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Abstract 
 
In this thesis I develop an account of  Nietzsche‘s great man framed around the idea that he is a 
‗monster of  energy.‘ In the first part I establish that Nietzsche developed a criterion to assess the 
value of  values, centred on whether they express abundance or exhaustion. Cultivating an 
abundance of  energy is the key to how we should approach the problem of  suffering, how we 
master ressentiment, and ultimately, how we experience authentic joy. We should thus use energy 
expenditure as the standard to evaluate the different narratives that we use to interpret ourselves 
and our existence. In the second part I use this criterion to establish the types of  narratives most 
conducive to creating oneself  as the monster of  energy. I argue that the great man should desire 
to determine his own will, should cultivate strength of  character, believe in the freedom of  his 
will, and take responsibility for the self  that he has created. Finally, I examine the attitude the 
great man should adopt towards his past, and argue that we should reject the idea that the eternal 
return plays an important role in the process of  becoming a great man, since this process should 
emphasise the necessity of  self-mastery, asceticism, and the cultivation of  a unified and volitional 
self. 
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Oh if  only you understood my words: ―Go ahead and do whatever you will - but first be the kind of  
people who can will!‖ (Z, III, 5) 
 
 
This man who had returned could not remember any time in his life when he had not been fired with the 
will to become a great man; it was a desire Ulrich seemed to have been born with. Such a dream may of  
course betray vanity and stupidity, but it is no less true that it is a fine and proper ambition without 
which there probably would not be very many great men in the world. 
 
Robert Musil, The Man Without Qualities1 
 
 
In the end there appears a man, a monster of  energy, who demands a monster of  a task. (WP 
995/KSA 11:26 [409]) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                 
1 Robert Man Without Qualities, trans. Sophie Wilkins and Burton Pike, Picador, London, 1995, p. 31. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
My goal is to pursue the heroic figure of  Nietzsche‘s writings. He is not the noble barbarian of 
On the Genealogy of  Morals, but the great man whose presence is felt throughout Nietzsche, and 
who he at various times names the philosophical ―commander‖ (BGE 211), the ―artist-tyrant‖ 
(WP 960/KSA 12:2[57]), and the ―Übermensch‖ (Z, I. Prologue). I emphasise, above all, that the 
great man must create himself as the ―monster of  energy‖ (WP 995/KSA 11:26[409]). While 
Nietzsche sometimes speculates enthusiastically that society might take control of  breeding great 
men, he is starkly ambiguous over how this might be achieved, at times suggesting that we must 
protect great men from the weak, that the ―healthy should remain segregated from the sick,‖ whilst 
at others he emphasises that great men tend to appear precisely under the harshest conditions, 
when they face the greatest resistance (GM III, 14).2 He instead generally prioritises inward drive 
and expansion over external forming and shaping, and develops an account of  the narratives that 
great men tend to create to interpret themselves and their existence. It is these narratives of  self-
interpretation that constitute Nietzsche‘s great man theory proper. It is by analysing the 
underlying narratives that the great man uses to interpret himself  that we can bring together, and 
reconcile, apparently contradictory attributes that he often assigns to great historical figures. I 
will distinguish two strands of  Nietzsche‘s thought about what is involved in achieving greatness: 
narratives about the mind, and narratives about the body. It is helpful to distinguish between 
these, because commentators addressing Nietzsche‘s writings on the self  often neglect one of 
these strands, and sometimes both.  
Nietzsche makes several prominent claims about the importance of  physiology, arguing: 
that fluctuating physiological states affect thought more than we generally suppose; that we 
cannot readily separate consciousness from the drives or passions; that we can diagnose masses 
of  individuals and great periods of  history as suffering from exhaustion; that philosophers have 
been generally ignorant of  the importance of  physiology, especially when dealing with the 
problem of  suffering; and that we must take the body seriously as an object of  analysis.3 We can 
divide Nietzsche scholars into two camps, based on how they respond to some or all of  these 
claims. Firstly, significant numbers of  Nietzsche scholars ignore all or most of  these claims and 
                                                                 
2 See, for example, TI IX, 38: ―One would have to seek the highest type of  free man where the greatest 
resistance is constantly being overcome.‖ 
3 I will cover all of  these themes in detail, but see, for instance: WP 54/KSA 13:15[13], NCW preface, TI, 
VI, 2-6.  
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fail to think through their repercussions, or at least fail to take them seriously. This leads them to 
reproduce something akin to the traditional image of  the subject, ignoring the problems 
Nietzsche finds with it, and solving none of  the problems related to physiology. Such studies can 
of  course contribute valuably to the study of  the Nietzschean great man (and have), but by 
avoiding the crucial arguments he makes about, for example, the link between expending energy 
and creating values, or the need to reconcile responsibility with his criticisms of  the will as 
faculty, these studies inevitably fail to capture the richness and tensions in the figure of  the great 
man. We could single out a work like Kaufmann‘s influential Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, 
Antichrist as exemplifying this, but, truth be told, we could place a vast number of  texts on 
Nietzsche in this strand: if  we take just one of  Nietzsche‘s preoccupations, how one should respond 
to exhaustion, then we will find very few texts that address this issue in any detail. 4 For most 
authors the issue of  exhaustion just does not seem to be a problem worth considering, and thus 
I will have to demonstrate that energy expenditure is central to understanding Nietzsche‘s 
thought. For now we might note in passing that Nietzsche could hardly make less of  a secret of 
the importance of  exhaustion, and the importance of  physiology more generally, such as in the 
following passage: ―The race is corrupted - not by its vices but by its ignorance; it is corrupted 
because it did not recognise exhaustion as exhaustion: mistakes about physiological states are the 
source of  all ills‖ (WP 54/KSA 13:15[13]).  
Secondly, there is a strand of  thought that is attentive to Nietzsche‘s emphasis on the 
body‘s importance, but takes his criticism of  the subject too seriously in certain respects. By this I 
mean that, in emphasising Nietzsche‘s criticisms of  the ‗traditional‘ idea of  the subject,  these 
scholars reject concepts such as the unified ‗I,‘ free will, volition, responsibility, and so on, 
invariably in favour of  some kind of  dispersed, decentred, or disunited idea of  the self. In 
discussing this strand of  thought I will consider such disparate authors as Georges Bataille, Alex 
McIntyre, William Connolly, Henry Miller, Antonin Artaud, and Alan Weiss. In forsaking the 
unity of  the self, some authors in this strand contribute significantly towards understanding the 
arguments Nietzsche makes about physiology; for example, in On Nietzsche Bataille interprets 
Nietzsche experimentally, putting the idea of  energy expenditure at the centre of  his study, and 
this remains one of  the only studies to take this issue seriously. Others merely ‗trade‘ the unity of 
the self  for a rather vague ‗decentred‘ or ‗dispersed‘ image of  the self, and generally fail to take 
seriously questions of  how one should think about oneself. What unites all these authors, 
however, is that they are sceptical towards, and/or reject, the idea of  the unified self, and attempt 
                                                                 
4 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, fourth edition, Princeton University Press, 
New Jersey, 1974.  
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to rethink the self  in such a way that sidesteps traditional accounts of  volition, free will, agency, 
responsibility, etc. I will argue, in contrast, that we cannot separate Nietzsche‘s great man from a 
version of  the unified self, both volitional and responsible. 
Both of  these strands of  thought contribute positively to interpreting Nietzsche‘s 
thought, and both are to some extent understandable, because there is a significant tension in 
Nietzsche‘s thought between these two sets of  narratives, those that emphasise the mind and 
those that emphasise the body, and this, at times, makes him appear inconsistent. At times he 
lapses into a rather distasteful physiological reductionism, especially in his earlier works, 
particularly Human All too Human (1878), although as late as The Gay Science (1882) he feels 
comfortable describing the innovation of  great men in the following terms: ―The reason why 
these individuals have different feelings and tastes is usually to be found in some oddity of  their 
life style, nutrition, or digestion, perhaps a deficit or excess of  inorganic salts in their blood and 
brain; in brief, in their physis‖ (GS 39). On the contrary, at other times he seems to reproduce the 
same image of  the subject that he criticises elsewhere, apparently relying on concepts such as the 
will, free will, responsibility, that he elsewhere declares are imaginary. It is thus understandable 
that many commentators assume that Nietzsche holds one position or the other, especially if 
one hopes to flatten out his thought‘s apparent contradictions forcibly. It is certainly logical to 
suppose that emphasising physiology will tend to weaken the coherence, strength, and unity of  
the mind, and it is equally logical to suppose that emphasising the unity of  the mind and the self 
will tend to downplay physiology‘s influence. I think, however, that we can account for these 
tensions rather than eliminate them, account for both the narratives of  the mind and the body, 
and only by doing so do we get a sense of  the great man‘s identity. What we need is an account 
of  the great man that fully develops Nietzsche‘s physiological arguments, but incorporates these 
into the types of  self-narrative most conducive to greatness. I will demonstrate that it is 
impossible to understand what he wants to express in the idea of  the great man unless we 
understand the apparently contrasting, but ultimately complimentary nature, of  both of  these 
sets of narratives, reconciling his writings on physiology and on the mind through the idea of 
the strong Will.  
I construct the Nietzschean great man in two stages. In the first part I establish criteria 
that we can use to evaluate different narratives of  interpreting oneself. This must be sufficiently 
flexible that it can account for all that Nietzsche praises and criticises about individuals, but also 
stable enough that it can provide a basis for future evaluating and to ground actual practices of 
self-creation. First, I consider the nature of  his criticisms of  traditional ideas about the self, 
arguing that they are united through condemning ignorance to the practice of  falsely and 
 10 
 
 
unhelpfully interpreting the causes of  suffering. These both reflect and perpetuate widespread 
exhaustion. Second, having diagnosed the central role that suffering and exhaustion play when 
Nietzsche negatively characterises individuals, societies, values and theories of  the self, I establish 
the primary role that the concept of  intoxication plays in combating this exhaustion. I develop a 
hierarchical account of  intoxication by identifying the weaknesses of  the key Nietzschean figures 
of  the modern artist and the ascetic priest, and subsequently I distinguish between inauthentic 
and authentic forms of  intoxication, whereby I condemn the former as symptomatic of 
exhaustion, weakness, and a desire to lose oneself. Third, I develop an idea of  authentic 
intoxication, and argue that it is the highest Nietzschean state, synonymous with joy, æsthetic 
perfection, increasing energy, a feeling of  power and growth, and with a strong Will. It is this 
state that distinguishes the great man, and the possibility of  this state that provides a way to 
assess different narratives of  the self.  
In the second part, I use this idea of  abundance to draw Nietzsche‘s fragmented 
arguments about the great man into three narratives concerning how he should interpret his 
inner life and his relation with the world to enhance his possibility of  greatness, i.e., achieve 
authentic intoxication. These narratives are the constitutive parts of  a wider narrative, that 
Nietzsche names the strong Will. First, I argue that the great man must cultivate a narrative of  
self-determination, which involves him cultivating character (being able to resist stimulus), 
autonomy and sovereignty; willing rather than being willed. Second, he must cultivate an attitude to 
himself  and his Will that enables him to respond appropriately to his suffering, and achieve 
authentic joy. The main narrative to achieve this is believing that his Will is free, not just in the 
sense that he chooses his actions, but in the sense of  taking responsibility for creating himself, 
and thus all that he is. Third, I discuss the attitude Nietzsche proposes that we take towards the 
past, and discuss the idea of  the eternal return, so often thought to be Nietzsche‘s most 
important doctrine, and argue that it cannot work as a narrative to achieve greatness.  
Anyone writing on Nietzsche must deal with the question of  how to interpret him. The 
difficulties of  interpreting his work are by now fairly extensively documented: many authors 
highlight the problems that his literary style causes, since he rejects the (more) traditional 
philosophical essay in favour of  aphorisms, a full length tragic drama (Zarathustra) and even 
poems. Blondel argues that Nietzsche‘s style is ―discontinuous and aphoristic, in contrast to the 
architectonic project of  classical philosophy.‖5 Detwiler argues that ―Nietzsche‘s various literary 
styles lead to a highly digressive and disjointed mode of  presentation,‖ while White singles out 
both the ―violence‖ of  Nietzsche‘s rhetoric and his lack of  ―unitary, coherent essays‖ as 
                                                                 
5
 Eric Blondel, Nietzsche: The Body and Culture, trans. Sean Hand, Athlone, London, 1991. 
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obstacles to interpreting him. 6 7  If  one hopes to in some way address Nietzsche‘s overall 
philosophy, rather than develop one or two specific, semi-isolated and perhaps unexplored 
aspects of  his texts (his relationship to Heraclitus, or Napoleon, or suchlike), one must deal with 
at least two issues. Firstly, and most importantly, how one will choose which concepts or ideas to 
prioritise, how to arrange the material, how to structure and drive one‘s arguments, to what 
extent one wants to ‗systemise‘ Nietzsche, and so on. Secondly, one must choose what one wants 
to do with Nietzsche‘s rhetoric, polemical style, and his literary excesses or brilliance (depending 
on who is interpreting it); in particular, whether or not to try to strip this away and reveal 
philosophical coherence (or incoherence) ‗beneath,‘ or whether his style is in some way intrinsic 
to his thought, worthy of  careful analysis. 
There is something akin to an orthodox method of  interpreting philosophers, consisting 
broadly of  choosing and listing a philosopher‘s most important concepts, and then attempting to 
reconcile them into a system of  thought. Although this methodology dominates interpretations 
of  Nietzsche, I will argue that it is an unsuitable approach to his style. In contrast, I propose  that 
a methodology that aims to capture the underlying spirit of  his thought, including the excesses 
of  his style, can better make sense of  his apparent contradictions and nuances. Furthermore, we 
can complement such an approach by incorporating a method Henry Staten describes as 
―psychodialectical,‖ which he exemplifies in his seminal Nietzsche‘s Voice, where he pays attention 
to the (often disparate) relationship between the force of  Nietzsche‘s utterances and the  logical 
structure of  his texts.8 
The most common approach to any philosopher‘s thought is to list his most important 
concepts, explain what they mean, examine to what extent they complement or contradict one 
another, and establish a hierarchy of  importance between them to flatten out contradictions. 
Over time, orthodoxy has evolved over the central concepts of  Nietzsche‘s work, that pushes the 
will to power, the eternal return, the Übermensch, and his criticisms of  morality to the forefront, 
adorning these with a selection from the Dionysian, the revival of  tragedy, noble and slave 
morality, the death of  God, nihilism, and so on. There are two main problems with this most 
popular approach. Firstly, it is not always clear - and sometimes entirely unclear - why these 
concepts have been chosen. For example, the eternal return barely features outside of  Thus Spoke 
                                                                 
6 Bruce Detwiler, Nietzsche and the Politics of  Aristocratic Radicalism, The University of  Chicago Press, 
London, 1990, p. 9. 
7 Alan White, Within Nietzsche‘s Labyrinth, Routledge, New York, 1990, p. 6. 
8 Henry Staten, Nietzsche's Voice, Cornell University Press, New York, 1990, p. 2. 
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Zarathustra, and never in any detail, as does the Übermensch.9 It is popular to write something on 
The Birth of  Tragedy, even though when an author structures his work conceptually, this tends to 
mean he rather loses track of  the way that the meaning of  its themes shift dramatically in 
Nietzsche‘s later work. Staten argues that he is ―not convinced that the topics made de rigueur by 
the conventions of  Nietzsche scholarship are necessarily the most important,‖ and cites that, 
although the ―the question of  pity‖ appears throughout his texts, ―yet this question plays no 
significant role in any of  the commentaries on Nietzsche that I know.‖10 
Secondly, beyond the issue of  choosing which concepts are central lies a far greater 
problem: it is far from clear that this is a helpful way to treat any philosopher‘s work, even if  we 
are clear on what his most important concepts are. It is even less clear that this is an appropriate 
way to treat Nietzsche, as we shall see. Commentators that attempt to address Nietzsche‘s 
philosophy rigorously and analytically tend to strip away both the way that he chose to present 
his thoughts and the way in which he chose to structure them, aiming to reveal the philosophical 
coherence buried beneath. Perhaps the most extreme example of  this is Arthur Danto‘s 
approach in Nietzsche as Philosopher, where he argues that Nietzsche‘s ―language would have been 
less colourful had he known what he was trying to say‖ and that the way in which he chose to 
structure his work was completely irrelevant:11  
 
Any given aphorism or essay might as easily have been placed in one volume as in 
another without much affecting the unity or structure of  either. And the books 
themselves, except for their chronological ordering, do not exhibit any special structure 
as a corpus. No one of  them presupposes an acquaintance with any other. Although 
there undoubtedly was a development in Nietzsche‘s thought and in his style, his writings 
may be read in pretty much any order, without this greatly impeding the comprehension 
in his ideas.12 
 
While most writers stop short of  claiming that Nietzsche‘s style was due to him lacking clarity of  
thought and expression, most are content to develop his philosophy by examining what they take 
to be - or merely assume to be - his most important concepts. Whether or not we agree with 
Danto – and I am going to disagree with him substantially – at least he takes a clear 
methodological position, and attempts to justify it. Some take this methodology for granted, 
                                                                 
9 For example, the well-known ―demon‖ passage in The Gay Science, (GS 341), a few mentions in Ecce Homo 
(e.g., p. 69), and in the conclusion to The Will to Power, although the material was arranged posthumously. 
None of  these are sustained discussions. 
10 Ibid., p. 1. 
11 Arthur C. Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, Columbia University Press, New York, 2005, p. xxv. 
12 Ibid., p. 1. 
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such as David Owen, in Nietzsche, Politics and Modernity, whose brief  introduction merely states the 
order that he will cover themes in, apparently assuming that making sense of  key Nietzschean 
themes will yield a coherent account of  his philosophy that he can then compare to liberalism.13 
Others, such as Detwiler‘s Nietzsche and the Politics of  Aristocratic Radicalism, at least discuss some 
of  the difficulties with interpreting Nietzsche, before he decides that he will take this orthodox 
approach anyway.14 Whenever a commentator tries to take Nietzsche‘s thought and analyse it 
conceptually, reconcile apparent discrepancies, and form some kind of  philosophical system, 
they adopt a certain stance towards his writings, often without explicitly acknowledging it. 
Nietzsche chose his style deliberately, and there is no reason not to assume that he wrote as he 
did to express ideas that he either: felt he could not express in a philosophical system; did not 
think it possible to express in a philosophical system; thought he could more easily express 
outside of  a philosophical system. Occasionally a commentator takes a clear stance on these 
issues, such as when Danto asserts that Nietzsche was simply unable to express himself  clearly 
enough to construct a philosophical system. More often, he merely assumes that we do not lose 
anything by stripping away Nietzsche‘s style and all of  its excesses, or that what we lose is more 
than made up for by the coherence that we (apparently) gain. I think, however, that we trade too 
much of  the meaning of  Nietzsche‘s thought if  we try to systemise it around a series of 
concepts. Nietzsche explicitly attempts to displace the traditional image of  the philosopher, 
arguing that the philosopher has often been conflated w ith the ―philosophical labourer‖ (BGE 
211). The philosophical labourer‘s method, exemplified by Kant and Hegel, is organising the past 
and making prior value-creations intelligible, by reducing them to formulas. In contrast, 
Nietzsche identifies himself  as an ―actual philosopher,‖ who builds upon the work of  the 
philosophical labourer and establishes future values: 
 
It is the duty of  these scholars to take everything that has hitherto happened and been 
valued, and make it clear, distinct, intelligible and manageable, to abbreviate everything 
long, even ‗time‘ itself, and to subdue the entire past: a tremendous and wonderful task in 
the service of which every subtle pride, every tenacious will can certainly find 
satisfaction. Actual philosophers, however, are commanders and law-givers: they say ‗thus it shall 
be!‘, and is they who determine the Wherefore and Whither of  mankind, and they 
possess for this task the preliminary work of all the philosophical labourers, of all those 
have who subdued the past - they reach for the future with a creative hand, and 
everything that is or has been becomes for them a means, an instrument, a hammer. 
                                                                 
13 David Owen, Nietzsche, Politics & Modernity, Sage Publications, London, 1995. 
14 Detwiler, p. 9-11. 
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(BGE 211) 
 
It is crucial to understand the stress that Nietzsche places on the normative value of  his thought, 
that is, his attempt to convey an image of  how we should be, and what we ought to do. He 
deliberately collapses the distinction between truth-claims and normative statements in a way 
that most philosophy does not, or at least does not admit to. It is not just his flamboyant 
rhetoric, his aphoristic style, or his shifts in literary style that blurs this distinction: he does not 
concern himself  with exhaustively defining any of  the concepts that are often interpreted as 
central to his thought, nor explain how they are supposed to fit together. This is because the use 
of  these ideas is bound up with the normative force Nietzsche designs them to express. 
Therefore, the problem is not just that it is difficult to systematise his thought, it is that when we 
strip away his literary style, we lose at least some of  the content, and most of  the force, of  his 
normative claims. Of  course, this is fine if  our explicit aim is, as Danto‘s is, to measure Nietzsche 
by the standards of  the philosophical labourer, and establish whether or not his thought is 
conceptually coherent (although I would dispute Danto‘s fundamental position, that essentially 
Nietzsche would be a philosophical labourer if  only he could express himself  more clearly). But 
if  we actually want to understand the meaning of  his thought as a whole, as he deliberately 
presented it, then we must approach it with a method that can capture its normative aspects.  
There are two broad methodological approaches, often overlapping considerably, that 
underpin many of  the best interpretations of  Nietzsche, and promise to also yield the most 
promising results in the future. The first approach is isolating one theme or concept and using it 
to structure one‘s narrative about Nietzsche‘s project, bringing in other writings and concepts 
only where necessary or helpful. This can mean either establishing that one theme is of  central 
importance or at least indispensable to the project, or establishing that a certain spirit underpins 
Nietzsche‘s texts, and that we can use this either to explain or animate the rest of  his work. In 
both cases, this involves making some sort of  claim about Nietzsche‘s motivation for writing, i.e., 
putting forward a particular goal, idea or topic, and then explaining how he thought this could be 
enunciated through the style he chose, rather than a more traditional conceptual one (or at least 
how he might think it could best be enunciated in this way).  
A notable example of  such an approach is Bataille‘s On Nietzsche, where he argues that 
Nietzsche expresses an ―extreme, unconditional human yearning for the first time,‖ and that he 
―can‘t really define it, but it motivates him and it‘s what he unreservedly makes his own.‖ 15 
Bataille argues that Nietzsche constructs his thought around an essential experience, a ―dazzling 
                                                                 
15 Georges Bataille, On Nietzsche, trans. Bruce Boone, Paragon House, St. Paul, 1992, p. xx. 
 15 
 
 
dissolution into totality,‖ and that his thought can only be understood by experiencing this same 
sensation: ―I want to be very clear on this: not a word of  Nietzsche‘s work can be understood 
without experiencing that dazzling dissolution into totality, without living it out.‖16 If  we take 
Bataille‘s contention seriously then the reasons behind Nietzsche‘s methodological choices are 
clear: he is motivated by, and attempting to capture, an essential experience whose character he 
can only gesture towards. Bataille aims to capture this experience by mixing esoteric 
autobiographical material with philosophical abstraction, subordinating theory to actual examples 
of  transgressive thoughts and practices: ―In the helter-skelter of  this book, I didn‘t develop my 
views as theory. In fact, I even believe that efforts of  that kind are tainted with ponderousness. 
Nietzsche wrote ―with his blood,‖ and criticising or, better, experiencing him means pouring out 
one‘s lifeblood.‖17 Bataille adopts a coherent methodological approach to interpret a thinker who 
writes as Nietzsche does. I agree with him that a joyful experience animates Nietzsche‘s thought, 
and that we should place this at the centre of  our interpretation. I disagree substantia lly, 
however, over what this joyful experience consists of, and will discuss this at length later.  
The second methodological approach to interpreting Nietzsche that is worth highlighting 
is one Henry Staten exemplifies in Nietzsche‘s Voice, one of  the finest Nietzsche studies. His 
approach does not contradict the other, but can be used to complement and enrich just about 
any approach. Staten describes his approach as a ―psychodialectical one‖:  
 
we pursue our psychodialectical investigation of  what Nietzsche calls the ―economy‖ of 
his soul (GS 338). Psychodialectical reading treats the interaction between the libidinal 
economy of a text and its logical and dialectical structures. It is a form of Nietzschean 
reading, as mediated by the thought of  Freud, Derrida, and Lonnie Durham, thought I 
consider to be in the tradition of  Nietzsche.18 
 
This sounds rather obscure, but in what follows Staten develops a close reading of  Nietzsche‘s 
texts that is masterful, paying special ―attention to dramatic context, tonal shifts, ambiguities, 
conflicts between what is said and the motivational forces inscribed within what is said, and the 
system of  entrances, exits, and interactions of  personae.‖19 Such a methodology provides Staten 
with a clear way to structure his text: he emphasises the aspects of  Nietzsche‘s text that ―most 
revealingly manifest‖ its ‗psychodialectic.‘ 20  And because Staten looks for Nietzsche‘s most 
                                                                 
16 Ibid., p. xxxi-xxxii. 
17 Ibid., p. xxiv 
18 Staten., p. 2. 
19 Ibid., p. 5 
20 Ibid., p. 1. 
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dramatic pronouncements, his largest rhetorical flourishes, his most intense contradictions and 
his most deeply buried ambiguities, it transpires that the material he concentrates on is among 
Nietzsche‘s most interesting. Staten emphasises and explores precisely the tensions that other 
commentators try to collapse, and this leads him to a novel and rich interpretation.  
Staten‘s approach could not be further from the one that I have been criticising, as he 
makes no attempt to force material into conceptual lists, or ‗soften‘ Nietzsche‘s literary style. 
Staten‘s interest is in precisely the material that other authors often strip away under the guise 
that it is unhelpful or contradictory: ―The ―frequent rhetorical excesses‖ and ―ill -considered 
shots... At various targets‖ which Richard Schact dismisses as ―so much unfortunate static‖ are 
integral parts of  the movement of  Nietzsche‘s writings. To subtract them is to subtract 
Nietzsche‘s signature from his text, to be left with an anonymous patchwork of  ―views.‖21 Of  
course, Staten‘s methodological approach does not preclude the one that Bataille employs. 
Staten‘s search for Nietzsche‘s richest tensions leads him to a central tension vis-à-vis the great 
man‘s expenditure, and he uses this to drive his narrative. His complex account belies any 
attempt to summarise it, although I will address it in part later.22 
One of  the only commentaries that rival Staten‘s is Klossowski‘s Nietzsche and the Vicious 
Circle, which loosely incorporates both of  the methodological approaches I am praising. 
Klossowski‘s investigation centres on the idea of  the eternal return (the ‗vicious circle‘), but it 
becomes increasingly clear that its real importance is not as a philosophical concept, but as a 
―lived experience‖ that strikes at the centre of  Nietzsche‘s disposition. 23  Klossowski‘s 
investigation places Nietzsche‘s preoccupations, his ‗lived experience,‘  at its forefront, but he is 
nonetheless careful not to slide into the crude vulgarity that often goes hand in hand with 
speculating about psychological motivation. Like Staten, he tries to make sense of  ―the 
whisperings, the breathings, the bursts of  anger and laughter‖ of  Nietzsche‘s prose, arguing that 
the excesses to which he tends reveal that he is obsessed with maintaining the boundaries of  his 
self  (identity) against his attraction to Chaos and self-dissolution: ―Now early on, Nietzsche was 
apprehensive about this propensity in himself, and his every effort was directed towards fighting 
the irresistible attraction that Chaos (or, more precisely, the ‗chasm‘) exerted on him.‖ 24 
Klossowski gives a broadly chronological account of  Nietzsche‘s thought, that centres on his 
experience of  the eternal return and its effect on his thinking, and concludes with his breakdown 
in Turin, which in a sense ‗resolves‘ this conflict, as Nietzsche loses his struggle for coherence. 
                                                                 
21 Ibid., p. 3 
22 I address his discussion of  the ascetic philosopher on p. 74. 
23 Pierre Klossowski, Nietzsche & the Vicious Circle, trans. Daniel W. Smith, Athlone, London, 1997, p. xv. 
24 Ibid., p. xiv & xv. 
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I am choosing to focus on the question of  the great man, because I think that it is the 
idea that animates all of  Nietzsche‘s thought. He obsessively returns to questions surrounding 
great men: their thoughts, their attitudes, how they interpret themselves, their place in driving the 
society‘s development, as value creators and lawgivers, the necessity of  protecting them from the 
weak and resentful, and their ability to redeem and justify entire ages and civilisations: ―Let me be 
granted a glimpse, just one glimpse of  something complete, wholly successful, happy, powerful, 
triumphant, something still capable of  inspiring fear! A glimpse of  a man who justifies mankind, 
of  a compensatory, redeeming stroke of  luck on the part of  man, a reason to retain faith in 
mankind!‖ (GM I, 12). It overlaps with his personal quest for greatness, for turning his apparent 
weaknesses into strengths, for integrating his drives and desires into a coherent image of  himself. 
In a stark admission in Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche confides the role that imagining 
greatness plays in overcoming his weakest periods, ―There are no such ―free spirits,‖ were none - 
but, as I said, I needed their company at the time, to be of  good cheer in the midst of  bad things 
(illness, isolation, foreignness, sloth, inactivity)‖ (HH 2). The question of  the great man 
consistently plays a significant role in overcoming his disgust at the present and present man, and 
he details this (we might even say he parodies it) in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. I freely subordinate all 
of  Nietzsche‘s ‗concepts‘ to my attempt to sketch the figure of  the great man, interpreting such 
ideas as the Übermensch, the eternal return, responsibility, freedom of  the will and character as 
values to aspire to, as narratives for understanding oneself. For example, in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, while the Übermensch is ostensibly a declaration designed to win over the marketplace, 
it is also a narrative that Zarathustra uses to structure his own existence, both in terms of  his 
drives and passions, but also his relation to the herd. In fact, the whole of  Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
is best read as an attempt to convey the kinds of  narratives that a great man uses to interpret 
himself  and his existence. This does not mean that Nietzsche does not make any truth-claims, or 
that all his ideas are arbitrary. It means that he chooses to structure and simplify complex cause 
and effect (Becoming) in such a way that achieves a certain set of  effects, and these relate to the 
effect that values have on the possibility of  developing great men. The more successfully we can 
describe the process by which the great man creates himself, the closer we get to understanding 
the underlying spirit of  Nietzsche's thought. My aim is to capture the normative sense of  his 
writings, and to do this we must pay attention to his style, which he designs to express this 
normative force. As I will establish shortly, Nietzsche could not just describe the great man, 
because part of  this greatness is being able to determine and create oneself  in a way that one 
chooses. Hence Nietzsche relies on rhetoric, assuming a style that he intends to seduce those 
who aspire to greatness. He intends his writings to be both inspirational and to impart 
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knowledge about the kind of  ways it is most helpful to think about oneself.  He begins with the 
idea that absolute self-knowledge is impossible, and this allows him to argue that man must create 
himself.  
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I 
 
 
The Self and Exhaustion 
 
 
 
―And so we necessarily remain a mystery to ourselves, we fail to understand ourselves, we are bound to mistake 
ourselves.‖ (GM, I, 1)  
 
 I will determine the nature of  creating oneself  by initially examining and establishing the 
grounds upon which Nietzsche‘s criticism of  narratives of  the self, and value systems generally, 
rest. His attempt to revaluate substantially the basis for thinking about the self  is rooted in 
rejecting the possibility that a man can know or discern the ‗truth‘ about his inner life. Broadly, 
he rejects the autonomy of  consciousness from the drives or passions, arguing that multiple 
drives compose the self, seek to expand their domain, and therefore struggle for ascendancy. 
Consciousness or the intellect evolves from a particular relationship between drives that stabilises 
over time. Thought likewise does not appear independently of  drives, but is affected by a 
momentary balance of  power between drives: ―We can rise or sink to no other 'reality' than the 
reality of  our drives – for thinking is only the relationship of  these drives to one another‖ (BGE 
66). Nietzsche argue that consciousness exhibits certain tendencies; in particular, frequently 
referring to it as the ―cause-creating drive,‖ because it simplifies and falsifies the drives‘ act ivity 
to represent it to itself  (TI VI, 4). It also acts similarly on the external world. It therefore posits a 
unity of  origin onto the multiplicity of  drives, and represents this unity as the subject: ―The 
subject: this is the term for our belief  in a unity underlying all the different impulses of  the 
highest feeling of  reality: we understand this belief  as the effect of  one cause‖ (WP 485/KSA 
12:10[19]). Believing in the subject is a simplification in that it involves projecting simple cause 
and effect onto complexity. ―Everything that enters consciousness as ―unity‖ is already 
tremendously complex: we always have only a semblance of  unity‖ (WP 489/KSA 12:5[56]). 
One aspect of  the limitations of  self-knowledge is that language can only crudely designate 
nuanced and subtle states; language hinders us ―when we want to explain inner processes and 
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drives,‖ because ―words really only exist for superlative degrees of  these processes and drives,‖ 
while the ―lower degrees... elude us‖ (D 115). However, this is more than just a language 
problem; the wider problem is that consciousness lacks the means to uncover the causality of 
body accurately. As one aspect of  the overall process, consciousness tends to interpret falsely, that 
is, usefully. It assumes that it both causes thoughts and actions, and that it truthfully represents 
events. 
Alexander Nehamas argues that we tend to interpret ―mental acts‖ as distinct:  
 
We assume that each of  them is an object in its own right: a thought, a desire, a wish, a 
belief. We separate them from one another, subordinate some to others, consider some 
causes and others effect. We therefore think that each has a character of  its own, 
independent of  its interrelations with other such events as well as with the events of  
which we are not aware in the first place... (instead, there is a) single continuum which we 
cannot see in its totality.25 
 
Consciousness fails to conceive of  itself  as one agent in a wider process, and tends to impose its 
own regularity and uniformity onto complex cause and effect. In contrast, Nietzsche reinserts a 
complexity into the relation between thoughts, deeds, and the image of  the deed: ―But thought is 
one thing, and deed another, and the image of  a deed yet another. The wheel of  motive does not 
roll between them‖ (Z, I, 6). Consciousness‘ unwillingness and inability to comprehend or 
represent the complex cause and effect of  the inner life imposes limitations on the possibility of  
attaining self-knowledge: ―We rub our ears after the fact and ask in complete surprise and 
embarrassment: 'What was that we just experienced?', or even 'Who are we really?‘ Then we 
count back over in retrospect, as I said, every one of  the twelve trembling strokes of  our 
experience, our life, our being – and alas! Lose our count in the process...‖ (GM I, 1). Denying 
absolute self-knowledge does not mean that all narratives and ideas about the self  are equally 
true or false; it simply means that we require criteria to evaluate ideas about the self. Nehamas 
distinguishes neatly between simplifying and falsifying ideas about oneself, where the former are 
necessary, whilst the latter are superfluous and undesirable:  
 
(Nietzsche) believes that all human practices - moral, religious, artistic, or cognitive - 
involve the sort of  selection and simplification that I have been discussing. There can 
therefore always be alternatives to any given system. But he also believes that though we 
necessarily simplify whatever we are to deal with, it is also true that at least in many cases 
                                                                 
25 Alexander Nehamas, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, Harvard University Press, London, 1985, p. 77. 
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we think that we don‘t. And it is just here that falsification enters the picture: it is 
produced by the belief  that the particular enterprise in which one is involved or which 
one values the most is exempt from simplification, that it is the only possible or correct 
mode of  proceeding.26 
 
Interpreting always involves simplifying, but it is only when we take an interpretation to be 
absolute that we are also falsifying. At the same time, Nehamas points out that we must take each 
simplification to be ―a very good, perhaps the best‖ interpretation, rather than one ―among 
equally good alternatives.‖27 But thinking that we are simplifying in the best way is not the same 
as thinking that it is absolutely true, and the only possible interpretation, and it is this last idea 
that Nietzsche denies in his claim of  perspectivism: ―What must be denied instead is the more 
fundamental claim that there could ever be a complete theory or interpretation of  anything, a 
view that accounts for ―all‖ the facts; we must deny the claim that the notion of  ―all the facts‖ is 
sensible in the first place.‖28 This perspectivist claim does not only hold for analysing oneself, but 
we should extend it to the world more generally. Nietzsche extends this distinction between 
simple and complex onto the external world, conceptualising it in the ideas of  ‗Becoming‘ and 
‗Being.‘ When we impose simple cause and effect, that is, narratives onto the world, we impose a 
theory of  being: ―Being is everywhere thought in, foisted on, as cause‖ (TI III, 5). Nietzsche 
develops a complex account of  the interplay between Being and Becoming, and part of  this is 
imposing narratives of  simple causal relations onto the self.  
The result of  conceiving of  self-interpretation in these terms, as consciousness imposing 
simple cause and effect onto complex, is that while Nietzsche imposes limits on the possibility 
of  accurately designating the processes of  the body, within these limits we must evaluate narrative and 
ideas according to a different criterion than merely that of  truth. We must criticise the will to 
truth, because truth cannot function as the sole criterion for evaluating the different ways of 
interpreting oneself: ―The will to truth requires critique – let us define our own task in this way – 
the value of  truth must for once, by way of  experiment, be called into question...‖ (GM III, 24). 
Since there is a threshold where self-knowledge becomes impossible, we require different methods 
to evaluate ideas about the self. This is the meaning of  Nietzsche‘s pronouncement: ―Revaluation 
of  all values!‖ (AC 62). While they generally recognise this, commentators rarely extend this 
approach to the realm of  the self, where truth apparently remains the standard for both 
criticising the self, and the sparse attempts to articulate a positive vision of  the self  and its 
                                                                 
26 Ibid., p. 57. 
27 Ibid., p. 59. 
28 Ibid., p. 64. 
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relation to itself. The narratives concerning oneself  should not, however, be immune from the 
criticisms of  the will to truth. Nietzsche complicates this project by continuing to make apparent 
truth claims about the self, whilst he evaluates by different methods. In numerous places 
Nietzsche calls into question the idea of  the ‗subject‘, but this is a claim he designs to force us to 
revaluate the self, and, on its own, does not require the ‗death of  the subject.29 On the contrary, 
Nietzsche argues that believing in the subject is the cornerstone of  man‘s development, ―habitual‖ 
and ―indispensable‖ (WP 484/KSA 12:10[158]). For example, thought‘s operation depends upon 
many of  the narratives that produce the traditional idea of  the self: ―Here we come to a limit: 
our thinking itself  involves this belief  (with its distinction of  substance, accident; deed, doer, 
etc.); to let it go means: being no longer able to think‖ (WP 487/KSA 12:7[63]). The basis for 
interpreting the self  cannot be - and should not be – merely truth; criticising the subject on the 
grounds that it is false transpires not only to be no be criticism at all, but also a self-defeating 
endeavour. Interpreting the inner life necessarily involves projecting simple cause and effect.  
Once we acknowledge the limits of  the project of  self-knowledge, we strip the charge of  
falsity of  any significant purchase. That is, once we accept that the depths of  the inner life are to 
some extent incommunicable and impossible to signify with certainty, we must accordingly switch 
our focus to questioning the value of  thinking about oneself  in a certain way: ―The falseness of  a 
judgement is to us to not necessarily an objection to a judgement: it is here that our new 
language sounds strangest. The question is to what extent it is life-advancing, life-preserving, 
species-preserving, perhaps even species-breeding; and our fundamental tendency is to assert 
that the falsest judgements... Are the most indispensable to us‖ (BGE 35). The great man must 
decide the type of  structure that he should impose on the complex phenomena of  his inner life, 
to shape and develop himself  as he pleases. While it is straightforward enough to imagine how 
we can evaluate ideas of  the self because of  their value, not their truth, it is less straightforward 
to determine of  what this value should consist. While Nehamas, for instance, recognises that 
criticising the will to truth has important repercussions for the criticisms of  the will to truth, I 
am not sure that he ever succeeds in making sense of  how we should assess ways of  interpreting 
oneself. Rather than truth per se, he argues that: ―The will to truth turns out to be an effort to 
establish a world in which one‘s best impulses and strongest needs can find expression, and in 
which perhaps, at least for a time, they can be satisfied.‖30 It is all very well to say that we should 
interpret the world in such a way that best enables our strongest needs to express themselves, but 
this does not give us any way to evaluate values on a wider scale. Nehamas later restates this 
                                                                 
29 See, for example, WP, 481/ KSA  12:7[60], GM I, 13. 
30 Ibid., p. 68-9. 
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criterion as ―The free spirits see their creations as views that are best for them and for those like 
them, if  there are any.‖31 But it is not at all clear what ‗best for them‘ actually means. Presumably 
in some sense everybody thinks that they interpret the world in a way best for them, or that best 
satisfies their needs, and so the phrase is little more than a tautology. Nehamas seems to leave no 
room to criticise other tables of  values, because we cannot say: ‗No, those views are not best for 
you at all, because they do not allow you do to X, or feel Y,‘ because we never get a sense of 
what X or Y could possibly be. 
Nehamas summarises Nietzsche‘s writings on interpreting the world as perspectivism: 
―Perspectivism does not result in the relativism that holds that any view is as good as any other; 
it holds that one‘s own views are the best for oneself  without implying that they need be good 
for anyone else.‖32 While perspectivism successfully avoids relativism, it still offers little means to 
evaluate the narratives that different men use to understand themselves. Thus on its own it 
cannot function as a guide for interpreting oneself, beyond the self-evident ‗believe what is best 
for you.‘ What we need is a criterion or criteria to evaluate different narratives; because Nietzsche 
does clearly believe that some are better than others. This is not to claim that there is one way to 
interpret the world and oneself  that he recommends to all, but is to acknowledge a hierarchy of 
interpretations, and the need to determine of  what this hierarchy consists as precisely as is 
possible. Nehamas admits, however, that he rejects the idea that there can be rules or principles 
to establish the kind of  conduct that makes a man great. He grounds this rejection in the way he 
defines the great man, or ‗true individual.‘ For Nehamas, it is nonsensical that we can specify how 
a man can come to create his own values, precisely because it is the way that the creative 
individual differs from the rest of  the world that is all important. ―A true individual is precisely 
one who is different from the rest of  the world, and there is no formula, no set of  rules, no code 
of  conduct that can possibly capture in informative terms what it is to be like that. There are no 
principles that we can follow in order to become, as Nietzsche wants us to become, unique. On 
the contrary, it is by breaking rules that such a goal, if  it is indeed a goal at all, can ever be 
reached.‖33 Nehamas does, however, admit that Nietzsche devotes considerable attention to 
suggesting how the great man creates himself; it is these suggestions that I will use to develop a 
criterion for assessing competing narratives about the self. Nehamas argues, however, that such 
an attempt is doomed to failure because of  his contentions in the above passage, that the great 
man must be unique and that this uniqueness can only be achieved by breaking rules.  
 
                                                                 
31 Ibid., p. 71. 
32 Ibid., p. 72. 
33 Ibid., p. 225. 
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The best that can be expected in this regard is a set of  vague and banal guidelines, 
statements like, ―Use all your abilities and deny none, for any denial will be guided by the 
values that rule your world, whether you want to or not, and so you will fail to be as a 
different after all‖ - statements of  which Nietzsche‘s writing is full... None of Nietzsche‘s 
examples show how one can become like the individuals he admires, and it is not even 
clear that this is their intent.34 
 
As Nietzsche: Life as Literature develops, Nehamas argues that Nietzsche‘s central concern is with 
the unity and coherence of  a man‘s life. We should evaluate individual actions and traits relative 
to how they contribute to his life as a whole: ―Given his general view that the character of 
everything is given only through its constantly changing interrelations, Nietzsche can now argue 
that traits of  character and actions can be evaluated only in light of  their contributions to a 
complete person, a complete life, or, as he would doubtless prefer to put it himself, a complete 
work.‖35 However, even if  this superficially looks like a criterion to evaluate values, Nehamas 
makes it clear that it cannot function in this way, since there is no mechanism for evaluating a 
man‘s whole life: ―there also is no type of  life that is in itself  to be  commended or damned.‖36 We 
are thus back where we started: unity and coherence might be praiseworthy principles in general, 
but they say little about what the actual life of  the individual is like, and Nietzsche therefore 
apparently does not, and cannot, say anything interesting about the ―true individual‖: ―Nietzsche 
cannot therefore have a general view of  conduct that can apply to everyone and also be specific 
and interesting.‖37 All Nietzsche can do, for Nehamas, is construct himself, through his works, as 
a literary character; but his attempt to turn ‗life into literature‘ ultimately leaves him requiring 
readers to judge whether his attempt has been successful: ―every text is at the mercy of  its 
readers.‖38 Since even if  he does succeed in this it does not guarantee that he is either great or 
even praiseworthy in general, there does not appear to be a tremendous amount at stake. 
Incidentally, there is also something horribly reactive about Nehamas‘ conclusion that creating 
oneself  as a literary character leaves one requiring an audience to judge the success of  our 
creation. Nehamas argues that this is necessary because of  the absence of  complete self-
knowledge, which means that the question of  whether we have successfully achieved unity of 
self  must be ―finally decided from the outside."39 Furthermore, Nehamas asserts, no one can 
                                                                 
34 Ibid., p. 226. 
35 Ibid., p. 228. 
36 Ibid., p. 228. 
37 Ibid., p. 228. 
38 Ibid., p. 234. 
39 Ibid., p. 186. 
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hope to write themselves into history on their own.40 But there is an obvious retort to this: it is 
not at all clear why the feeling of  unity and coherence should not be more important than some 
objective standard of  it. Nehamas argues that ―the distinction between the fact and the feeling 
of  unity must be pressed and maintained,‖ but it is not especially clear why we should maintain it, 
unless objective unity is a goal in itself.41 I will establish that it is the feeling of  growth that is of  
paramount importance, and this depends only on the feeling of  unity, not ―public,‖ recognition 
of  it, and thus it does not put one ―at the mercy of  one‘s audience.‖42 I will focus, however, on 
objecting to Nehamas‘ arguments, interesting and innovative as they are, in more fundamental 
ways. 
The logic of  Nehamas‘ fundamental argument seems simple enough: to be a true 
individual is to be unique, no code of  conduct can explain what it is to be unique, and therefore 
there is no point trying to extract a code of conduct from Nietzsche. Yet this account is both 
perplexing and troubling, since this logical move so poorly describes Nietzsche‘s ‗positive 
philosophy.‘ To start with, his goal is not explaining what it is actually like to be unique, or trying 
to help anyone imagine it. His goal is explaining the process through which the great man learns to 
create his own values. Creating one‘s values makes one unique, but there is nothing necessarily 
unique (at least in any thick use of  the idea) about the process through which one comes to 
acquire this ability. On the one hand, this seems so obvious that pointing it could almost be 
banal, but, on the other, Nehamas inexplicably seems not to distinguish between the process and 
its product. Nietzsche‘s interest is in highlighting common themes in the process of  becoming a 
great man. Of  course, this is not a complete set of  guidelines or a code of  conduct, but this does 
not mean that they are not useful, and dismissing these guidelines as ‗vague and banal,‘  as 
Nehamas does, merely seems bizarre. Nietzsche‘s certainly does not intend his positive proposals 
to be entirely structured and coherent, but this just shows that he was not designing inflexible 
‗rules‘ for conduct, but rather identifying recurring themes in the way that great men tend to 
think about themselves and existence.  
At least part of  Nehamas‘ problem is the way he sets up the ‗true individual.‘ I will argue 
that, whilst creating values is one of  the great man‘s characteristics, it is not the only one. Other 
ideas are also crucial, and it is the presence of  all these that establishes greatness. Whilst 
Nehamas highlights the one aspect of  the great man - his creating values - that is unique and 
thus to some extent impossible to represent, he completely avoids the other aspects, that 
Nietzsche can, and does, sketch in some detail, albeit in his characteristically fragmented way. 
                                                                 
40 Ibid., p. 234. 
41 Ibid., p. 186. 
42 Ibid., p. 186. 
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Nehamas thus picks up on the end of  the process, and misses the process itself. I want to 
suggest that the process is cultivating a certain type of  way of  thinking about oneself, which 
makes greatness possible. It is only once all the elements of  greatness are in place that the final 
product will be unique and impossible to have specified in advance. To do so I will establish the 
grounds upon which Nietzsche criticises traditional narratives of  the self, concentrating, in 
particular, on where his criticisms diverge from merely pointing out the contingency and 
falsehood of  different narratives.  
 
The Traditional Image of  the Subject 
 
But the sane man at least tries to strike a balance. The Christians, who weren‘t sane, told people that they‘d got to 
throw half  of  themselves in the waste-paper basket. And now the scientists and business men come and tell us 
that we must throw away half  of  what the Christians have left us. But I don‘t want to be three-quarters dead. I 
prefer to be alive, entirely alive. It‘s time there was a revolt in favour of  life and wholeness. Aldous Huxley, 
Point Counter-point43 
 
 To establish Nietzschean narratives for thinking about oneself, we need to know what 
kinds of  ideas about the self  he criticises. He repeatedly sketches a traditional image of  the self, 
and while he is rather prone to constructing a straw man, it matters little whether this image 
accurately represents any philosopher‘s thought, since my interest is establishing a method to 
evaluate narratives. In On the Twilight of  the Idols Nietzsche attacks the idea of  will as a faculty: ―At 
the beginning stands the great fateful error that the will is something which produces an effect – that 
will is a faculty....‖ (TI III, 5). And, again: ―The ‗inner world‘ is full of  phantoms and false lights: 
the will is one of  them. The will no longer moves anything, consequently no longer explain 
anything – it merely accompanies events, it can also be absent‖ (TI VI, 3). He goes as far as to 
claim that the idea of  the will as faculty, as causal, is ―the great fateful error‖ (TI III, 5), because it 
is the foundational assumption upon which many others stand; it suggests that there must be 
something that wills, and this reflects consciousness‘ desire for simple causality within the inner life, 
that it can represent and comprehend: ―The conception of  a consciousness (‗mind‘) as cause and 
later still that of  the ego (the ‗subject‘) as cause are merely after-products after causality had, on 
the basis of  will, been firmly established as a given fact, as empiricism‖ (TI VI, 3). This is the 
traditional idea of  the self: a realm or domain (consciousness, ego, rationali ty) that produces 
thought and action. This is a narrative of  simple cause and effect that we are imposing onto the 
                                                                 
43 Aldous Huxley, Point Counter-Point, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1955, p. 123. 
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body‘s complex cause and effect. To understand why Nietzsche criticises this idea, and what is at 
stake in this criticism, we must understand what is happening when we posit such an idea, what 
force we are expressing, and what kind of  attitude to ourselves we are adopting. Before taking up 
this task, it is worth noting that we should not take his criticism of  the idea of  the will too 
seriously, in the sense of  being a general criticism of  will-theory. Later I will argue that an 
idiosyncratic notion of  the Will is indeed the great man‘s central narrative.  
Throughout sections of  The Twilight of  the Idols, Nietzsche appears to criticise the act of  
imposing causes itself; in other words, traditional ideas about the self  are false because they posit 
false causes. In line with this, he entitles three of  the ―four great errors‖: ―the error of  confusing 
cause and consequence,‖ ―the error of  a false causality,‖ and ―the error of  imaginary causes‖ (TI VI, 1-
3).  In sum, initially it appears that the entire project of  projecting causes onto the inner life is an 
error. Furthermore, if  Being is nothing other than this positing of  simple cause and effect, then 
Being itself  appears to be an error; in the following passage he suggests that this might indeed be 
the case: ―More strictly, one would admit nothing that has being - because then becoming would 
lose its value and actually appear meaningless and superfluous‖ (WP 708/KSA 13:11[72]). Since 
positing Being tends to lead us to lose the value of  Becoming, Nietzsche goes as far here as 
suggesting that we should reject Being itself.  
We might interpret Nietzsche‘s attack on the traditional unity and centrally organised self 
as advocating a disunited and disorganised self, composing of  shifting arrangements of  drives, 
beyond the reach of  conscious control. But this need not be so. Ken Gemes argues that, while 
the ‗postmodernists‘ use Nietzsche to ―typically celebrate the death of  the subject,‖ we can 
interpret Nietzsche as ―pointing to the conclusion that a creature with a genuine centre... Is 
something to be achieved rather than something to be taken for granted.‖44 While the ―herd 
man‖ is ―a mere collection of  ever fluctuating, competing drives,‖ Nietzsche challenges us to 
make ―a self  of  those competing drives.‖45 Unity is not given, but we must create it. Nietzsche 
thus elsewhere strongly rejects the idea that we can simply do away with Being, offering several 
vindications of  Being: rather importantly, human existence depends upon positing a degree of  
Being: ―Life is founded upon the premise of  a belief  in enduring and regularly recurring things; 
the more powerful life is, the wider must be the knowable world to which we, as it were, attribute 
being. Logicalizing, rationalizing, systematizing as expedients of  life‖ (WP 552/KSA 12:9[91]). 
Nietzsche regularly asserts that simplifying the world by positing constancy and regularity makes 
it possible to be the kind of  being that we are. Not only is it necessary, but also, in the right 
                                                                 
44 Ken Gemes, ‗Postmodernism‘s Use and Abuse of  Nietzsche‘, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
Vol. LXII, No. 2, March 2001, p. 339 & 342. 
45 Ibid., p. 343. 
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forms, it is desirable - the ability to engender forms and to will error is the Dionysian ideal: ―My 
Dionysus ideal – the perspective of  all organic functions, all the strongest instincts of  life: the 
force in all life that wills error; error as the precondition even of  thought. Before there is 
―thought‖ there must have been ―invention‖; the construction of  identical cases, of  the appearance 
of  sameness, is more primitive than the knowledge of  sameness‖ (WP 544/KSA 12:10[159]). This 
raises several problems: first, once we accept that it is essential to posit at least some causes, we 
must turn our attention to the negative repercussions of  positing certain types of  causes, for only 
then can we understand why Nietzsche criticises certain ideas of  the self. Second, when 
Nietzsche declares projecting Being to be the will to power‘s ‗supreme act‘ he implies a positive 
dimension to this process beyond its usefulness and necessity, and we must account for this. 
Third, we must understand how the ‗will to truth‘ originates in this basic drive to simplify and 
falsify Becoming. In the following passage Nietzsche summarises the initial connection between 
the drive to posit causes and the ‗will to truth‘: ―The fictitious world of  subject, subs tance, 
‗reason,‘ etc, is needed -: there is in us a power to order, simplify, falsify, artificially distinguish. 
‗Truth‘ is the will to be master over the multiplicity of  sensations: - to classify phenomena into 
definite categories. In this we start from a belief  in the ‗in-itself ‘ of  things (we take phenomena 
as real)‖ (WP 517/KSA 12:9[89]). Truth‘s origin is in simplifying a multiplicity of  sensations; and 
is thus one method through which the will to power masters experience. At the stage of 
explaining the inner life – or better still, within the process making the inner life possible – will 
to truth and will to power are identical. A man imposes regularity when he designates 
phenomena as real, and he thinks that when he accesses this ‗reality,‘ he is accessing truth. That 
this is false (in the sense that it involves simplifying) is of  no importance at this stage, since 
believing in a certain amount of  regularity and constancy – both in the inner life and the world – 
makes human existence possible. 
Nietzsche (re) defines truth as a specific instance of  the will to power, unveiling a deep 
complicity between the will to truth and the will to power. This means that we cannot criticise 
the will, consciousness and the ego merely because they involve a false causality; because false 
causality is a necessary precondition of  human experience, we must find the grounds to criticise 
these ideas elsewhere. Nietzsche‘s overwhelming emphasis on the falsity of  these narratives is a 
rhetorical device, by which he intends to introduce contingency to what others frequently accept 
as certain. Simple causality may be necessary, but these particular instances of  it are not. 
Furthermore, he not only argues that it is necessary to impose causality, but also contends that 
imposing Being onto Becoming is the supreme will to power: ―To impose upon becoming the 
character of  being - that is the supreme will to power‖ (WP 617/KSA 12:7[54]). I have 
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suggested, however, that imposing causes is desirable up to a certain point, where it then 
becomes an error that harms overall health. Nietzsche attempts to make sense of  this 
ambivalence towards the project of  positing causes by studying the will to power‘s multifaceted 
nature, in relation to the theme of  appropriating new experience. In Beyond Good and Evil he 
summarises the will to power‘s positing of  causes most succinctly: ―That commanding 
something which the people calls ‗spirit‘ wants to be master within itself  and around itself  and to 
feel itself  master: out of  multiplicity it has the will to simplicity, a will which binds together and 
tames, which is imperious and domineering‖ (BGE 230). Nietzsche contrasts two manifestations 
of  the ―fundamental will of  the spirit,‖ although he leaves their relation relatively ambiguous. 
First, incorporating new ―experiences‖ produces a ―feeling of  growth.‖ This includes 
―assimilating the old to the new,‖ simplifying the ―complex‖ and overlooking or repelling ―what 
is wholly contradictory‖ (BGE 230). Second, there is an ―apparently antithetical drive... For 
ignorance,‖ for ―shutting-out,‖ and for ―contentment with a closed horizon‖ (BGE 230). I can 
therefore achieve the feeling of  growth, mastery, either by assimilating or by rejecting experience. 
My problem is establishing why I should carry out one or the other of  these processes, and the 
relation between them. Nietzsche suggests that the first process takes priority as long as there is 
sufficient ―power‖ for it to do so: ―according to the degree of  its power to appropriate, its 
‗digestive power,‘ to speak in a metaphor – and indeed ‗the spirit‘ is more like a stomach than 
anything else‖ (BGE 230). In other words, the stronger the spirit‘s digestive power, the more it 
can appropriate experience. Nietzsche suggests that it is only when this digestive power fails that 
the process of  arbitrary shutting out takes place. The first process therefore is in a hierarchical 
relation with the second: assimilating relates to strength, and closing horizons to weakness.  
Nietzsche runs into two potential problems when he contends thus. The first problem 
stems from something I have already established, that the process of  imposing Being onto 
Becoming becomes a problem when we take it to the point at which it devalues Becoming. This 
seems to run directly contrary to the argument that simplifying experience, reducing the new to 
the old, reflects strength. In the former case, we can diagnose imposing too much cause and effect 
as fleeing from Becoming, and therefore as weakness, but in the latter case assimilating relates to 
strength and blocking out to weakness. This apparent contradiction makes it obvious that we 
must solve the problem of  how desirable it is to impose causality, and of  closed horizons, 
because we have not yet established how they relate. If  we are to resist the tendency to arrest all 
Becoming into an inert Being, then it is imperative to rethink assimilating, so that we do not 
praise it without reserve. The second problem concerns assimilation‘s apparently conservative 
tendency; assimilating is conservative in the sense that it involves reducing the new to the old, 
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and the unknown to the known. This movement founds the kind of  being that can calculate, 
possess intentions, and make promises, because assimilating new experience means transforming 
it into something that we can think, schematize, and comprehend. A certain kind of  ―cause -
ascription‖ often comes to ―dominate the rest‖ and tends to ―exclude‖ other explanations; ―The 
banker thinks at once of  ‗business,‘ the Christian of  ‗sin.‘ The girl of  her love‖ (TI VI, 5). The 
potential problem with this conservative tendency is that we know Nietzsche emphasises the 
importance of  creating values, and it seems intuitively to run counter to this (Z, I, 17). This is 
only a problem, however, if  we conceive of  creation as experiencing ‗new‘ types of  forms of  
experience, and/or being outside of  oneself, and/or going beyond one‘s everyday existence, and 
so on. I will argue that many Nietzsche scholars (and it is certainly not restricted to this field) do 
conceive of  creation in these terms, and for them assimilation‘s conservative tendency, which 
Nietzsche is so clear about, is certainly a problem. I will argue in contrast that the conservative 
nature of  assimilating is actually vital to Nietzsche‘s idea of  creation: the strong man possesses 
the ability to make experience conform to him and bend reality to his will. His strength allows 
him to fold new experience into his existing character, and this provides the basis for æsthetically 
transforming the world. Since this æsthetic transformation is the basis for creating, assimilation‘s 
conservative tendency is vital. While this solves the potential problem of  an apparent opposition 
between assimilating and creating, it does not help our need to determine the proper relation 
between assimilating and closing oneself  off  from experience. To solve this problem I must 
establish criteria that we can use to assess under what conditions we should impose causality, and 
to set boundaries at which it is undesirable to go beyond. At this stage, we can conclude that 
Nietzsche criticises certain ideas of  causality not for their truthfulness or falsity, but elsewhere, 
for their lack of  value.  
 One clue towards the real basis for Nietzsche‘s criticisms is the connection that he draws 
out between this idea of  the self  and positing a ‗real‘ or ‗true‘ world. A man projects his 
interpretation of  his inner life onto the external world, creating a ―world of  causes‖ and a ―world 
of  will‖ (TI VI, 3): 
 
Man projected his three ‗inner facts,‘ that in which he believed more firmly than in 
anything else, will, spirit, ego, outside himself  – he derived the concept ‗being‘ only from 
the concept ‗ego,‘ he posited ‗things‘ as possessing being according to his ow n image, 
according to his concept of  the ego as cause. No wonder he later always discovered in 
things only that which he had put into them! (TI VI, 3) 
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The will to simplify is a general function and manifestation of  the will to power; a man imposes 
Being onto Becoming both on the grounds of  utility and because he desires to overcome and 
master it. The categories he imposes onto flux are certainly, to some extent, expedient 
falsifications, but we must focus on the point where he takes an expedient falsification for a 
truth. Imposing elements of  Being can transmute into imposing an objective and universal 
theory of  Being, yet the necessity of  Becoming (change) renders the idea of  a totalising Being 
impossible. Thus, although man imposes Being onto Becoming so that he can act, and to expand 
his capacity to act, at the point where he externalises and objectifies Being he loses the ability to 
account for Becoming‘s most self-evident manifestations. This leads him to deny and resent these 
elements of  Becoming; Nietzsche‘s examples include the ―irrational,‖ the ―arbitrary,‖ 
―accidental,‖ ―sex,‖ ―change,‖ and ―transitoriness‖ (WP 576/KSA13:18[16] ). The doctrine that 
―basically everything stands still‖ becomes a ―good thing for sterile times‖ and a ―comfort,‖ but 
Nietzsche claims that it is both a lie and also unhelpful (Z, III, 12). 
As I will determine, Nietzsche consistently criticises the practice of  extending the world 
of  inner necessities onto the world‘s character: ―One should not understand this compulsion to 
construct concepts, species, forms, purposes, laws, (‗a world of  identical cases‘) as if  they 
enabled us to fix the real world; but as a compulsion to arrange a world for ourselves in which our 
existence is made possible: - we thereby create a world which is calculable, simplified, 
comprehensible, etc., for us‖ (WP 521/KSA 12:9[144]). The problem is clear: one of  the will to 
power‘s functions is making the world knowable, and this process extends further the ―more 
powerful life is,‖ until all Being is made conceivable and universalised under a fiction. Yet 
precisely this desire to fix Being is also a weakness because it involves fleeing from Becoming. 
Hence the paradox: I increase my power to act by making Being conceivable, but at a certain 
point in doing so I weaken and sicken myself  and reduce my capacity to act. Nietzsche must 
therefore identify the point at which simplifying and falsifying become a problem, and this 
means he must discover the threshold where the process transmutes from an integral aspect of 
human existence into a regrettable practice. It is vital that a man assumes phenomena are ‗real,‘ 
and this facilitates and enhances his existence, but he errs when he posits a world he can 
objectively know and comprehend. Distinguishing between these is crucial in making sense of 
why Nietzsche denounces certain ideas (e.g., cause and effect, substance, purpose, the will), while 
at the same time he recognises variants of  the same ideas as both necessary and desirable in 
certain contexts. Nietzsche therefore argues that when we posit a universally ‗true‘ world we tend 
to devalue existence. On its own, this argument cannot provide suitable grounds for criticising a 
particular image of  the self, because it is concerned with extending the use of  certain ideas; i.e., it 
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is extending the idea that is illegitimate and unhelpful, rather than the ideas and categories 
themselves.  
 
The War on Becoming and the Senses  
 
'I am suffering: someone must be to blame‘ –this is how all sickly sheep think. (GM III, 15) 
 
 The real root of  Nietzsche‘s criticism of  the real world is not that it causes ressentiment 
against Becoming, but that it is already a symptom of ressentiment. Nietzsche identifies a common 
theme that the desire to posit a real and objective world expresses: a certain response toward the 
problem of  suffering. He suggests that the sufferer tends to attempt to identify causes of  his 
suffering, and he frequently thinks that these causes are elements of  Becoming and change. 
Accordingly, Becoming and suffering tend to become psychologically inseparable in his mind, 
and he becomes increasingly averse to change.  The will to truth, which we might initially 
understand as a drive to make Being conceivable, and to produce a being that can possess 
intentions and vouch for himself, is also a process that tends to devalue Becoming. The sufferer‘s 
desire for truth reflects his craving for consistency and stability: ―Man seeks ‗the truth‘: a world 
that is not self-contradictory, not deceptive, does not change, a true world – a world in which one 
does not suffer; contradiction, deception, change – cause of  suffering!‖ When the will to truth 
extends into the world this suggests fleeing from Becoming towards an illusory state of  stability 
and security - ―a world of  the constant‖: ―Contempt, hatred for all that perishes, changes, varies 
– whence comes this valuation of  that which remains constant? Obviously, the will to truth is 
here merely the desire for a world of  the constant‖ (WP 585/KSA 12:9[60]). The metaphysics of 
the true world is a metaphysics of  ―timidity‖; metaphysicians of  this type strategically eliminate 
aspects of  Becoming from the narratives they use to interpret the world by denying their reality, 
necessity and importance (WP 576/KSA 13:18[16]). They invent an account of  happiness that 
embodies calmness, peacefulness, and freedom from change; this is the happiness of  the inert. 
This approach embodies a certain attitude towards suffering, where the sufferer downplays or 
denies the reality and meaning of  the elements that he assumes cause his suffering. Nietzsche‘s 
attempt to construct an authentic theory of  happiness hinges on his challenge to two aspects of  
this process. First, the sufferer attempts to locate a source of  suffering, since he assumes that 
there must be a specific reason why he suffers. Second, this attempt to locate causes for his 
suffering is disingenuous, because he identifies a cause just so that he can subsequently deny that it 
is real. Nietzsche criticises Being because he suspects that at a certain point a man‘s desire to 
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posit Being no longer relates to enhancing his life, but is co-opted by fear and mistrust of 
Becoming. ―Belief  in what has being is only a consequence: the real primus mobile is disbelief  in 
becoming, mistrust of  becoming, the low valuation of  all that becomes‖ (WP 585/KSA 
12:9[60]). 
We can apply the grounds on which Nietzsche rejects the real world not only to the 
external world, because aspects of  the inner life too are characterised by change, mutation and 
instability. He focuses particularly on the attitude that the sufferer adopts towards his senses and 
his drives, and it is here that we begin to understand why he criticises the traditional image of  the 
self  so consistently and emphatically. It is in articulating the idea of  consciousness as a faculty 
(and will as consciously producing an effect) that we make it possible to oppose the body. 
Nietzsche suggests that the idea of  the will as a faculty that produces an effect is bound up with 
a certain ―metaphysical‖ position on the mind, and he traces an interpretation of  the mind that 
elevates rationality at the expense of  the body back to Socrates; ―The absolute coldness and 
neutrality of  the consciousness‖ (WP 434/KSA 13:14[92]). Interpreting the mind in this way 
misconstrues pleasure and its relation to overcoming resistance by falsely equating reason with 
happiness: ―The highest rationality is a cold, clear state very far from giving that feeling of  
happiness that intoxication of  any kind brings with it -‖ (WP 434/KSA 13:14[92]  ). It is now 
possible to conceive of  reason as a product of  consciousness, and by default construe the senses 
as irrational, and this is a formula for decadence: ―The fanaticism with which the whole of  Greek 
thought throws itself  at rationality betrays a state of  emergency‖ (TI II, 10). Nietzsche analyses 
the inner life in the same terms as he analyses ontology: the sufferer tends to associate the 
universal (reason) with safety, stability, and the rational, and the contingent (the body) with 
unpredictability, change, and therefore suffering: ―They have hated the irrational, the arbitrary, the 
accidental (as the causes of  immeasurable physical suffering). As a consequence, they negated 
this element in being-of-itself  and conceived it as absolute ―rationality‖ and ―purposiveness‖‖ 
(WP 576/KSA 13:18[16]). Rejecting ‗external‘ Becoming and rejecting the senses are therefore 
two aspects of  one process, united through a similar type of  attitude towards suffering. Nietzsche 
suggests that the more we come to see the will as the product of  a faculty, the more this leads us 
to deny physiology‘s importance. Furthermore this also suggests that we are already dissatisfied 
with the body in the first place. Ignoring physiology‘s effect on suffering makes it impossible to 
deal with our suffering properly.   
Developing a certain attitude to suffering is implicit in the cause-creating drive‘s 
tendencies: the intellect tends to project simple causes onto the complex feeling of  suffering. This 
reflects not just ignorance of  the actual causes of  suffering, but a desire for simplicity and 
 34 
 
 
superficiality, whatever the cost: ―we want to have a reason for feeling as we do‖ (TI VI, 4). This drive‘s 
operation is therefore not intrinsically related with truth, but its principle is instead that: ―any 
explanation is better than none‖ (TI, VI, 5). Nietzsche identifies a widespread tendency to 
mistake the consequences of  a particular state to be its cause, and this underscores ―The Four Great 
Errors‖ from Twilight of  the Idols (TI VI, 1). A man in a particular mood (of  any kind) has ―no 
doubt‖ that he can discover the reason for it: ―So he looks for the reason – In truth, he cannot 
find the reason, because he does even suspect where he ought to look for it‖ (WP 229/ KSA 
13:14[179]). Consequently, he mistakes the product of  the mood for its cause; for example, he 
misidentifies the ―work‖ he undertakes whilst in a good mood as responsible for the mood, 
whereas he might actually undertake it because his good mood provides the ―courage‖ for it (WP 
229/KSA 13:14[179]). The same is true when a man interprets his suffering. He suffers, and 
wallows in the memory of  ―some worry, some scruple, some self-criticism,‖ that he then 
mistakenly identifies as the cause of  his suffering (WP 229/KSA 13:14[179]). In doing thus, he 
completely overlooks a whole host of  complex physiological conditions; for example, the 
physiological causes that make it possible for him to recall the memory, the causes that influence 
the way that he perceives and represents it, the context he places it into; in total, the influences 
that lead him to recall it in such a way that he feels it as suffering. 
Rather than merely a simple case of  mistaking the cause, the problem of  mistaking 
consequence for cause is ―reason‘s intrinsic form of  corruption‖ (TI VI, 1). The first aspect of 
this is that any causal explanation is better than none; this lack of  discernment over the truth of 
a claim leads a man to favour simplistic and superficial causes over complex and unclear ones. 
Second, ascribing a cause produces a feeling of  power, and of  mastery: tracing ―something 
unknown back to something known is alleviating, soothing, gratifying and gives moreover a 
feeling of  power‖ (TI VI, 5). He associates the ―unknown‖ with ―danger, disquiet, anxiety‖ and 
above all, this provokes a sensation of  ―fear‖ (TI VI, 5). Consequently, not only is any cause 
better than no cause, but this also combines with a desire to trace everything unknown back to 
something known and/or something already experienced. The greater a man‘s susceptibility to 
fear and anxiety over the unknown, the greater his desire to alleviate and soothe this by positing 
causes to explain it. Exhaustion intensifies and exacerbates suffering. Consciousness experiences 
a feeling we might call pleasure, but is more properly just relief  from suffering, by momentarily 
anesthetising suffering, by relating it back to a cause; the cause-creating drive‘s priority is therefore 
predominantly immediate utility. The sufferer invokes ―most common explanations‖ so that this 
―feeling of  the strange, new, unexperienced‖ can be ―more speedily and most frequently 
abolished‖ (TI VI, 5). The result is that it becomes increasingly unlikely that he will investigate 
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the actual complex of  causes the create a particular state: ―Thus there arises an habituation to a 
certain causal interpretation which in truth obstructs and even prohibits an investigation of  the 
cause‖ (TI VI, 5). 
As early as Human all too Human Nietzsche distinguishes between two ways of  dealing 
with a misfortune, in a note he titles ‗The twofold struggle against misfortune‘: ―we can overcome it 
either by removing its cause or else by changing the effect it has on our feelings, that is, by 
reinterpreting the misfortune as a good, whose benefit may only later become clear‖ (HH 108). 
Two stark choices: either one removes the cause, or one tries to discover a way to reinterpret and 
justify it. Since Nietzsche wants to characterise the latter negatively, this distinction is too simple 
really to be credible, and he will later refine it heavily - there are clearly times when reinterpreting 
a misfortune is the only option, should the cause be impossible to remove, and therefore it is 
imperative to be able to distinguish between these times. Furthermore, not all reinterpretations 
are of  equal value. For example, he will still criticise those who reinterpret a misfortune by 
positing a real world or afterlife, while the ability to interpret necessary misfortune as vi tal to 
human life will become a virtue.  
Although Nietzsche perhaps expresses it rather badly at this stage, the important issue 
that he raises here is not so much opposing removing a cause with reinterpreting a cause, but is the 
one he raises in the next passage, where he opposes actually attempting in good faith to identify 
the cause of  misfortune/suffering with temporarily alleviating suffering - this only defers the 
problem and makes it worse. Religion, art, and metaphysical philosophy are common examples 
of  this second approach. The key ideas here are narcotisation and anesthetising suffering, rather than 
genuinely attempting to remove the problem and prevent it manifesting in the future:  
 
The more a person tends to reinterpret and justify, the less will he confront the causes of  
the misfortune and eliminate them; a momentary palliation and narcotisation (as used, 
for example, for a toothache) is also enough for him in more serious suffering. The more 
the rule of  religions and all narcotic arts decreases, the more squarely do men confront 
the real elimination of  the misfortune - of course, this is bad for the tragic poets (there 
being less and less material for tragedy, because the realm of  inexorable, invincible fate 
grows smaller) but it is even worse for the priests (for until now they fed on the 
narcotization of  human misfortunes). (HH 108) 
 
Nietzsche‘s interpretation of  the helpful and unhelpful approaches to suffering gradually gains 
more nuance, and he begins to develop the thesis that the sufferer often places an overwhelming 
and unjustified emphasis on the importance of  spiritual and psychological factors to his 
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suffering, and pays a corresponding lack of  attention to his physiology (WP 233/ KSA 
13:14[155]). A sufferer desire a ―noble interpretation of  their condition,‖ and this tends to mean 
that he ―must know as little as possible about physiology,‖ since this would reveal his complicity in 
his suffering (WP 423/ KSA 13:14[142]). Nietzsche rages particularly against Christian denial of 
the body: ―they despised the body: they left it out of  the account: more, they treated it as an 
enemy‖ (WP 226/ KSA 13:14[96]), arguing that they created ―an imaginary psychology‖ based on 
―self-misunderstandings‖: ―‗repentance,‘ ‗sting of  conscience,‘ ‗temptation by the Devil,‘ ‗the 
proximity of  God‘‖ and so on (AC 15). Nietzsche‘s attempt to combat this ignorance of, and 
inattentiveness to, physiology, is central to revaluating values. He believes his insight into the 
physiological basis of  values gives him a vantage point from which to revaluate traditional values 
and modes of  Being: ―Through the long succession of  millennia, man has not known himself  
physiologically: he does not know himself  even today. To know, e.g., that one has a nervous 
system (-but no ―soul‖-) is still the privilege of  the best informed‖ (WP 229/KSA 13:14[179]). 
The sufferer‘s positing of  false causes inevitably leads him to adopt false solutions; his 
―habituation‖ of  certain causal interpretations leads him to fabricate an entire realm of  
―imaginary causes‖ (TI VI, 5-6). When he (mis-)interprets the causes of  his suffering as spiritual 
and psychological ones, then he also looks to solve his problems in this realm.  
Nietzsche switches his focus in On the Twilight of  the Idols to demonstrating that morality 
and religion are examples of  imaginary causes (TI VI, 6). He interprets Christianity as the 
product of  imaginary causes, and purveyor of  imaginary solutions, but this, however, is of  
secondary importance to his diagnosis of  a widespread inability to understand and combat the 
actual causes of  suffering - an inability apparently endemic to reason, which seeks causes. There 
are, then, a set of  tendencies that lead a man to misdiagnose suffering. This is not, however, to 
say that this move is necessary, which would leave little scope for self-creation; rather, a man‘s 
choices and attitudes condition whether suffering appears, and whether its effects intensify. 
Indeed, the great man‘s self-creation is designed so that he forges a new relation with himself, 
cultivating a relationship with his suffering that avoids intensifying and perpetuating it. What I 
must determine, therefore, are the factors that condition the frequency with which a man resorts to 
misdiagnosing his suffering. We need to know not just how he interprets his suffering falsely, but 
why this occurs in his case and not others. The starting point is re-orientating attitudes towards 
suffering. The cause-creating drive‘s positing of  imaginary spiritual and psychological causes is 
not inevitable, but reflects a sufferer‘s deficient attitude and ethos towards himself. 
Fundamentally, his drive to ignore physiology‘s influence on his suffering in many cases reflects 
his desire to locate the blame for suffering outside of  his own responsibility. Some examples are 
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straightforward: blaming existence for his suffering by identifying deficiencies in human 
existence; blaming man‘s ‗state of  sin,‘ and blaming others for causing his suffering. In these 
cases he projects responsibility for his suffering externally. The central aspect of  this is 
downplaying his agency, for accepting this would require him to accept at least a degree of 
responsibility for his suffering. Instead he construes his (lack of) happiness and his suffering as 
conditions that are imposed upon him, and over which he has little to no control. 
The immediate repercussion of  the sufferer‘s failure to claim responsibility for his 
suffering and unhappiness is that he is ignorant of  physiology‘s importance. Other cases seem 
less straightforward; we might object, for example, that the connection between denying 
physiology‘s importance and a desire not to take responsibility is broken in cases when the 
sufferer blames aspects of  himself; in particular, his instincts, senses, or sexual drive, etc. This is, 
however, only a superficial incongruity. It is not his projecting blame externally that is important, 
but his failing to take responsibility for his role in, and complicity with, intensifying his suffering. 
It matters little whether he projects this blame onto the world generally, or onto a part of  
himself; in both cases he assumes that factors outside of  his control are at fault and to blame. Furthermore, 
the line between denying existence and denying the senses is both unstable and untenable. To 
take one case: when the sufferer divides the world into an apparent and a real one, although this 
apparently concerns his external existence, the apparent world is really just the world that the 
senses produce. When we posit a real world, and thereby slander the apparent world, this 
signifies that we are mistrusting and devaluing the senses.   
It would be a mistake to think a renewed emphasis on physiology signifies an emphasis 
on aspects of  ourselves that we cannot control, or any other kind of  self-defeating determinism. 
As we shall see, Nietzsche sets up the idea of  the self  so that the attitude we adopt toward 
ourselves has a vital role in improving ourselves. Paying new attention to one‘s physiology is a 
way to begin to adopt a new relationship with one‘s suffering. Since Nietzsche links inappropriate 
responses to suffering because they all fail to take seriously the extent to which one is 
responsible for one‘s own suffering, opposing this requires some variant of  recognising one‘s 
complicity in experiencing suffering. This is not the same as claiming that all suffering is self-
inflicted, but means recognising crucial ways that self-perception, habits and routines all affect 
both the likelihood of  us suffering and the way that we experience this suffering. Thus even 
when suffering is clearly outside of  our immediate control, this does not mean that our 
responsibility for it ceases. As far as one is able to create oneself  one should take responsibility 
for the self  that one has chosen to create. Failing to realise this responsibility fully and to act 
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accordingly is the consistent factor that Nietzsche uses to justify his criticisms of  traditional 
values and narratives of  the self.  
I will further develop the specific meaning of  responsibility later. First we must 
understand how physiology affects one‘s relationship with suffering.  Only by demonstrating that 
physiology is crucial to Nietzsche‘s thought, especially with regards to suffering, can we truly 
make sense of  his rejection of  the idea of  the will as faculty.  In analysing this relation, I will 
concentrate particularly on the effects of  exhaustion. I will address this problem from both ends, 
concentrating on both the physiological conditions that influence the failure to take responsibility 
for one‘s sufferings (and thus misdiagnose it), and on the effects that this misdiagnosis has on 
one‘s future experience of  suffering. After achieving this we will be in a better position to 
determine the types of  narratives that can combat these failings.  
 
Exhaustion 
 
If  one has trained one's eye to detect the symptoms of  decline, one also understands morality,—one understands 
what lies concealed beneath its holiest names and tables of  values: e.g., impoverished life, the will to nonentity, 
great exhaustion. (NCW, preface) 
 
 Nietzsche consistently diagnoses certain value systems as the effects of  exhaustion. That 
is, dominant value systems often reflect widespread physiological exhaustion and weakness; at 
times he goes as far as to suggest that all the ―supreme value judgments‖ that have come to 
―dominate mankind... can be derived from the judgments of  the exhausted‖ (WP 54/KSA 
12:5[71]). The exhausted, however, do not perceive themselves as such, and this fits with 
Nietzsche‘s earlier diagnosis that the enduring problem of  man‘s history is that both individuals 
and collective groups have failed to recognise the physiological roots of  their problems 
sufficiently, and that physiological inhibition tends to cause: ―deep depression, leaden fatigue and 
black sadness‖ (GM III, 17). He singles out exhaustion as the fundamental aspect of  this 
delusion: ―The race is corrupted - not by its vices but by its ignorance; it is corrupted because it 
did not recognise exhaustion as exhaustion: mistakes about physiological states are the source of  
all ills‖ (WP 54/KSA 12:5[71]). Nietzsche‘s crucial claim is that exhaustion – and physiological 
states generally – tends to produce certain types of  values, and this relies on the broader claim 
that we cannot separate thought from physiological conditions, because these conditions affect 
both the quality of  thought and perception. His claim is not therefore simply that exhaustion 
alters perception in certain ways; rather, it is that there is no such thing as a pure state of  
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perception that exists outside of  fluctuating physiological states. Just as thought misdiagnoses the 
causes of  suffering, it also tends to mistake and misrepresent its own origins, and the conditions 
under which it functions. It represents itself  as continuous and stable, and in doing so 
misrepresents the importance of  physiological fluctuations.  
Nietzschean scholarship tends to underestimate and ignore the role that exhaustion plays 
in his thought significantly. This is symptomatic of  the general inability to recognise the extent to 
which Nietzsche emphasises the role of  physiology when he analyses a whole host of  problems. 
We can explain much of  the apparent ambiguity in his oeuvre when we recognise this. For 
example, he apparently denies consciousness, the will, and freedom in places, whilst affirming 
them in others; in reality, however, he denies one interpretation of these ideas, whilst nonetheless 
retaining and refining the terminology. He consistently denies these ideas in the sense that they 
are, or depend on, faculties – i.e., that we can oppose them to the body, and analyse them 
independently of  it. He instead discusses them as intrinsically connected with the amount of  
energy one possesses. Since Nietzsche leads the categories of  the mind back to the body as 
aspects of  physiology, their functioning becomes susceptible to exhaustion. Emphasising 
exhaustion‘s role, however, is only one aspect of  this movement back toward the body. A 
properly physiological criterion for evaluating value systems and narratives – including those a 
man uses to understand himself  – requires that we produce a full-scale account of  energy 
expenditure, and how it relates to thought.  
The closest example of  such an account of  energy expenditure and exhaustion that 
exists is Bataille‘s On Nietzsche, where he develops criteria of  ―the decline‖ and ―the summit‖ to 
designate exhaustion and its corollary. 46  This account is invaluable as a kind of  ‗practical 
Nietzschean-ism,‘ and details a life that oscillates between the extreme states of  energy 
expenditure and exhaustion. However, for reasons that I will outline later, it is also insufficient. It 
refuses to acknowledge Nietzsche‘s hierarchy of  types of  states of  expenditure, instead 
prioritising a transgressive experience that dissolves the boundaries of  the self, and temporarily 
disperses the everyday image one has of  oneself. This as much reflects Bataille‘s particular 
interest in violent acts of  transgression as it does his misinterpretation of  Nietzsche. However, 
my task here is to provide the basis for an entirely different account of  energy expenditure that 
moves beyond opposing exhaustion to violent moments of  transgression, and instead prioritises 
understanding one particular aspect of  energy expenditure: abundance. I will use the term 
‗abundance‘ to designate a particular kind of  intoxication, which Nietzsche gradually privileges 
above all other lesser or inauthentic forms of  intoxication. He develops a relation between 
                                                                 
46 Bataille, p. 17. 
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exhaustion and this specific type of  abundance that provides a scale to assess values, and this in 
turn allows him to develop strategies and methods to evaluate the way one thinks about and 
interprets oneself.  
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II 
 
 
Responses to Exhaustion I: The Modern Artist 
 
 
 
What are the Fausts and Manfreds of  the theatre to anyone who is somewhat like Faust and Manfred? (GS 86) 
   
What do I care about the theatre? What do I care about the spasms of  its moral ecstasies in which the mob—
and who is not the mob to-day?—rejoices? What do I care about the whole pantomimic hocus-pocus of  the actor? 
You are beginning to see that I am essentially anti-theatrical at heart. For the stage, this mob art par excellence, 
my soul has that deepest scorn felt by every artist to-day. (NCW ‗Wherein I Raise Objections‘) 
 
 It is one thing to diagnose traditional notions of  the self  as products of  exhaustion, and 
quite another to work out what Nietzsche opposes exhaustion to, and thus to establish a way to 
assess values. First, I argue that he contrasts exhaustion with the idea of  intoxication, and that he 
gradually begins to distinguish a hierarchy of  states of  intoxication, whereby there are authentic 
and inauthentic forms. Second, I develop this contrast by examining an apparent paradox in his 
writings on intoxication: the Dionysian state involves losing the ability not to react, and yet, as we 
will see, elsewhere he criticises this inability as vulgar and as indicating a lack of  character. On 
this basis, Nietzsche argues that the modern artist is similar in type to the hysteric. When he 
criticises the modern artist he points towards a deeper state of  intoxication, towards a state that 
prioritises self-control and resisting stimulus. It is this authentic state of  intoxication that I will 
refer to as abundance. Third, I develop this state by contrasting it with the apparent self-control of 
the ascetic priest. Nietzsche‘s criticisms of  the ascetic highlight the possibility of  a superior form 
of  self-control, which maximises the amount of  energy that a man produces. He brings this 
together under the idea of  the strong Will, which becomes the central idea for assessing values 
and narratives of  the self. Thus I establish the issue of  cultivating a strong Will as the 
cornerstone for the entire project of  creating oneself.  
Nietzsche first discusses intoxication in The Birth of  Tragedy, and never writes a more 
detailed account. I want to suggest, however, that: firstly, he alters his understanding of  
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intoxication substantially, and that the carefully laid out formulation in The Birth of  Tragedy gives 
way to a strikingly different account, that he does not set down definitively, but which we can 
piece together from his later works; secondly, that substantial numbers of  Nietzsche scholars fail 
to take into account this transformation, instead clinging to part or all of  Nietzsche‘s early 
theories. This failure severely damages their ability to present a coherent reading of  the desired 
Nietzschean self. In The Birth of  Tragedy Nietzsche discusses intoxication through the idea of  the 
Dionysian experience, contrasting this with the Apollonian experience, and forming an account 
of  Greek (and Wagnerian) tragic art. There are three aspects of  the idea of  the Dionysian that 
are particularly interesting, and I will argue that he later refutes either part or all of  these three 
ideas. Firstly, the Dionysian involves experiencing ‗oneness‘ and temporarily dissolving one‘s 
individuality, and all that that includes, volition, will, etc. Secondly, Nietzsche suggests little or no 
hierarchy of  states of  intoxication; he values states for the effect they produce, not the means used 
to acquire them. The Dionysian experience does not therefore presuppose that a man possess 
any particular qualities. Thirdly, the Dionysian experience is a temporary and unstable state that 
devalues everyday life, revealing its impoverishment by way of  comparison with a higher state.  
Both points one and two arise in the following passage, where Nietzsche summarises the 
Dionysian experience:  
 
We catch a glimpse of  the essence of  the Dionysiac, which is best conveyed by the 
analogy of  intoxication. These Dionysiac stirrings, which, as they grow in intensity, cause 
subjectivity to vanish to the point of  complete self-forgetting, awaken either under the 
influence of  narcotic drink, of  which all human beings and peoples who are close to the 
origin of  things speak in their hymns, or at the approach of  spring when the whole of 
nature is pervaded by lust for life. (BT 1) 
 
The Dionysian state is a kind of  ‗intoxication,‘ that does not depend upon an actual narcotic, but 
does not rule one out either. Whatever its source, it signifies intensifying emotions, and produces 
a state of  self-forgetfulness that leads to the ―breakdown of  the principium individuationis‖ (BT 1). 
A man is immersed into a mystical ‗oneness,‘ and the subjective collapses into the objective: 
 
Now the slave is a freeman, now all the rigid, hostile barriers, which necessity, caprice, or 
‗impudent fashion‘ have established between human beings, break asunder. Now, hearing 
this gospel of  universal harmony, each person feels himself  to be not simply united, 
reconciled or merged with this neighbour, but quite literally one with him, as if  the veil 
of  maya had been torn apart, so that mere shreds of it flutter before the mysterious 
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primordial unity. (BT 1) 
 
 The man thus intoxicated is not an artist, but a ―work of  art‖: ―all nature‘s artistic power 
reveals itself  here, amidst shivers of  intoxication, to the highest, most blissful satisfaction of  the 
primordial unity‖ (BT 1). The willing, desiring everyday subject is here antithetical to æsthetics, 
which requires that this subject is collapsed into a state where desire and will no longer exist, a 
―mystical feeling of  oneness‖ (BT 2). Art is only possible where a man is ―already released and 
redeemed from the individual will and has become, as it were, a medium, the channel through 
which the one truly existing subject celebrates its release and redemption in semblance‖ (BT 5) 
The individual thus becomes little more than a conduit through which the Primordial Unity 
expresses itself, and in this experience he learns that individuation is ―evil‖ and a barrier to 
ecstatic joy: ―the fundamental recognition that everything which exists is a unity; the view that 
individuation is the primal source of  all evil; and art as the joyous hope that the spell of 
individuation can be broken, a premonition of  unity restored‖ (BT 10). Since individuality 
matters so little in this state, it does not presuppose that one possess any qualities. ‗The slave‘ is 
equally as susceptible to Dionysian intoxication as the master, and actual intoxication is as 
effective as metaphorical intoxication. The strength of  one‘s will is irrelevant, given that the state 
of  willing is always an un-æsthetic condition, where the individual will is suspended. Nietzsche 
therefore posits little to no hierarchy in his account of  intoxication. What one is has little impact 
on what one experiences. The æsthetic revelation is a state where one is laid bare to the truth and 
depth of  existence, and is therefore a state where one in a sense becomes ‗like‘ or ‗at one with‘ 
the world. 
In fact, Nietzsche seldom discusses the causes of  intoxication in The Birth of  Tragedy, 
taking it for granted that there are numerous ways that it is induced, and that there is no reason 
why anyone would want to resist it. His focus is on the ecstatic experience itself, and further, the 
effect this experience has on one‘s everyday life. It is here that he justifies the third point; 
Dionysian experience devalues everyday experience and makes it into a problem that only art can 
resolve. Comparing Dionysian man to Hamlet, Nietzsche suggests that insight into the true 
character of  things reveals the poverty of  the everyday world of  experience, and this threatens to 
make all willing and desiring seem superfluous, petty and unnecessary:  
 
The reason for this is that the ecstasy of  the Dionysiac state, in which the usual barriers 
and limits of existence are destroyed, contains, for as a long as it lasts, a lethargic element 
in which all personal experiences from the past are submerged. This gulf  of oblivion 
separates the worlds of  everyday life and Dionysiac experience. But as soon as daily 
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reality re-enters consciousness, it is experienced as such with a sense of revulsion; the 
fruit of  those states is an ascetic, will-negating mood. In this sense Dionysian man is 
similar to Hamlet: both have gazed into the true essence of  things, they have acquired 
knowledge and they find action repulsive, for their actions can do nothing to change the 
eternal essence of  things; they regard it as laughable or shameful that they should be 
expected to set to rights a world so out of  joint. Knowledge kills actions; actions requires 
one to be shrouded in a veil of  illusion – this is a lesson of  Hamlet, not that cheap 
wisdom about Jack the Dreamer who does not get around to acting because he reflects 
too much, out of  an excess of possibilities, as it were. No, it is not reflection, it is true 
knowledge, insight into the terrible truth, which outweighs every motive for action, both 
in the case of  Hamlet and in that of  Dionysiac man. (BT 7) 
 
It is the danger of  this condition that justifies Nietzsche‘s projected revival of  tragic art. Art 
consoles and makes everyday life bearable, allowing one to face ―what is terrible or absurd in 
existence,‖ and in doing so it saves the will: ―Here, at this moment of  supreme danger for the 
will, art approaches as a saving sorceress with the power to heal. Art alone can re-direct those 
repulsive thoughts about the terrible or absurd nature of  existence into representations with 
which man can live‖ (BT 7). Intoxication represents moments of  ‗blissful ecstasy,‘ where desire, 
will, and any individual action are suspended. When Nietzsche depicts intoxication as a state 
other than the ‗everyday‘ one, this suggests that it is ‗other‘ to oneself, that it does not reflect 
what one is, and that it is unaffected by one‘s everyday self. Later I will address commentators 
whose accounts of  joy and intoxication repeat some or all of  these three key points from The 
Birth of  Tragedy. First, we need to look at intoxication in his later writings, and address the ways 
that it diverges from this early account.  
Nietzsche‘s most substantial discussion of  intoxication besides The Birth of  Tragedy takes 
place in Twilight of  the Idols, some sixteen years later. To begin with, it appears that he is still 
grouping together lots of  different types of  intoxication, all of  which have the power to make 
art possible: 
 
Intoxication must first have heightened the excitability of  the entire machine: no art 
results before that happens. All kinds of  intoxication, however different their origin, 
have the power to do this: above all, the intoxication of  sexual excitement, the oldest and 
most primitive form of intoxication. Likewise the intoxication which comes in the train 
of  all great desires, all strong emotions; the intoxication of  feasting, of  contest, of  the 
brave deed, of victory, of  all extreme agitation; the intoxication of  cruelty; intoxication 
in destruction; intoxication under certain metereological influences, for example, the 
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intoxication of  spring; or under the influence of  narcotics; finally, the intoxication of  the 
will, the overloaded and distended will. (TI IX, 8) 
 
Intoxication, then, still has multifarious forms, but Nietzsche replaces his metaphysics in The 
Birth of  Tragedy, where intoxication re-joins one with a Primordial Unity, with an account of 
intoxication that centres on expending energy: ―the essence of  intoxication is the feeling of  
plenitude and increased energy‖ (TI IX, 8). This appears to accord well with the thesis I have been 
developing, for if  exhaustion designates a lack of  energy, then intoxication might very well 
designate its opposite, a ‗plenitude‘ or abundance of  energy; and just as exhaustion affects 
perception in certain ways, so too does intoxication: ―In this condition one enriches everything 
out of  one‘s own abundance: what one sees, what one desires, one sees swollen, pressing, strong, 
overladen with energy‖ (TI IX, 8). Thus the feeling of  one‘s energy increasing influences one to 
view the world in a certain way. What Nietzsche describes here is a particular type of  perception 
where one interprets the world as possessing overflowing energy: rich, full, 'swollen,' 'pressing.' 
This conditioning of  perception is the essential reason that he describes the state of  intoxication 
as an æsthetic state or condition, and it explains how he can interpret it as the foremost precursor 
to the possibility of  genuine art. Nietzsche‘s claim is that plenitude enhances the way that one 
perceives the world, and the highest form of  perception is experiencing oneself  as perfect, and, 
subsequently, transforming the world so that it mirrors this perfection: ―The man in this 
condition transforms things until they mirror his power – until they are reflections of  his 
perfection. This compulsion to transform into the perfect is – art‖ (TI IX, 8). Since perception is 
so closely tied to a spectrum of  energy expenditure, exhaustion, on the other hand, tends to 
affect and condition perfection in such a way that impoverishes existence, and it is thus a 
movement away from perfection; an: ―antithetical condition – a specific anti-artisticality of 
instinct – a mode of  being which impoverishes and attenuates things and makes them 
consumptive‖ (TI IX, 8). Nietzsche clearly implies that not everyone can create or enjoy genuine 
art; only those who are abundant can create it, and only who can relate to the æsthetic experience 
that it conveys can enjoy it: (It) ―appears only in natures capable of  that bestowing and 
overflowing fullness of  bodily vigour… the sober, the weary, the exhausted, the dried-up (e.g. 
scholars) can receive absolutely nothing from art, because they do not possess the primary 
artistic force, the pressure of  abundance: whoever cannot give, also receives nothing‖ (WP 
801/KSA 12:9[102]). It is therefore clear that we can describe exhaustion as a creative state, in 
the sense that it conditions perception. The state of  intoxication Nietzsche describes as the 
essential precondition for, and common root of, a range of  artistic expressions, despite their 
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different manifestations. ―The actor, the mime, the dancer, the musician, the lyric poet are 
fundamentally related in their instincts and essentially one, only gradually specialised and 
separated from one another – even to the point of  opposition‖ (TI IX, 11). 
Nietzsche apparently suggests a straightforward schema of  two opposing physiological 
states: intoxication and exhaustion. This only holds, however, if  we can legitimately conflate all 
intoxication with plenitude. If  this is the case then we can use intoxication as the solitary 
measure to evaluate values; i.e., we can simply evaluate positively anything that produces 
intoxication. But if  this conflation is illegitimate, then we must determine which types of 
intoxication correspond to plenitude, and why. I will emphasise that this conflation is far from 
unusual, and has an enduring hold over large parts of  Nietzschean scholarship, particularly that 
which takes the notion of  energy expenditure seriously. It is central to my argument, however, to 
establish that as Nietzsche‘s ideas progress he develops a hierarchy of  states of  intoxication. While 
he often merely alludes to this hierarchy, we can nonetheless piece his arguments together and 
distinguish between authentic and inauthentic states of  intoxication. Authentic intoxication is the 
genuine Nietzschean state, and the one that we can most properly oppose to exhaustion; indeed, 
it is the possibility of  this state (and general failure to reach it) that explains why he evaluates 
exhaustion negatively in the first place. Failing to distinguish authentic intoxication from 
inauthentic often leads commentators to misrepresent Nietzsche‘s project, and misrepresent the 
aims and process of  the project of  self-creation.  
As we have seen, substantial evidence in The Birth of  Tragedy suggests that Nietzsche 
initially does not distinguish between different states of  intoxication. However, as early as The 
Gay Science he has significantly altered his account of  intoxication, with his optimism over the 
effects of  intoxication shifting towards mistrusting certain forms of  intoxication, that act as a 
substitute for genuine ―higher moods‖ and merely ―ape the high tide of  the soul‖: 
 
Of  the theatre - I had strong and elevated feelings again today, and if  I could have music 
and art in the evening, I know very well what sort of music and art I do not want - 
namely, the kind that tries to intoxicate the audience and to force it to the height of  a 
moment of strong and elevated feelings. This kind is designed for those everyday souls 
who in the evening are not like victors of  their triumphal chariots but rather like tired 
mules who have been whipped too much by life. What would men of  this type know of 
―higher moods‖ if  there were no intoxicants and idealistic whips? Hence they have those 
who enthuse them even as they have their wines. But what are their drinks and their 
intoxication to me? Does he that is enthusiastic need wine? Rather he looks with some 
sort of  nausea at the means and mediators that are trying to produce an effect without a 
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sufficient reason - aping the high tide of  the soul! (GS 86) 
 
Nietzsche increasingly criticises art that requires an over-wrought audience; Klossowski argues 
that this criticism mirrored his increasing alienation from Wagner and his circle of  admirers: ―He 
then revealed all the traits of  false genius in Wagner, who relied on the nervous vulnerability of 
the listener. Intoxication, ecstasy, the tonality of  the soul, excess,  delirium, hallucination - these 
were what this Cagliostro seemed to look for in order to abuse the crowds and heighten the 
hysteria of  his female listeners… Because of  this he called Wagner a histrionic, and therefore the 
very symptom of  decadence.‖47 In criticising Wagner Nietzsche indicates a hierarchy of  states of  
intoxication. Less important than his attack on the composer is his attack on the type of  people that 
he influences and moves; those who are susceptible to intoxication in this way tend to be tired and 
exhausted ‗everyday souls.‘ Wagner‘s music depends for its effect on the presence of  the 
exhausted and their ―tired nerves‖:  
 
Wagner is a great corrupter of  music. With it, he found the means of  stimulating tired 
nerves,—and in this way he made music ill. In the art of  spurring exhausted creatures 
back into activity, and of  recalling half-corpses to life, the inventiveness he shows is of 
no mean order. He is the master of  hypnotic trickery, and he fells the strongest like 
bullocks. Wagner's success—his success with nerves, and therefore with women—
converted the whole world of  ambitious musicians into disciples of  his secret art. (CW 
5) 
 
The crucial aspect is not that the ‗tired mules‘ are able to gain a form of  pleasure (in solace) from 
intoxication, but that different types of  intoxication vary in quality and value. Nietzsche mocks 
men ―whose lives are not an ―action‖ but a business,‖ but who use music and art to 
inauthentically: ―ape the high tide of  the soul,‖ and refers disparagingly to both their exhausted 
character, and that they suffer from existence and seek to be consoled (GS 86). Nietzsche 
suggest here that there are states of  intoxication that the ‗tired mules‘ or ‗men of  business‘ 
cannot access; while they may think that they are accessing a similar experience, their experiences 
are qualitatively different. It is not just music and art that can be used to produce these inferior 
types of  intoxication in the weak; Nietzsche also lists: ―intoxication as cruelty in the tragic 
enjoyment of  the destruction of  the noblest; intoxication as blind enthusiasm for single human 
beings or ages (as hatred, etc). – Attempt to work blindly as an instrument of  science… 
mysticism, the voluptuous enjoyment of  eternal emptiness… or some stupid little fanaticism,‖ 
                                                                 
47 Klossowski, p. 222. 
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and so on (WP 29/KSA 10:24[26]). These types of  intoxication are all mistaken attempts to 
alleviate suffering, and, since they fail to address its real roots, they weaken the will (WP 29/KSA 
10:24[26]). Not everyone can access the higher type of  experiences, for they presuppose that a 
man possess certain qualities. It is the meaning of  this ‗high tide of  the soul‘  that I will focus on, 
for it corresponds to the idea of  authentic intoxication.  
To develop criteria for assessing the authenticity of  particular states, we need to establish 
a physiological difference in kind between different types of  intoxication. To achieve this I will 
highlight, and interrogate, a tension in Nietzsche‘s account of  the state of  intoxication, which he 
often refers to as the Dionysian state. This tension is a paradox in his observations on intoxication 
that concerns having the ability to resist a stimulus. By untangling this tension I will suggest that it 
is both possible, and desirable, to avoid conflating all types of  intoxication with plenitude. We 
know that the Dionysian state is creative because it involves altering perception. Nietzsche 
frequently depicts this influence on perception, however, as synonymous with losing control; 
thus he explicitly links the Dionysian state with the inability ―not to react‖: ―The essential thing 
remains the facility of  the metamorphosis, the incapacity not to react… It is impossible for the 
Dionysian man not to understand any suggestions of  whatever kind, he ignores no signal from 
the emotions… (TI IX, 10). The Dionysian man‘s emotional system intensifies, which means he 
is increasingly susceptible to his emotions and impulses, and thus to whim and caprice. His 
suggestibility stretches further than this: this heightening emotional state, this intensifying of  his 
nervous system, also leaves him susceptible to external provocation; thoughts, feelings, and 
actions can be induced in him more easily. Of  course, we could praise this susceptibility as a 
creative state, and at times Nietzsche praises it precisely in these terms. Nonetheless, these 
praises should puzzle the scholar of  Nietzsche, because the inability to resist stimulus is also 
frequently criticised as incapacity, and as a symptom of  sickness. Elsewhere in Twilight of  the Idols he 
argues that precisely this inability to resist a stimulus often reflects exhaustion: ―all unspirituality, 
all vulgarity, is due to the incapacity to resists a stimulus... in many instances, such a compulsion 
is already morbidity, decline, a symptom of  exhaustion‖ (TI VIII, 6). He suspects that failing to 
resist external stimulus suggests an inability to resist. Being exhausted tends to leads one to 
prioritise a type of  pleasure that does not require that one resist anything, but instead welcome 
the invasion of  stimulus and the overwhelming of  oneself.  
 
Instinctive exclusion of  all aversion, all enmity, all feeling for limitation and distancing : consequence 
of  an extreme capacity for suffering and irritation which already feels all resisting, all 
need for resistance, as an unbearable displeasure (that is to say as harmful, as deprecated by 
the instinct of  self-preservation) and knows blessedness (pleasure) only in no longer 
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resisting anyone or anything. (AC 30)  
 
Therefore while Nietzsche initially presents the Dionysian state in such a way that he defines it 
by ―a feeling of  plenitude and increased energy,‖ he also suggests that it shares a cent ral 
characteristic that he associates with exhaustion and weakness (TI IX, 8). This consequently 
threatens to destroy his attempt to posit a tangible link between energy and intoxication, and 
therefore undermines his attempt to make intoxication the basis for evaluating values. Indeed, if 
being susceptible to stimulus presupposes exhaustion, then we might expect abundance and 
intoxication to be mutually exclusive. Resolving these ideas, and therefore solving this paradox, is 
crucial to making sense of  the basis for revaluing values. However, Nietzsche does not address 
this problem in any rigorous sense, despite it being crucial in making sense of  æsthetics, his 
account of  both creation and joy, and indeed his entire project of  constructing a coherent 
philosophy centred on energy expenditure. I will devise a solution to this paradox, however, by 
considering Nietzsche‘s writings on the modern artist, who in a certain form represents a pure 
Dionysian state; and the ascetic priest, whose condition manifests exhaustion in one form, and, 
overall, through Nietzsche‘s idiosyncratic idea of  the will. 
Nietzsche‘s discussion of  the artist contains an ambiguity which we can use to draw out 
the meaning of  authentic intoxication. Ideally, we would be able to distinguish between the 
authentic and inauthentic artist, so that this distinction maps onto the same distinction vis-à-vis 
intoxication. This is, however, problematic. In notes incorporated into The Will to Power, 
Nietzsche criticises a figure, which he identifies as the ―modern artist,‖ because he has much in 
common with the ―hysteric‖ or ―hysterical female‖: ―The modern artist, in his physiology next-of-
kin to the hysteric, is also distinguished by this morbidity as a character. The hysteric is false – he 
lies from love of  lying, he is admirable in every art of  dissimulation…‖ (WP 813/KSA 
13:16[89]). The physiological basis for this ―morbid‖ similarity between the artist and the hysteric 
is that they lack enduring character. Indeed, he lacks sufficient stability of  self  for us even to 
describe him as a ―person‖: ―The absurd irritability of  his system, which turns all experience into 
crises and introduces the ―dramatic‖ into the smallest accidents of  life, robs him of  all 
calculability: he is no longer a person, at most a rendezvous of  persons and now this one, now 
that one shoots forward with shameless assurance‖ (WP 813/KSA 13:16[89]). The hysteric‘s lack 
of  character is tied to the ‗irritability‘ of  his system, which means that he cannot resist stimulus; 
this lack of  resistance signals a desire to lose the feeling of  self. His self‘s coherence and its 
‗calculability‘ are overwhelmed by external stimulus, by all the small accidents of  life. This 
inability to resist is vulgar, because time and again he is stripped of  his character, revealing his lack 
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of  self-control and self-mastery. 
Even if  the artist tends to enter a physiological state similar to that of  the hysteric, then 
we can still distinguish these the two figures by the after-effects that they experience from this 
condition; when Nietzsche discusses after-effects he reintroduces energy expenditure as 
important: ―But the after-effect is not the same; the extreme exhaustion of  all morbid natures 
after their nervous eccentricities has nothing in common with the states of  the artist, who does 
not have to atone for his good periods – He is rich enough for them: he is able to squander 
without becoming poor‖ (WP 812/KSA 13:14[119]). The hysteric and the artist are therefore 
clearly separated by the quantity of  energy that they possess; while the former is further 
exhausted by expending the energy that the state of  intoxication requires (which is, after all, the 
feeling of  increasing energy), the latter either staves off  exhaustion by possessing deeper energy 
stores, and/or possesses the ability to recover more quickly. By distinguishing in this way, 
Nietzsche avoids bringing to bear a comprehensive criticism of  the modern artist, in the terms 
of  energy expenditure. He dismisses the hysteric as weak, exhausted, irritable; furthermore,  since 
he is not rich enough to expend energy, he only intensifies his exhaustion. The hysteric‘s case recalls 
that of  the tired businessman, who, listening to music, imagines himself  to be joyfully 
intoxicated, but is really only aping an ideal. His intoxication stems from weakness because its 
roots are in his complete inability to resist stimulus and provocation. Since the modern artist 
often possesses a degree of  strength and energy, we cannot dismiss the modern artist on these 
same grounds, and therefore he represents a more complex case. We can at least partially explain 
this, however, by the fact that Nietzsche at times discusses ‗artists‘ as one type, whilst at other 
times he distinguishes between different types, placing them on completely opposite ends of  the 
spectrum of  how much energy they possess. But we can also point to the idea that the modern 
artist makes bad choices about how to expend the energy and strength he possesses. Just because 
the artist possesses sufficient energy not to need to atone for the energy that he squanders, this 
does not necessarily mean that his intoxication issues from strength and excess energy. Just because 
he possesses some energy, this does not mean that his intoxication is not provoked by his 
impoverished physiology. Nietzsche suggests that the artist‘s intoxication is vulgar when it 
involves temporarily losing his character, even when he uses up his strength and energy to pursue 
this state deliberately. The artist‘s vulgarity is thus often due to the type of  intoxication he 
chooses to pursue, rather than the type of  intoxication he is currently physiologically capable of.  
The upshot of  this is that, while the category of  the modern artist ultimately fails to 
provide a definitive account of  the relation between intoxication and energy expenditure, the 
criticisms Nietzsche aims at this figure suggest that the Dionysian state is a troubling state of 
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intoxication, which has a great deal in common with weak and exhausted ones. Despite this, 
many commentators have assumed this particular interpretation of  the Dionysian state to be 
Nietzsche‘s ideal. That is, they have misinterpreted the unquestionable praise he bestows on some 
types of  intoxicated states by conflating all of  these states. In Nietzsche on Art, Aaron Ridley 
argues that Nietzsche rather invited this conflation by continuing to use ―Dionysian‖ to describe 
different ideas of  intoxication. One of  these is akin to the position I have been criticising here, 
and he calls this ―the Dionysian art of  ‗becoming.‘‖48 Ridley eloquently summarises the role of  art 
in this idea of  the Dionysian as: ―There, the role of  art is to supply  a (dishonest) fantasy that is 
to replace a reality that one cannot face – it is, in effect, to hold out the prospect of  becoming an 
impossible (non-)self, a (non-)self  that is insulated, as nothing can be insulated, from the very 
conditions of  its own existence.‖49 In this idea of  the Dionysian, a man tries to become like 
Becoming, which ―represents a travesty of  the intellectual conscience.‖50 Ridley concludes that 
Nietzsche ―should really have reserved the label ‗Dionysian‘‖ for his most positive articulations 
of  the self, one that does not seek to deny existence, but instead to enhance and enrich it.51 
The debate over the meaning of  intoxication often crosses over into the question of  how 
we should conceptualise the relationship of  Being to Becoming. I highlighted earlier that 
Nietzsche at times appears to suggest that the highest state involves destroying Being and 
immersing oneself  in Becoming, a project which involves temporarily dissolving the self  as a 
mechanism for achieving closeness or ‗oneness‘ with Becoming. This contributes to the 
interpretation that intoxication and joy are found in the self  as it dissolves and disperses into 
Becoming. There are numerous notable interpretations of  this kind, some direct interpretations 
of  Nietzsche, and others that he influences more indirectly. We can further our understanding of  
the difference between authentic and inauthentic intoxication by considering some of  these 
accounts. 
In On Nietzsche Georges Bataille interprets Nietzsche‘s thought in terms of  energy 
expenditure, and his study remains one of  the foremost example of  this approach.52 While this 
makes it a valuable contribution to interpreting Nietzsche, it is of  limited use, however, in 
identifying authentic intoxication, and by extension in pinpointing the nature of  authentic joy, 
because Bataille fails to acknowledge a hierarchy of  intoxication, leading him to overemphasise 
the inferior types. This overemphasis means he entirely misses key elements of  Nietzsche‘s 
response to the problem of  suffering. Bataille‘s target throughout is a state or feel ing he calls the 
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―summit,‖ which corresponds to an ―excess,‖ and an ―exuberance of  forces.‖53 He makes it clear 
from the outset, however, that the nature of  this excess overwhelms and violates the self ‘s everyday 
barriers; it: ―relates to measureless expenditures of  energy and is a violation of  the integrity of  
individual beings.‖54  This violation aims to destroy ‗transcendence,‘ and its goal is ―human 
entirety or totality.‖55 Bataille constantly emphasises this idea of  the ―violation‖ and ―laceration‖ 
of  the everyday self.56 His work encapsulates the problems that arise if  we subordinate the habits 
and routines of  everyday life to pursing all states of  intoxication, no matter their origin or content. 
On Nietzsche reminds one inexorably of  Nietzsche‘s diagnosis of  the modern artist/hysteric as 
suffering from an ‗absurd irritability of  the system‘; Bataille describes a continual state of  anguish, 
and it becomes clear that it is precisely this anguish, this constant irritability, that opens him up 
towards intoxication: ―Anguish and anxiety preoccupy me and gnaw at me. Anguish is present 
and hovering over possible depths… I hoist myself  up to my summit and see the grounding of  
things opening up. Like an unwelcome knock at the door, anguish is present.‖57 Anguish is 
constantly expending nervous energy; he recklessly and deliberately expends energy, and this 
leads him to feverishly oscillate between states of  ecstasy and complete exhaustion: ―After this 
morning‘s laceration, my nerves were shattered again (yet again).‖58 This is self-perpetuating, 
because his exhaustion means a lack of  ability to recover, a lack of  plastic healing power: ―My 
ability to bounce back seems gone for good.‖ 59  Yet Bataille welcomes the suffering that 
exhaustion brings, because it further opens him up to the loss of  his everyday self  and the 
intoxicating experience that accompanies this: ―In every instance, I think, only suffering 
(devastating, exhausting your existence) opens such deep-seated wounds.‖ 60  The following 
passage personifies this dramatic oscillation: suffering and unsatisfied desire produces constant 
nervous excitation of  energy, and depleted energy stores subsequently provoke a descent to the 
―foundation of  the world‖ – which he equates with ―emptiness‖ and ―absence‖: 
 
Lacerated this morning, my wound opening again with the slightest jostling. Once more, 
empty desire and inexhaustible suffering! A year ago in the heat of  my decisiveness I 
distanced myself  from the barest possibility of  rest. For a year I‘ve been thrashing about 
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like a fish out of water. I‘m eager and laughing, becoming a fiery rush… Suddenly: 
emptiness and absence. And from now on I‘m at the foundation of  the world.61 
 
This type of  intoxication is characterised by losing firmness of  character and the feeling of  self. 
It is a condition provoked in a subject laid bare to the world, passively receiving stimulus. He 
interprets his inability to resist stimulus as strength, as totality, as openness to the world, and as 
plunging into Becoming.  
There is great value in Bataille‘s work: first, he attempts to take seriously a Nietzschean 
philosophy of  energy expenditure; second, he interprets intoxication as a creative state that 
transforms the world; third, he attempts to affirm suffering and redeem it through intoxication. 
We can therefore contrast this account favourably with many approaches to the problem of  
suffering; for example, it rejects the attempt to deny the reality of  suffering by positing a true or 
real world; the slandering of  the instincts and body; and the attempt to revenge oneself, (an 
imaginary revenge or otherwise) on those who do not suffer from suffering. My observations 
intend, however, to counter Bataille‘s contention that the idea of  the ‗summit‘ is a desirable 
representation of  Nietzsche‘s account of  intoxication and joy. 
Bataille‘s account, strange and esoteric though it is, greatly influences a significant 
number of  Nietzsche‘s scholars, particularly the so-called ‗continental‘ strand. In an interview 
with Trombadori, Foucault argues that the trio of  Nietzsche, Bataille and Blanchot offered a 
philosophical escape route from an academic conformity around Hegel and phenomenology and 
a non-academic devotion to Sartrean existentialism: ―Doing philosophy in those days (early 
fifties), and today as well in fact, mainly amounted to doing the history of  philosophy - and the 
history of  philosophy delimited, on the one hand, by Hegel‘s theory of  systems and, on the 
other, by the philosophy of  the subject, went on in the form of  phenomenology and 
existentialism.‖62  Foucault reads Nietzsche just as Bataille does, as pushing experience to a 
―maximum of  intensity‖ that makes the traditional idea of  the subject impossible.63 As opposed 
to phenomenology and existentialism‘s focus on the subject of  ―everyday‖ experience, Foucault‘s 
Nietzsche prioritises the ―limit-experience‖: ―For Nietzsche, Bataille, Blanchot, on the other 
hand, experience is trying to reach a certain point in life that is as close to possible to the 
―unlivable,‖ to that which can‘t be lived through. What is required is the maximum of  intensity 
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and the maximum of  impossibly at the same time.‖64 Where the phenomenological subject 
―recaptures the meaning of  everyday experience,‖ the Nietzschean project is one of 
―desubjectification‖: ―experience has the function of  wrenching the subject from itself, of  seeing 
to it that the subject is no longer itself, or that it is brought to its annihilation or its dissolution.‖65 
For Foucault, as for Bataille, Nietzsche‘s writings on energy point towards a state of  maximum 
energy, where the subject is no longer himself, and feels other to his everyday state. He prioritises 
this state over the everyday state, and this gives everyday existence new meaning, but also 
devalues it. The subject does not actively produce meaning, but finds it in its temporary 
dissolution, and it is therefore stripped of  its ―foundational function‖ and ―supremacy.‖66 While 
we should note that Foucault is primarily discussing the uses he found in Nietzsche, we can 
nonetheless isolate the same illegitimate moves vis-à-vis Nietzsche‘s thought: conflating being 
intoxicated with losing oneself, with the decentering of  meaning, with passively responding to 
experience, and with indifference to the source of  intoxication.  
Henry Miller‘s semi-autobiographical work offers another profound example of  
Nietzsche‘s figure of  the modern artist. He underscores his work with a broadly Nietzschean 
emphasis on Becoming‘s primacy: ―chaos is the score upon which reality is written.‖67 He argues 
that, in contrast to the mediocre, who seeks ―protection‖ and ―safety‖ and cower behind inert 
Being, he embraces the elements of  Becoming: ―I love everything that flows, everything that has 
time in it and becoming,‖ for example: ―rivers, sewers,  lava, semen, blood, bile, words, 
sentences.‖68  Miller takes the figure of  the modern artist to an extreme, by sacrificing the 
integrity of  his everyday self  to his creative urge: ―a man who is intent on creation always dives 
beneath, to the open wound, to the festering obscene horror.‖ 69  This laceration involves 
imagining that he is identifying the ‗flows‘ of  his body with wider and more general ‗flows‘: ―and 
I join my slime, excrement, my madness, my ecstasy, to the great circuit which flows through the 
subterranean vaults of  the flesh.‖70  
Miller prioritises creating art above all, including his mind‘s immediate integrity and 
coherence. He describes the state of  identifying with Becoming as the opening up of  a ―deep 
fissure‖ in his brain, and ―a grand schizophrenic rush.‖71 For Miller authentic art requires that the 
artist lacerate himself  in new ways, searching for extreme experiences, completely other than his 
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everyday experience, and those more mediocre; the artist must: ―Stand up on the high place with 
gibberish in his mouth and rip out his entrails. It is right and just, because he must! And anything 
that falls short of  this frightening spectacle, anything less shuddering, less terrifying, less mad, 
less intoxicated, less contaminating, is not art. The rest is counterfeit. The rest is human.‖72 Such 
arguments arise because Miller consistently identifies Being with inertia, and Becoming with 
change, in a way that tends to lacks subtlety about how the two interact. Consequently, he 
suggests we achieve creation by forcefully rejecting everything that he perceives to cause inertia, 
―laws, codes, principles, ideals, totems, and taboos,‖ plunging into Becoming, and reforming 
Being in light of  this exposure to change, flux, etc.73 This is a transgressive practice he designs to 
violate the everyday self, and what he believes is its tendency towards protection and security. In 
lesser men this tendency triumphs and they cannot create or act originally, but are inert and 
reactive. Miller‘s faith is that it is the stagnant structures of  Being that act as a barrier to vitality, 
and to the creative impulse. His emphasis is therefore predominantly on removing the obstacles 
to joy, intoxication and creation, rather than on how he should develop himself. While some of 
his descriptions are undoubtedly just stunning literary excess, Miller is nonetheless extremely 
consistent in this understanding of  the great man and creation, and this is also a very common 
interpretation, especially amongst Nietzsche scholars.  
Like Bataille, Miller highlights the exhilarating energy expenditure that pursuing 
intoxication involves. He claims to be ―Incurably healthy. No sorrows, no regrets. No past, no 
future,‖ and while he does frequently completely exhaust himself, which at times leads to 
extreme anguish and suffering, he nonetheless claims a remarkable resilience, regaining strength 
rapidly.74 Thus we certainly cannot align Miller precisely with either the tired businessman or the 
hysteric; they react exhaustedly to stimulus, whereas he exhibits a degree of  autonomy they do 
not have, living according to a code that he creates himself. Yet his method of  creation, 
predicated upon violently oscillating between expending energy and complete exhaustion,  and 
sacrificing his mind‘s coherence, long-term plans, and the protracted will, to his creative urge, is 
also a long way from the theory of  intoxication that I will privilege. Authors such as Bataille and 
Miller demonstrate that the modern artist is a nuanced and complex case: on the one hand his 
capacity for great expenditure marks him out from weaker figures, but on the other, his 
indiscriminate pursuit of  intoxication betrays a desire to lose his everyday self, a desire for 
temporary incoherence, for dissolving the boundaries of  his self.  The issue then, with both of  
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these authors, is that they believe that the moment of  intoxication justifies and redeems the 
suffering that it costs them. This is certainly true to some extent, but only because we can surely 
prefer the creative existence of  the intoxicated sufferer to the inert mediocrity that both Bataille 
and Miller oppose. Indeed, the violent oscillation between exhaustion and suffering that both 
Bataille and Miller depict is often taken to be the quintessential Nietzschean idea of  intoxication. 
However, as I have established, Nietzsche is clearly concerned about the modern artist‘s 
similarity to the hysteric, and it is difficult to read his account of  the modern artist in any way 
other than critical. My aim will be to take the best features of  those great modern artists, Bataille 
and Miller, and maintain something like their creative intoxication, whilst avoiding their 
weakness. Nietzsche sketches a higher model of  the artist and his creative experience, and we 
must carefully separate this figure from lower types.  
Some commentators simply ignore this problem by refusing to acknowledge Nietzsche‘s 
writing on the importance of  strength of  character and maintaining a coherent self. Alex 
McIntyre‘s The Sovereignty of  Joy is one such example of  this approach. The central narrative he 
proposes for understanding oneself  is to think of  oneself  as an ―intermediary of  becoming.‖ 75 
Whenever we have an idea, or perform a deed, we should not feel as if  we own it, or that we 
create it, but that we are a vehicle for something that is being born through us: ―towards every 
bringing forth, whether it is an idea or a deed, we have no other relationship than that of 
pregnancy; we are simply ‗intermediaries‘ (D, 552) of  becoming, of  nature as natura: that which is 
about to be born.‖76 This phrase is repeated ad nauseum, reinforcing its centrality in McIntyre‘s 
interpretation. ―Nature as becoming‖ comes into being through man, who ―always belongs as 
intermediary‖; this is what Nietzsche ―symbolises in the phrase ―will to power.‖77 Under such a 
schema it is impossible to feel pride or mastery over one‘s deeds or thoughts, since they are 
simply nature finding its expression in him (whether he like it nor not). There is therefore little 
point in him cultivating his abilities, creating himself  in such and such a way, improving himself, 
etc. As I have identified, one of  the central aspects of  the will to power is imposing Being onto 
Becoming, but for Nietzsche it is the quality of  this imposition that is all important. There is no 
sense that the quality matters at all in McIntyre, since after all, man is just an intermediary, and 
not responsible for what he creates - or, more accurately, what is created through him; it is not his 
will that is at stake, but nature‘s. It is hard to imagine a more passive interpretation of  Nietzsche‘s 
great man, since the only active role he plays here is recognising that he should let go of  the idea 
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that he has a coherent character, and embrace his role as the conduit of  stimulus: ―To be able to 
be a creator, according to Nietzsche, involves first overcoming all presumptuous talk of 
‗creating‘ and ‗willing,‘ and thus presupposes that one belongs to nature in this newly discovered 
and newly redeemed sense of  ‗will to power.‘‖78 
For McIntyre the traditional image of  the subject, including the will, free will, the idea of  
a doer, of  a creator, is just a useless fiction. All we need to do is collapse these distinctions, and 
man will be ‗freed‘ back into the ‗innocence of  becoming,‘ which does not seem to be anything 
other than ‗nature‘: ―In taking the doer back in the deed, Nietzsche places man into the 
continuous flow of  becoming in which there is no absolute subject, but only intermediaries of  
nature who bring forth what is coming to be...‖79 McIntyre ‗solves‘ the problem of  the subject by 
simply getting rid of  it, which seems neither profound nor particularly wise. McIntyre‘s ‗solution‘ 
actually has a lot in common with issues I have been discussing in relation to Bataille and Miller, 
though he lacks their style and their valuable contributions. McIntyre‘s dissolving of  the subject 
is underpinned (theoretically, not, one suspects, psychologically) by identifying joy with 
becoming. As the title of  the work indicates, this joy is taken to be sovereign. While there is 
nothing wrong with putting joy at the forefront of  Nietzsche‘s thought, McIntyre falls into the 
same trap as Bataille and Miller in, firstly, thinking of  joy as identical with all forms of  
intoxication, and, secondly, of  conceiving of  intoxication as synonymous with dissolving into, 
and identifying with, Becoming. He dismisses all that hinders this process as an obstacle to joy; it 
is as if  Being in its entirety is just a trick of  the priest.  
Along these lines, McIntyre reinterprets Nietzsche‘s most well-known concepts as really 
meaning nothing other than praising the value of  Becoming: for instance, on the great man: 
―The really great soul is not stronger and more powerful in the narrow sense , but wider and 
more open‖;80 to be a creator means ―bringing forth… that which is about to be born‖; 81 and 
even the Overman is not the one who ―rules over‖ Becoming, but ―the one who releases himself 
into the joy of  becoming.‖82 If  this all seems a little repetitive, and to be putting a little too much 
faith in the ability of  Becoming to solve all the issues in Nietzsche‘s work, then things only get 
worse. In a bizarre move, he reinterprets the idea of  freedom as nothing do with possessing 
autonomy or sovereignty, but ―renouncing the mythology of  absolute autonomy and 
sovereignty,‖ and again, the target for criticism is anything which sounds like it is ―abstracted‖ 
from the world: ―instead of  interpreting freedom as absolute autonomy abstracted from the 
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world, Nietzsche attempts to take freedom back into nature by understanding it as the act of 
embracing one‘s limitedness - one‘s ‗unfreedom.‘‖83 He confusingly reinterprets freedom as the 
freedom to be the passive intermediary of  whatever nature ‗desires‘ for us, and to embrace the 
innocence of  Becoming. Finally, it becomes clear that any difficulty can be overcome simply by 
‗releasing oneself  into becoming‘ when McIntyre deals with one of  the central complexities of  
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the problem of  the relation between the will and the past. Of  course, 
since McIntyre wants to deny the will altogether, he simply changes the problem to the need to 
redeem past suffering. The outcome of  his discussion is entirely predictable: the sufferer just 
releases his past into Becoming: ―Taking the doer back into the deed implies that one releases 
oneself  into becoming, that one releases the past into pure becoming by affirming it as the 
medium of  one‘s present.‖84 
In The Æsthetics of  Excess Weiss argues that Bataille is able to avoid the problem of  the 
coherence of  the self  by eliminating the idea of  the will to power altogether, at least in any 
recognisable form. 85  Weiss acknowledges that the need for ―dramatisation,‖ exemplified by 
Bataille‘s rejection of  everyday experience, betrays weakness, and, furthermore, he realises that 
Bataille‘s intoxication involves an openness to possession that positively requires a weakness of 
will: ―Yet isn‘t such a weakness… at the very core of  Bataille‘s project? And isn‘t a weak, passive 
will precisely a necessary precondition for the state of  possession, of  intoxication?‖ 86  This 
weakness of  will is, however, not a problem for Bataille because he replaces the will to power 
with the will to chance, arguing that Nietzsche misunderstood the relation between sovereignty 
and power: ―Sovereignty is rebellion; it is not the exercise of  power. Authentic sovereignty 
refuses...‖87 Weiss describes this ‗rebellion‘ from the everyday self  with all the terminology that 
we have come to expect from so-called poststructuralist accounts of  Nietzsche. And it is this 
specific idea of  intoxication, the loss of  the feeling of  self, which underscores so many readings of 
Nietzsche in this tradition. Intoxication involves the ―death of  the subject‖ and the 
―renunciation of  volition,‖ and is the ―the epidemic loss of  self  and transformation into alterity,‖ 
where the ―distinction between self  and other is effaced,‖ and so on.88 This is the meaning of  
the Dionysian state, and is the basis for creating: ―Clearly, the celebration of  creativity and 
ecstasy beyond the limits of  rational thought is founded upon intoxication as demonic possession 
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by Dionysus.‖89 Nietzsche‘s ideas about imposing the will to power onto oneself, and about 
imposing constraint, style, and coherence, have been completely lost here. For Weiss, Bataille 
builds on a problem in the development of  Nietzsche‘s work: the Birth of  Tragedy‘s dialectical 
relation between the Apollonian and the Dionysian breaks down and Nietzsche increasingly loses 
his grasp on the Apollonian aspect - this parallels his fall ―into madness‖: ―Apollo forgotten, 
there remains only Dionysus the Crucified; there remains only the empty gestures of  one we call 
mad, one who perhaps was only nostalgic for a different order of  things, for the possibility of  
sacred sacrifice, for that different joy which marked the origin of  our culture.‖90 Weiss suggests 
here that Nietzsche‘s increasing preoccupation with Dionysian aspects of  existence undermines 
and eventually destroys his coherence entirely. This seems to suggest that Nietzsche was 
somehow unaware of  the dangers involved in pursuing Dionysian intoxication, but, on the 
contrary, I will argue precisely the opposite, that Nietzsche is acutely aware of  both the 
advantages and dangers. He shares Bataille and Miller‘s enthusiasm for certain effects of 
intoxication, particularly the effect it has on perception, but he is aware that certain types of  
intoxication both represents and perpetuate weakness and losing the feeling of  self. As such, he 
does not devalue the experience of  intoxication in itself, but his interest is in carefully separating 
types of  intoxication from one another, and creating a hierarchy between them. Brief  moments 
where we forget suffering, cannot compensate for the advantages we lose, by not cultivating a 
relationship with ourselves by which we do not desire to lose ourselves in the first place. 
Nietzsche suspects that desiring an experience completely other than our everyday life betrays a 
lack of  contentment with one‘s existence; constantly desiring the ―fast, new, strange‖ betrays a 
lack of  contentment, suggesting a ―will to forget yourself,‖ lacking belief  in the value of  one‘s 
existence: ―If  you believed more in life, you would hurl yourself  less into the moment. But you 
do not have enough content in yourselves for waiting - not even for laziness!‖ (Z, I, 9). 
These authors, who vary dramatically in quality, all share certain ideas of  creation, which, 
while not completely identical, are unified by the idea that creation‘s most important aspect is 
some kind of  immersion into becoming, which the creator experiences as a blurring of  the 
boundaries between the self  and the world. Bataille and Miller prioritise this state not just 
because of  its role in creation - although that is certainly part of  it - but also as a joyful 
experience. In his recent work A World of  Becoming, Connolly argues that, for Nietzsche, creation 
is intrinsically linked to the experience of  Becoming, and that the one who wishes to create 
should therefore cultivate a relationship with the world where he is able to blur himself  into the 
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world of  Becoming, seeking inspiration and new ideas - he becomes ―a Seer.‖91 These seers, of  
which he uses Nietzsche as a prominent example, cultivate ―exquisite sensitivity to the 
accelerated pace in several zones of  life‖ and sink: ―into moments when sensitivity intensified 
and the action-oriented sense of  chronology blurred.‖92 Connolly‘s work is useful because he is 
not afraid to state as bluntly as possible the kind of  arguments that authors like Bataille and 
Miller like to gesture at in literary and often mystical terms. The following passage summarises 
the attitude that Connolly believes one should take towards creation, and it is precisely this 
attitude that I oppose: 
 
Today, however, it is important for more people to hone some of  the capacities of  a seer 
and to exercise them periodically. When a period of turbulence arises in a zone that had 
been relatively quiescent, you revisit a habitual pattern of thought by slipping into a 
creative suspension of  action-oriented perception, doing so to allow a new insight or 
tactic to bubble forth if  it will, as if  from nowhere. You may then intervene in politics 
on the basis of  that insight, ready to recoil back on the insight in the light of  its actual 
effects. You soon launch another round as you maintain a relation of torsion between 
following a train of thought, dwelling in duration, and exploring a revised course that 
has just emerged, until your time runs out.93 
 
Such an attitude towards creation is clearly extremely passive: one merely has to suspend one‘s 
everyday thought (‗action-oriented perception‘), ‗slip into‘ Becoming, and creative impetus might 
strike one ‗as if  from nowhere.‘ We then apply this ‗insight,‘ and we can repeat the process 
whenever we require. The only active part of  the process of  creation is the prior cultivating of  
the ability to be able to slip into this state (trance?). Creating, it turns out, does not require much 
effort at all; it is more the absence of  effort and of  will, which is replaced by the ability to tune 
oneself  into Becoming, nature etc. In this conception, it is Becoming that is creative, not the 
actual individual himself, whose role appears to be channelling or conducting an inherently 
creative Becoming. It is thus not only a very similar attitude to McIntyre‘s, but also (in some 
ways) to Miller and Bataille, in that it prioritises the experience of  being outside the everyday self 
(intoxication) above all else.  
There is certainly something to be said for the idea that creation involves interrupting 
habit, and I think this aspect is consistent with Nietzsche‘s thought. But this is one aspect of  a 
much larger project of  self-creation that makes creativity possible; as I develop the meaning of  
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self-creation in Nietzsche‘s thought, it will become clear that the way in which these authors 
frame creation both misrepresents his thought and is also unhelpful, because it involves an 
overriding emphasis on Becoming that obscures the real processes involved in becoming a great 
man. Earlier I established that Nietzsche diagnoses hating Becoming as central to the tendency 
to misinterprets suffering‘s causes. All the authors I have discussed in this section agree with this 
explicitly, identifying hatred of  Becoming as central to a whole host of  problems. The problem is 
that they invariably take this approach too far by endorsing something akin to hating Being, 
identifying it variously as synonymous with inertia, lack of  creativity, cowardice, weakness, 
exhaustion, and so on. In particular, they tend to disparage the everyday self, criticise any 
approach that includes a unity of  the self, and praise some variation of  a disorganised, chaotic, 
decentred self. They reject the will‘s primacy, the importance (or possibility) of  intentionality, 
freedom of  thought as bound up with an idea of  the self  which perpetuates guilt and 
punishment, deprives them of  the ―innocence of  becoming,‖ and stifles creativity, among other 
things. In terms of  the self-creation of  the great man, this indiscriminate hatred of  Being is just 
as unhelpful as the hatred of  Becoming. It is extremely rare for any author to discuss the 
Dionysian experience but also recognise Nietzsche‘s ambiguity towards this state. Henry Staten 
makes one such attempt in Nietzsche‘s Voice. He recognises the excesses towards which Nietzsche 
tends when describing the Dionysian state (it has) ―The character of  a pressure or impulsion and 
its effect in the most extreme case is to throw the self  outside itself, into a state of  self-
forgetfulness, transport, ecstasy, ―annihilation of  the ordinary bounds and limits of  existence,‖ 
oblivion of  the person memory constitutive of  the identity of  the individual as such.‖ 94 
However, Staten is also aware that Nietzsche does not glorify this state, and that it is one puts the 
―essence of  the self  as conscious and sensitive being‖ into doubt, and that: ―Nietzsche fears this 
experience, this absolute and potentially irrecoverable expenditure of  self.‖95  Nietzsche desires a 
way to reconcile Being and Becoming, where neither is privileged and neither is despised. 
Whenever a commentator analyses intoxication without referring to its source he fails to understand 
its significance in Nietzsche‘s thought: all his writings on the Will, on abundance, and on energy, 
point towards a highest form of  intoxication, an authentic joy, which, far from loss of  self  or 
madness, is predicated upon cultivating an enhanced sensation of  self. To uncover Nietzsche‘s 
highest narratives of  the self  we must move beyond his predominantly critical writings on the 
modern artist, and develop a theory of  authentic intoxication. 
 An illuminating account of  creation‘s relation with losing oneself appears in the 
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correspondence between Antonin Artaud and Jacques Rivière. Rivière rejects Artaud‘s 
submission of  his poems, on the grounds of  their formal defects.96 Artaud then discourses on 
the connection between these defects and his state of  mind, which he characterises as lacking 
coherence and unity. This corresponds very well with the loss of  the feeling self  I have been 
identifying in Miller, Bataille and others. What is particularly notable is that Rivière is clear that 
Artaud‘s curious mental condition holds him back from expressing his creativity, and Artaud 
does not dispute this point. Rivière suggests potential solutions to the incoherence of  the mind 
that Artaud feels, convinced that this incoherence is a defect and a constraint on his creativity, 
not its cause or prerequisite. It is thus a profound reflection on the question of  whether we can 
correctly posit a link between the decentering of  the individual and creativity.  
The rejection of  his poems provokes Artaud to speculate, in a dense and rich letter, on 
their ―dispersiveness,‖ attributing this to the ―central collapse of  the mind,‖ and an ―erosion‖ of  
his thinking: ―This diffusion of  my poems, these defective forms, this constant falling off  in my 
ideas, must not be set down to lack either of  practice or control of  the instrument I was 
manipulating, of  intellectual development. Rather to a focal collapse of  my soul, a kind of  essential 
and fugitive erosion in thought, to a transitory non-possession of  physical gain to my 
development to the abnormal separation of  the elements of  thought.‖97 Artaud describes this 
collapse of  the mind in terms of  a force that seems to attack him from without; a hollowing 
force that strips him of  coherent sentences as they occur to him, and destroys his coherent 
thought just as it evolves.98 The way he describes this condition closely resembles the way both 
Bataille and Miller‘s describe losing the everyday self, the levelling out of  the individual, and the 
plunge into Becoming. Whilst they celebrate this state as both joyful and creative, Artaud 
discusses this state in the language of  coherence, leading him to denounce it. He fears the 
dissipation often heralded as the prerequisite of  the genuinely creative experience, interpreting it 
as the dispersal of  his mind‘s forces: ―Give my mind back its power of  concentration, its missing 
cohesion, its uniform tenseness, the consistency of  its own matter‖99 
In further letters, however, Artaud show a degree of  ambiguity towards this state, 
because of  the suspicion that his creative inspiration relates directly to these apparent flaws in his 
mind, or at least the way he perceives his mind. For instance: ―I am well aware of  the stops and 
starts in my poems, jolts which are linked with the very essence of  inspiration.‖100 He admits that 
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his inspiration is perhaps linked to ―physiological weakness,‖ and in particular ―our nervous 
energy emanating.‖ 101  The problem, however, is that he lacks the coherence to translate 
inspiration and mental clarity into an expression; his mind is again too fragile, too incoherent for 
this process, although he still falls back on the idea of  ―higher vicious will‖ that attacks as if 
from without, making coherence impossible: ―The moment the soul proposes to coordinate its 
riches, its discoveries, its revelations, unknowingly at the very minute the thing is about to 
emanate, a higher vicious will attacks the soul like vitriol, attacks the mass of  words and 
imagery.‖102 Rivière responds by presciently analysing Artaud‘s descriptions of  his mental state, 
and this response, at least in part, parallels the position I will be developing here, which I take to 
be a genuinely Nietzschean one. What is most striking is that he develops a nuanced account, 
which recognises both the attractions and pitfalls of the chaotic experience of  self-dissipation, 
arguing that the latter far outweigh the former. He also recognises that a mind of  ‗servile 
imitation‘ is not the only alternative to this experience, and that this represents a false and 
unhelpful opposition. Rivière recognises that ―There is a whole body of  literature‖ that concerns 
itself  with the ―animal operations of  the mind,‖ where the mind abandons coherence, giving 
itself up to chance: ―One might say that it is the clearest and most exact manifestation of  the 
animal nature in all men, but which we usually instinctively try to shackle with the bonds of  fact 
and experience.103 He describes the experiences of  this ‗animal nature‘ as an intoxication of  ―the 
wholly subjective impression of  complete freedom.‖104 Far from praising this intoxication, he is 
wary of  the effect that offering oneself  up to chance has on the coherence of  the mind, which 
cannot adequately represent this experience, and which therefore loses creative ability in trying to 
do so: ―But the penalty for these soaring flights is at hand. Universal possibilities are transformed 
into concrete impossibilities. The impression, once captured, engenders twenty more in revenge 
which paralyse us and ravage the mind‘s substance.‖105  
In his attempt to diagnose Artaud‘s problem and offer constructive advice, he picks up 
on the question of  Artaud‘s attempt to blame external forces – a ‗vicious will‘ - for the problems 
of  his mind. Rejecting this as a strategy for interpreting the problem of  the coherence of  the 
mind, he proposes two broad solutions. The first is acknowledging the physiological influences 
on this incoherence: ―There are obvious physiological reasons for these fadings out in the soul, 
which are often fairly easy to determine.‖106 He agrees with Artaud‘s description of  the soul as 
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―greatly dependent on the nervous system,‖ but argues that it is important to avoid the 
convenient ―mystical explanation,‖ of  a ―vicious will‖ that attacks from ―without.‖107 To avoid 
this positing of  imaginary external causes means shifting the focus back onto the physiological 
influences on the kind of  incoherence of  the mind that Artaud describes; furthermore, making 
this shift means taking responsibility for the presence of  this incoherence, and looking for the 
solution within the habits and routines that constitute a man‘s character.  
In addition to this renewed focus on real causes, rather than imaginary ones, Rivière 
proposes to Artaud that he consciously revaluate the way that he understands himself: 
deliberately restricting the freedom of  his mind to guard against its decomposition: ―It seems to 
me that this mental ―erosion,‖ this inner pilfering, this ―destruction‖ of  thought ―within its own 
matter‖ affecting you, is caused solely by the excessive freedom you allow it.‖108  Thus he 
diagnoses Artaud‘s mental rehabilitation as the product of  the too great freedom he allows to his 
mind; his too ready submission to chance subsequently impairs his ability to bring his thought 
together coherently. Rivière  opposes the passive-submission-to-chance mode of  art with a more 
nuanced approach, where choosing an object is paramount, but without a ―slavish imitation‖ to 
what exists: ―We must choose what we wish to ―express‖ which should always be not only 
something definite, not only the knowable, but the unknown as well.‖109  All ―successful‖ 
thought, translated into art, is thus the result of  a comprise between a ―stream of  intelligence 
flowing out of  him and incomprehension he encounters, surprise, a mental block.‖110 Rivière 
argues that where the mind lacks an ―obstacle‖ and is not deliberately prevented from wandering 
aimlessly, the creative impetus dissolves into abstraction: ―But where the object or obstacle are 
entirely missing, the mind carries straight on, defective. And everything disintegrates in immense 
contingency.‖111 The aspect of  this second strategy I consider most Nietzschean is the focus on 
the effort required to maintain the coherence of  the mind. This recognises that there are certain 
low forms of  intoxication, available to the passive and untrained mind, and destructive to the 
creative powers, rather than the source of  them. While we might assume that Artaud‘s creativity 
lies precisely in the incoherence of  his mind and the disintegration of  his everyday self, and his 
closeness to Becoming or chance, it seems likely, especially given Artaud‘s description of  his 
mental anxiety, that the inability to bring together thoughts coherently hinders him more than it 
helps. In relation to Nietzsche‘s own writings, I will emphasise the importance of  rejecting low 
forms of  intoxication in favour of  maintaining a coherent self. Not only is this coherence 
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important with regards to achieving clarity of  creative expression, it is also crucial in Nietzsche‘s 
work to cultivating a feeling of  self, which is vital to the specific manifestation of  the will to 
power as power over oneself; these feelings are vital to his account of  authentic joy.  
I have been searching for a way to conceptualise Nietzschean evaluation, and in doing so 
have shown two promising ideas to be insufficient. The first is employing the dichotomy of 
Being-Becoming to evaluate values. Although Nietzsche criticises traditional values as tending to 
elevate Being over Becoming because of  dissatisfaction with existence, it is now clear that 
pursuing Becoming can express precisely the same roots: ―The desire for destruction, change, and 
Becoming can be an expression of  an overflowing energy that is pregnant with future (my term 
for this is, as is known, ―Dionysian‖); but it can also be the hatred of  the ill-constituted, 
disinherited, and underprivileged, who destroy, must destroy, because what exists, indeed all 
existence, all being, outrages and provokes them‖ (GS 370). Thus the desire to destroy Being can 
stem not only from a desire to create more affirmative values, but also because of  ressentiment 
against existence, and a desire to obliterate and destroy what exists. The second failed criterion is 
evaluating values according to whether they reflect exhaustion or intoxication. This is made 
impossible by the paradox of  the inability not to resist stimulus. The case of  the modern artist 
points towards the necessity of  a hierarchy of  intoxication, where we reserve the highest praise 
for a type of  intoxication that does not stem from being unable to resist. Since inauthentic 
intoxication involves a movement where character is either lost or did not exist, we must 
determine whether it is possible to be intoxicated, but nonetheless possess and maintain 
character. Developing character depends on cultivating the ability to resist stimulus, discerning 
over what one allows to approach and what one takes in. This process of  cultivation has its own 
difficulties, which I will demonstrate by considering the figure of  the ascetic priest in Nietzsche‘s 
writings. He demonstrates that resistance too can stem from exhaustion, and is insufficient by 
itself for creating a great man. For a man to achieve a type of  intoxication that relates to strong 
character, he must find a way to cultivate resistance without thereby exhausting himself.  
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III 
 
 
Responses to Exhaustion II: The Ascetic Priest 
 
 
 
 To understand the meaning of  authentic intoxication we must understand what 
Nietzsche admires in the ascetic, but also why he ultimately rejects his approach. His attitude to 
the ascetic is simultaneously one of  horror and one of  admiration; the admiration is rooted in 
the idea that he embodies – or is seen to embody - a ―superior force‖: 
 
Hitherto the mightiest men have still bowed down reverently before the saint as the 
enigma of self-constraint and voluntary final renunciation: why did they bow? They 
sensed in him – as it were behind the question-mark presented by his fragile and 
miserable appearance – the superior force that sought to prove itself  through such a 
constraint, the strength of  will in which they recognized and knew how to honour their 
own strength and joy in ruling: they honoured something in themselves when they 
honoured the saint. (BGE 51) 
 
 The superior force is clearly the will to power, but given Nietzsche‘s flexible use of  this 
idea, it is vital to determine which particular manifestation he refers to in the above passage. 
Earlier I established that he identifies imposing Being onto Becoming as the supreme will to 
power. The ascetic tyrannically imposes Being – onto himself.  He appears to embody the extreme 
example of  cultivating the ability to resist stimulus. The 'mightiest men' sense in the ascetic a 
supreme degree of  self-control, a tyrannical rule over himself  and his drives. If  the hysteric 
suffers from being at most a ‗rendezvous of  persons,‘ then the ascetic appears in contrast to 
possess fixed and coherent selfhood; if  the hysteric‘s lack of  ability to resist reflects a loss or 
absence of  character, then the ascetic appears to possess supreme character. Both the admiration 
and the horror Nietzsche exhibits towards the ascetic are provoked by the cruelty with which his 
will turns inwards, both creating interiority but simultaneously imprisoning it by imposing an 
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unsympathetic order and structure onto his soul. Janaway argues that the ascetic is a paradoxical 
figure, because he grows in power over himself  but at the expense of  his ―natural strength‖:  
 
Nietzsche calls the ascetic a paradox and a self-contradiction, meaning not that the 
ascetic is an impossibility, but that he genuinely grows in power (over himself) as he 
dissociates from and destroys his natural strength. The ascetic ideal gives its proponent a 
unity of  purpose and strength of  will, so that there is a real ‗triumph‘ and ‗victory‘, not a 
mere illusion of  one. Yet this is a personality type—to which most of  us belong in the 
modern world, according to Nietzsche—whose strength and unity consist in self-
opposition and denial of  one's own most natural functions. The complexity of  the 
phenomena here is mirrored in Nietzsche's attitudes too: he admires the magnitude of  
the ascetic's achievement while lamenting its unhealthy devaluing of  the natural self.112 
 
Although the ascetic displays power over himself, and Nietzsche certainly finds this admirable, 
there are significant problems with holding him up as an example of  ‗strength of  will,‘  as 
Janaway does here. While Janaway is clearly aware of  the ascetic‘s shortcomings, I want to 
suggest that these shortcomings bar him from possessing a strong Will, once we conceive of  it in 
Nietzsche‘s idiosyncratic fashion. Although it is certainly true that the ascetic does possess 
something like strength of  will - particularly when we compare him to Nietzsche‘s sketch of  the 
modern artist - I want to distinguish qualitatively between his strength and the great man‘s 
strength. I am going to develop an account of  the strong will whereby power over oneself  is a 
necessary but not sufficient aspect, and must be coupled with Nietzsche‘s theories of  energy 
expenditure. Since the ascetic fails to cultivate abundant energy, this prevents him from 
experiencing the joy that only comes with exercising a strong Will.  
 Just as it transpires that intoxication reflects both exhaustion and strength, depending on 
its type, the same is also true for self-control and the ability to resist stimulus. This is the root of  
Nietzsche‘s criticisms of  the ascetic. Understanding the physiological difference between what 
the ascetic expresses, and what the great man expresses, promises to refine and deepen our 
understanding of  the basis for revaluating values. The idea that the ascetic captures the supreme 
will to power and supreme character is guilty of  mistakenly conflating two states: ―- two totally 
different states confounded: e.g. the calm of  strength, which is essentially forbearance from 
reaction (type of  the gods whom nothing moves) - and the calm of  exhaustion, rigidity to the point 
of  anesthesia‖ (WP 447/KSA 13:14[194]). I have thus far emphasised that exhaustion can 
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manifest itself  in constantly expending nervous energy, being unable to resist stimulus, desiring 
to lose the feeling of  self, and desiring to lose the feeling of  everyday reality; to this we can add 
another manifestation: rigidity. This state suggests a lack of  reaction to stimulus that reflects 
inertia and unresponsiveness; it is a passiveness rooted in perpetual and habitual inactivity. Thus 
apparently opposite reactions, constant anxiety and apparent calmness, can both be symptoms of  
exhaustion.  
Both the ascetic and the modern artist possess characteristics that appear valuable, but 
Nietzsche criticises both of  their overall characters for prohibiting greatness. In a passage from 
The Gay Science he compares these two types, or close approximations of  them, which he 
identifies as: ―the weak and quasi feminine type of  the dissatisfied‖ and ―the strong and 
masculine type‖ (GS 24).  The latter type corresponds more closely to the ascetic than he does to 
Nietzsche‘s great man. When Nietzsche refers to the latter type as desiring to make life ―safer‖ 
this immediately indicates that this account will not be a straightforward praise of  the latter, 
given that I have already established that he frequently associates safety with fear of  Becoming, 
an inability to deal properly with suffering, a desire to shut oneself  off  from the ‗questionable‘ 
aspects of  existence, and so on; often safety is merely a euphemism for denying existence (GS 
24). In this passage too, Nietzsche associates the desire for making life ―better and safer‖ with 
arresting chance and producing inertia; a ―Chinese ―happiness‖‖ (GS 24). He suggests that this 
incarnation of  strength produces nothing and cannot be creative. 
In contrast, the weak and quasi feminine type corresponds rather precisely to the way he 
later describes the modern artist. This weak type desires ―narcotic consolations‖ to produce 
intoxication, but this stems from his desire to deceive himself, rather than to enrich his existence 
(GS 24). Fittingly, this type links up nicely with my diagnosis that many men tend to take the 
wrong approach to suffering, and in doing so perpetuate their misery. The artist t ype he 
describes here seeks to be consoled even at the price of  deceiving himself, and thus he ―resents 
all who esteem physicians above priests‖; in doing so he ensures ―the continuation of  real misery‖ 
(GS 24). Nietzsche does not characterise this type entirely negatively, however, and this brings us 
back to the modern artist‘s positive characteristics. It is the ―sicklier, tenderer, more feminine 
dissatisfaction and romanticism that at present are still superabundant here (Europe)‖ that 
produce the capacity for change (GS 24). Europe owes the ―utmost gratitude‖ for these 
sicknesses, because whatever the faults this type exhibits, they make life ―more beautiful and 
profound,‖ because they prevent it from becoming sterile and lifeless (GS 24). It is obvious, then, 
that when Nietzsche distinguishes between two figures who map accurately onto the modern 
artist and the ascetic, he places creation firmly on the artist‘s side: Europe‘s feminine sickness has 
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―generated an intellectual irritability that almost amounts to genius and is in any case the mother 
of  all genius‖ (GS 24). He clearly implies here that genius falls firmly on the side of  the ―weak 
and quasi feminine type of  the dissatisfied‖ because of  his sensitivity and his powers of  
dissimulation (GS 24). I think we could coherently argue that these passages are a reasonable 
summary of  Nietzsche‘s thoughts on creation up until The Gay Science, but I want to suggest that 
this dichotomy completely breaks down once he properly conceives his great man theory: he 
then moves beyond the modern artist‘s so-oft inauthentic intoxication, and beyond the ascetic‘s 
sterility, and towards a figure that can truly reconcile all of  the characteristics that he values most. 
I will develop the idea of  ‗The Will‘ as the key narrative that orders Nietzsche‘s idea of  
the self, but at this point it suffices to note that one of  the primary ways he uses it is to designate 
the quality of  the relation between drives or instincts. In particular, the drives‘ precise interactions 
relates closely to possessing either a strong or a weak will: 
 
Weakness of  the will: that is a metaphor that can prove misleading. For there is no will, and 
consequently neither a strong or a weak will. The multitude and disgregation of impulses 
and the lack of any systematic order among them result in a ―weak will‖; their 
coordination under a single predominant impulse results in a ―strong will‖: in the first 
case it is the oscillation and the lack of gravity; in the latter, the precision and clarity of 
the direction. (WP 46/KSA13:14[219]) 
 
The strong Will designates coherence between drives, and the weak will correspondingly designates 
incoherence. I have already argued that, for Nietzsche, modern man‘s central problem is 
exhaustion, and we must now complicate this condition by adding the problem concerning 
conflict between drives or instincts, and a corresponding uncertainty in the way they operate: 
―because we forget that valuation is always from a perspective, a single individual contains within 
him a vast confusion of  contradictory valuations and consequently of  contradictory drives. This 
is the expression of  the diseased condition in man, in contrast to the animals in which all existing 
instincts answer to quite definite tasks…‖ (WP 259/KSA 11:26[119]). Since thought connects 
intrinsically to physiology and drive formation, incoherent thought tends to reflect incoherence 
between drives, as contradictory drives spark contradicting evaluations. The notion of  
incoherence here does not suggest that establishing coherence is simply a matter of  establishing 
the essential function of  particular drives. Nietzsche consistently asserts that man‘s uniqueness 
stems from the interiority created by his drives as they turn back upon themselves. The particular 
conception of  drives he employs suggests fluidity of  meaning, and incoherence is concerned less 
with misinterpreting the meaning of  a particular drive or set of  drives, and more with 
 70 
 
 
interpreting them in such a way as to establish a coherent relation between them. This involves 
reinterpreting the meaning of  drives in the ‗whole‘ that they produce – the self.   
We must reconcile the problem of  the desirable relationship between drives - which is 
also the meaning of  achieving a strong Will - with the problem of  exhaustion. It is far from 
clear, however, that these are even separate problems. I have not yet outlined the physiological 
conditions that condition and increase the likelihood of  exhaustion, and Nietzsche suggests that 
it is the drives‘ relation that is the most significant factor in this conditioning. Drives are ―the 
great sources of  strength,‖ and the ―impetuous torrents of  the soul‖; it is not just that they make 
use of  and direct energy: the level of  coherence between drives also determines the extent to 
which energy converts efficiently into both thought and action, and, more fundamentally, 
conditions the amount of  energy a man produces in the first place (WP 207/KSA 13:11[239]). 
Nietzsche constructs a nuanced account of  the drives‘ relation, tracing a line between 
two positions he considers equally dangerous. The first mistake, that might be said in some cases 
to correspond to the modern artist, although it is certainly not confined to him, is to think that 
one merely has to rely on one‘s drives or instincts, and that this will be sufficient. On the 
contrary, Nietzsche warns that instincts, left to their own device, tend to oppose and destroy one 
another: ―In times like these, to have to rely on one‘s instincts is one fatality more. These 
instincts contradict, disturb and destroy one another; I have already defined the modern as 
physiological self-contradiction‖ (TI IX, 41). Until he prunes his drives, a man is not a man at all, 
but merely a conduit of  forces: ―Today the only way of  making the individual possible would be 
by pruning him: possible, that is to say complete...‖ (TI IX, 41). I shall return later to the theme of 
how much we can say that a man is free to cultivate himself  in this manner, and how he should 
undertake this process. At this point it suffices to note that Nietzsche‘s particular concern here is 
that we do not conflate freedom to relying on one‘s instincts in some unmediated fashion (as if 
such a thing were possible). Ironically, the claim for ―free development‖ and ―independence‖ is 
often ―advanced most heatedly by precisely those for whom no curb could be too strong‖ (TI IX, 
41). Desiring to be free to pursue physiological self-contradiction, paradoxically, merely expresses 
degenerating instincts in the first place. 
With that said, it should be clear that the proper approach to take to cultivate an 
optimum relationship with one‘s drives cannot be merely to let oneself  be controlled by them, or 
to allow all urges free rein, etc. On the other end of  the spectrum, the second approach 
Nietzsche criticises is establishing coherence between drives whatever the cost - this is the ascetic‘s 
position. If  coherence meant simply establishing a clear and hierarchical relation between drives 
– and a corresponding clear outcome in thought and deed - then the ascetic might truthfully be 
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the very model of  the strong Will. In actuality, however, it is precisely the strong Will that he 
lacks. The first conflation to avoid is confusing subjecting oneself  to a single drive‘s tyranny with 
possessing a strong Will. Rather than totalising his drives under the rule of  one in particular, the 
great man cultivates a host of  ―antithetical capacities‖ that he nonetheless prevents from 
extirpating one another. Given that the intellect reflects the state of  drives‘ relations, possessing 
antithetical capacities tends to produce a more multifarious and therefore privileged perspective; 
Nietzsche credits antithetical capacities as vital to his adopting, and carrying out, the ―task of  a 
revaluation of  values‖:  ―Order or rank among capacities; distance; the art of  dividing without 
making inimical; mixing up nothing, ‗reconciling‘ nothing; a tremendous multiplicity which is 
nonetheless the opposite of  chaos – this has been the precondition, the protracted secret labour 
and artistic working of  my instinct‖ (EH II, 9). This introspection highlights that coherence 
means ordering and ranking drives or capacities without reconciling them. The problem with 
‗reconciliation‘ is that it risks destroying the drives‘ potential to produce energy, just as disorder 
likewise does. In the ascetic‘s case, what appears to be a relationship between drives characterised 
by coherence and unity is actually rooted in weakness and the inability to press drives into 
service, to retain their energy. While Nietzsche praises a tyrannical approach to one's drives, this 
means putting them to use, not denying and/or attempting to destroy them: ―Overcoming of  the 
affects? – No, if  what is implied is their weakening and extirpation. But putting them into service: 
which may also mean subjecting them to a protracted tyranny‖ (WP 384/ KSA12:1[122]). The 
ascetic lacks the strength to employ his own drives to his advantage, and so he attempts to 
weaken and destroy them. This is a familiar theme, since I have already suggested that the weak 
tend to associate Becoming and change with suffering, and then respond by trying to remove or 
downplay these contingent elements; the ascetic‘s struggle represents the struggle physiological 
weakness has to preserve itself: ―the ascetic ideal is derived from the protective and healing instincts of  a 
degenerating life, which seeks to preserve itself  and fights for existence with any available means‖ 
(GM III, 13). He declares war on the body and on the passions by imposing an artificial and 
ultimately regressive order and stability onto himself. He recoils from that which is potentially 
‗dangerous‘ and ‗overwhelming‘ by imposing a ‗moral code‘ upon his body (or allowing a moral 
code to be imposed upon him): ―Instead of  taking into service the great sources of  strength, those 
impetuous torrents of  the soul that are so often dangerous and overwhelming, and economizing 
them, this most short-sighted and pernicious mode of  thought, the moral code of  thought, 
wants to make them dry up‖ (WP 383/KSA 13:14[163]). The ascetic priest does this by lowering 
his level of  desire and will wherever possible, both from a specific conscious effort but also by 
removing himself  from all circumstances where they might arise: 
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In the first place, this domineering listlessness is combated through means which reduce 
the feeling of  life itself  to its lowest point. Where possible, will and desire are eliminated 
entirely; everything which produces ‗feeling,‘ which produces ‗blood‘ is avoided (a salt-
free diet: the hygiene of  the fakir); no love; no hatred; equanimity; no revenge; no self-
enrichment; no work; begging; where possible, no women, or as few as possible; with 
respect to the spiritual, Pascal‘s principle ‗ill faut s‘abetir‘ is adopted. The result, expressed 
in terms of psychology and morality, is the ‗loss of  the self,‘ ‗sanctification‘; in 
physiological terms, hypnosis. (GM III, 17) 
 
Aside from this explication of  the means the ascetic employs to extinguish his drives - and in 
doing so, inadvertently to cut himself  off  from his sources of  strength - we must note that while 
the ascetic is exercising self-control, and thus apparently increasing his self-mastery, Nietzsche 
suggests he is actually losing himself. It is therefore clear that self-mastery and the feeling of  self  
are not the same thing; this is because the feeling of  self  relates closely to a feeling of  increasing 
energy. As the ascetic destroys certain drives, he wastes their energy. Furthermore, his war 
against his desires leads to an incoherence that likewise hinders his ability to produce energy. Just 
like the modern artist, he is reacting to his lack of  energy. The modern artist and the ascetic 
therefore represent two (self-defeating) responses to the same problem, that of  ―reduced 
vitality‖ (NCW ‗We Antipodes‘). The ascetic‘s apparent calmness and repose appears to be a 
completely opposite state to the modern artist‘s indiscriminate frenzy, but they express a similar 
fundamental physiological condition:ss 
 
Every art and every philosophy may be regarded either as a cure or as a stimulant to 
ascending or declining life: they always presuppose suffering and sufferers. But there are 
two kinds of  sufferers:—those that suffer from overflowing vitality, who need Dionysian art 
and require a tragic insight into, and a tragic outlook upon, the phenomenon life,—and 
there are those who suffer from reduced vitality, and who crave for repose, quietness, calm 
seas, or else the intoxication, the spasm, the bewilderment which art and philosophy 
provide. (NCW ‗We Antipodes‘) 
 
Consequently, like the modern artist, the ascetic knows nothing of  authentic intoxication: the 
ascetic‘s ―violent willing‖ makes ―beauty‖ impossible, because his exhaustion precludes 
experiencing the æsthetic condition and transforming the world into perfection (Z, II, 13). 
‗Violent willing‘ refers to the fact that the ascetic constantly has to oppose his drives and 
inclinations; he experiences whatever ―impels‖ him from ―inside or outside‖ as a threat to his 
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self-control: ―Self-control- Those moralists who command man first of  all and above all to gain 
control of  himself  thus afflicts him with a peculiar disease; namely, a constant irritability in the 
face of  all natural stirrings and inclinations - as it were, a kind of  itching‖ (GS 305). The ascetic 
cannot ―entrust‖ any instinct, but interprets with ―sharp and mistrustful eyes‖ (GS 305). His will 
to power here finds a degree of  satisfaction, but only in terms of  the ―dangerous thrills of 
cruelty directed  against himself,‖ in the forms of  ―self-denial,‖ ―contrition,‖ ―spasm of  
repentance,‖ and so on (BGE 230). This is far beyond a feeling of  restraint, of  control, of 
imposing style and self-creation over oneself, all of  which Nietzsche praises for producing the 
feeling of  growth; it is instead the mind opposing the body and engaging in ―self-mutilation‖ 
(BGE 230). This self-mutilation is a form of  taking revenge on oneself, an ―over-abundant 
enjoyment of  one‘s own suffering‖ (BGE 229).  
 More than just a war against his own body, the ascetic also declares war on external 
aspects of  Becoming; thus he declares war on life itself, creating the paradox of  a kind of  life 
that turns upon life itself: 
 
For an ascetic life is a contradiction in terms: a particular kind of  ressentiment rules there, 
that of  an unsatisfied instinct and will to power which seeks not to master some isolated 
aspect of  life but rather life itself, its deepest, strongest, most fundamental conditions; an 
attempt is made to use strength to dam up the very source of strength; a green and 
cunning gaze is directed against thriving physiological growth, especially against its 
expression, beauty, joy; while a pleasure is felt and sought in failure, atrophy, pain, 
accident, ugliness, arbitrary atonements, self-denial, self-flagellation, self-sacrifice. All this 
is paradoxical to an extreme: we find ourselves confronted with a contradiction which 
wills itself  as a contradiction, which derives enjoyment from this suffering and even 
becomes increasingly self-assured and triumphant in proportion as its own pre-
condition, the physiological capacity for life, diminishes. (GM III, 11) 
 
The problem with the structure of  the ascetic‘s drives is tha t they preclude the abundance of 
energy he requires to harmonize his drives and to overcome their oppositions; Graham Parkes 
argues that this renders a creative existence difficult or impossible: ―The problem with such a 
regime, for Nietzsche, is that the balance of  power in the psyche is too one-sided, overly top-
heavy, for a fruitful and creative existence.‖113 While harmonizing the soul ―under the rule of  
single-minded reason‖ might be sufficient to achieve a ―life that is calm and serene,‖ a ―richer 
                                                                 
113 Graham Parkes, Composing the Soul; Reaches of  Nietzsche‘s Psychology, The University of  Chicago Press, 
London, 1994, p. 356. 
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life‖ requires ―a more Dionysiac disposition of  forces, one capable of  sustaining changing rulers 
and the tensions of  tyranny.‖114 This ―richer‖ existence requires a productive tension between 
drives that maintains the energy of  each: ―In this case the vicious and violent drives whose 
growth Socrates wants to hinder would be - though restrained and trained - retained as 
indispensable sources of  energy.‖115 Drives require tension and resistance to retain their power, 
hunger, and thus their energy; the presence of  this energy harmonises the way one perceives the 
activity of  one‘s drives, so that one does not feel this tension as oppositional, and the self  does 
not mistrust the drives that constitute it. 
 In many senses, the modern artist and the ascetic are opposite figures: the former has 
little control over his desires, while the latter tyrannises over them; the former expends his 
energy recklessly, while the latter channels his energy into a defensive war against the aspects of 
existence that he wants to deny; the former is unable not to react to any stimulus, while the latter 
cultivates self-control and even a type of  self-mastery. Yet there is a certain point in the ascetic‘s 
development when he opens himself  up to experiences similar to those of  the modern artist; in 
particular, apparent mystical experiences, characterised by a loss of  self. For the ascetic too is 
exhausted, not from recklessly expending energy, but from his constant defensive war, struggling 
against himself. He becomes ―angelic,‖ that is, a ―pale, sickly,  idiotically fanatical creature‖ (WP 
226/KSA 13:14[96]), and while this is interpreted as ―holiness‖ it is really the ―symptom-
syndrome of  the impoverished, enervated, incurably corrupted body‖ (AC 51). Paradoxically, 
because he refuses to react to stimulus, and because his drives are incoherent, this eventually 
leaves him in a condition where he lacks the ability to resist stimulus entirely, and when 
Nietzsche describes this state it, remarkably, has much in common with the Dionysian 
experience of  loss of  self  that he describes in The Birth of  Tragedy: 
 
But it certainly points the way to all sorts of mental disturbances, to ‗inner lights,‘ for 
example, as in the case of the Hesychasts of  Mount Athos, to aural and visual 
hallucinations, to lascivious outpourings and ecstasies of  sensuality (the story of  St 
Theresa)... The highest state, redemption itself, that finally achieved state of  complete 
hypnosis and silence, continues to be regarded as the mystery as such, the mystery which 
even the highest symbols are inadequate to express, as the return and entry into the 
ground of things, as liberation from all madness, as ‗knowledge,‘ as ‗truth,‘ as ‗being,‘ as 
escape from all goals, all desires, all action, as a domain beyond good and evil. (GM III. 
17) 
                                                                 
114 Ibid., p. 356. 
115 Ibid., p. 356. 
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Just as Nietzsche formerly conceived the Dionysian experience, the exhausted ascetic is laid bare 
to the ―ground of  things,‖ and liberated from ―all goals, all desires, all action‖ (GM III, 17). The 
experience may still contain ―ecstasies,‖ but no longer is it a metaphysical one, no longer does it 
reveal the Primordial Unity of  being - it is now a form of  ―mental disturbance‖ where the 
sufferer experiences ―aural and visual hallucinations‖ (GM III, 17). Such is the derision with 
which the intoxication of  the exhausted is now met.  
 The weak/strong Will criterion suggests the solution to the problem of  what it is that 
Nietzsche opposes exhaustion to: a particular type of  intoxication that he designates as 
abundance or superabundance. The states of  intoxication he criticises are states that are passively 
provoked and induced from without. A particular type of  exhaustion – constant nervous 
expenditure and the inability to resist – renders one susceptible to this intoxication. Desiring this 
intoxication - which he phenomenologically experiences as losing the feeling of  self, and signifies 
losing character - is a sign of  insufficiency and dissatisfaction with existence. 
 
The Ascetic Philosopher 
 
 While the ascetic priest is clearly not the great man, Nietzsche frequently makes it clear 
that the great man does incorporate elements of  asceticism; he praises the strongest individuals 
for transforming asceticism into an instinct: ―The most spiritual human beings, as the strongest, 
find their happiness where others would find their destruction: in the labyrinth, in severity 
towards themselves and others, in attempting; their joy lies in self-constraint: with them 
asceticism becomes nature, need, instinct‖ (AC 57). We must determine how the great man‘s 
asceticism differs from that of  the ascetic priest. In Henry Staten‘s reading of  the Genealogy, he 
argues that Nietzsche tends to overstate the distinctions between different forms of  asceticism, 
most obviously when he compares the ascetic priest with the ascetic philosopher. Staten‘s 
arguments are thus potentially significant for my attempt to distinguish clearly between the great 
man and the ascetic priest, and we must establish how the ascetic philosopher fits into this 
schema. 
 Staten argues that Nietzsche engages in a polemic designed to drive a wedge between the 
figures of  the ascetic philosopher and the ascetic priest: ―the former is a ―cheerful‖ asceticism, 
the latter is ―gloomy‖ and ―serious,‖‖ and unlike the priest, the philosopher‘s asceticism ―does not 
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deny ‗existence,‘ rather he affirms his existence and only his existence.‖116 The other difference 
Staten considers is that ―the artist or philosopher brings forth a work, whereas the ascetic priest 
works only on his own being, he does not save his energy for the production of  a work but uses 
it to shut down the springs out of  which that energy flows.‖117 Staten argues, however, that 
neither of  these differences is necessarily fundamental and it is entirely possible that ―the 
asceticism of  the ascetic priest is the pure essence of  the same will that drives the 
philosopher.‖118 This will that Staten argues the two figures have in common is a form of  
mastery which preserves themselves at the expense of  their relationship with the world: ―It 
seems that both practice the same method of  mastery, preserving their substance by keeping it 
from discharge into the world, other people, a woman.‖119  
 Staten suspects that Nietzsche overemphasises distinctions between the two figures to try 
to obscure that they are the same kind of  ascetic will; i.e., a desire not to squander or expend 
energy, a desire to preserve themselves, and so on. Nietzsche‘s references to the ‗cheerfulness‘ of  
the philosopher cannot disguise that his values merely reproduce the priest‘s; (the philosopher‘s 
asceticism is): ―the happy asceticism of  a deified and fully fledged animal, an animal which does 
not so much remain at rest as hover of  life. The three splendid slogans of  the ascetic idea are 
well known: poverty, humility, chastity. Now take a close look at the life of  all great, fruitful, 
inventive spirits – you will always find all three present to some extent‖ (GM III, 8). In particular, 
Nietzsche appears concerned to establish that the philosopher‘s optimal conditions exclude, or at 
least have thus far excluded, marriage: ―the philosopher loathe marriage... Marriage as obstacle 
and disaster on the path to the optimum‖ (GM III. 7). When analysing these passages in the 
Genealogy one could be forgiven for thinking that the ascetic philosopher has killed God, but not 
vanquished his shadow (GS 108). Nietzsche, however, is apparently unconcerned here that the 
philosopher replicates many of  the ascetic priest‘s important choices, instead emphasising that 
the philosopher‘s choices are rooted in a spirit of  affirmation, rather than the denial of  the 
priest. Staten is surely right to question whether we can believe Nietzsche‘s claim that there is 
―no resentment‖ and ―no vengefulness‖ in the philosopher‘s practices, particularly his denial of 
women: 
 
Does Nietzsche believe this? Do we? Do we believe one can say to someone else ―Die, 
cease to exist, it makes no difference to me; on the contrary, I can get along much better 
                                                                 
116 Staten, p. 62-3, quoting GM 87. 
117 Ibid., p. 63-4. 
118 Ibid., p. 62. 
119 Ibid., p. 63. 
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without you - even if  you still exist, I will act as though you don‘t - do we believe one can 
say this and do so without any ill will, without there being a certain spite in the sentiment 
behind the utterance, a certain satisfaction as of  triumph over the one who is dispensed 
with because unnecessary?120 
 
 The concern is that Nietzsche is trying to brute-force distinctions between the ascetic 
philosopher and the ascetic priest that do not actually amount to much at all. But the issue here 
is not just women: Staten‘s arguments open up all kinds of  problems when we consider that, in 
this context, women represents the non-satisfaction of  all desire: when the philosopher rejects: ―a 
woman who always goes away, or always might go away,‖ it represents his desire to ―triumph over 
a world that can never, will never, satisfy the absolute demand of  its desire.‖121 Staten believes 
that he has collapsed the most important distinctions between the philosopher and the priest, 
and concludes that, for Nietzsche, ―the aim of  the most spiritual will to power is solitude.‖ 122 
The absence and impossibility of  ―perfectly consummated desire‖ leads the philosopher to 
embrace solitude, weaving it into a narrative of  independence, thus ensuring his own ―self-
preservation‖ and ensuring ―that the ring of  the self  can close upon itself.‖123 
 This conclusion jars with many of  the arguments I have been making about the great 
man, and we should not be content with it. Staten is certainly right to suggest that Nietzsche 
appears far too keen to praise the ascetic philosopher. I have made several arguments thus far 
that suggest we should be criticising this figure as weak. I have argued that precisely the desire 
for absolute safety, for totality, for absolute Being, reflects weakness and an inability to deal with 
suffering. The great man, on the other hand, has sufficient strength to confront, and even to seek 
out, the most terrifying and questionable aspects of  existence, and there seems to be no reason 
why sensuality is not, or should not be, one of  these aspects. Furthermore, I have criticised the 
ascetic priest primarily on the grounds that he destroys and denies his drives because he lacks the 
strength to deploy them to his advantage, and the ascetic philosopher appears to be doing exactly 
the same thing. The great man, when sufficiently great, should be able to allow himself  the ‗full 
wealth of  naturalness,‘ as we saw in Nietzsche‘s praise of  Goethe. It seems obvious that the 
ascetic philosopher cannot be the great man. No matter what Nietzsche says about his 
cheerfulness, his affirmation of  life, his desire to channel all of  his energy into his philosophy, 
and to maintain himself  and his independence against all others, his descriptions suggest too 
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much residual resentment and vengefulness against life and its most basic conditions, too much 
distrust of  his own senses, and too much of  a desire for safety, security, and comfort. 
 What explanation can we give of  Nietzsche‘s praise of  the ascetic philosopher in the 
Genealogy? The most obvious explanation is one that Staten considers, that Nietzsche‘s sympathy 
for the ascetic philosopher is affected by his similarity to him: ―Here Nietzsche is at his coyest, 
speaking in terms that could apply precisely to him, that do apply precisely to him, yet from 
which he keeps a certain ironic distance. It is, after all, of  Schopenhauer that he is speaking, and 
we know that Nietzsche is not Schopenhauer, that Nietzsche says yes where Schopenhauer says 
no. But we have seen how complicated are Nietzsche‘s yesses and nos.‖124 This might well be 
true, but it is not really an argument we can take very far or do much with. There is a far more 
important reason why Nietzsche exaggerates the differences between the ascetic priest and 
philosopher, one strangely absent from Staten‘s text, and that is the role these passages from the 
Genealogy play in the text and Nietzsche‘s thought as a whole. Staten remarks several times in his 
discussion that the ascetic priest is a complex figure, who transcends both the noble/slave and 
strong/weak oppositions. But what he does not talk about is that Nietzsche wants to set up the 
ascetic philosopher as a link between the ascetic priest and the great man. We gain a lot from 
making this clear. To begin with, it helps us understand why Nietzsche is so keen to distinguish 
between the priest and the philosopher: the philosopher is the figure that shows that it is 
possible to redeem elements of  asceticism and place them in the service of  life, by using these 
elements to affirm his existence. As we have seen, he does not always succeed in achieving this, 
especially over the question of  sensuality, and this leaves the distinction between choosing 
asceticism to affirm existence, and choosing it to deny existence, looking rather clumsy at times. 
If  Staten chose to include Nietzsche‘s discussions on sensuality in his later texts, it would be clear 
that he generally adopts a strong position against anybody that devalues the instincts and the 
passions. He praises the ―Dionysus of  the Greeks‖ as representing ―life whole and not denied or 
in part,‖ singling out the sexual act as an example of  this affirmation: ―typical - that the sexual 
act arouses profundity, mystery, and reverence‖ (WP 1052/KSA 13:14[89]). He praises the law 
book of  Manu for its serious treatment of  sensuality, in contrast to the Christians: ―All the things 
upon which Christianity vents its abysmal vulgarity, procreation for example, woman, marriage, 
are here treated seriously, with reverence, with love and trust‖ (AC 56). Tellingly, he even singles 
out the philosopher‘s nonsensuality as nonsensical: ―We want to hold fast to our senses and to 
our faith in them - and think their consequences through to the end! The nonsensuality of 
philosophy hitherto as the greatest nonsensicality of  man‖ (WP 1046/KSA 11:25[438]). We can 
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happily dismiss Nietzsche‘s claims in the Genealogy about philosophy, marriage and sensuality. The 
important part of  the argument is that the ascetic philosopher is the beginning of  a movement 
that collapses the opposition between affirmation and asceticism. The great man thus descends 
not from the noble‘s unreflective and cruel affirming instincts, but ultimately from the ascetic 
priest, by way of  the ascetic philosopher. The ascetic practices of  the priest create autonomy and 
interiority for the price of  opposing all that is most fundamental in life; he savages his own 
instincts, distrusts his own senses, and opposes all naturalness, but he endures. Likewise, the ascetic 
philosopher is able to emerge disguised as a ―religious man,‖ believing in this ―role‖; this is how his 
existence is made possible (GM III, 10). However, this means he has failed to shed many of  the 
priest‘s characteristics: 
 
The particular remoteness of  the philosophers – with its negation of  the world, its 
hostility to life, its scepticism towards the senses, its freedom from sensuality – which 
has survived until very recently, and in the process almost gained currency as the 
philosophers‘ attitude as such – this is above all a consequence of  the critical situation in 
which philosophy first emerged and managed to endure. (GM  III, 10) 
   
The ascetic philosopher begins the slow process of  reforming all that is best about the ascetic 
priest - his independence, his autonomy, his self-mastery, power over life - but detaches these 
virtues from the resentment and vengefulness from which they arose. How does he do this?  The 
key is in a passage that Staten quotes, although he considers it relatively unimportant. Let us look 
at one of  the stated differences between the figures again: ―the artist or philosopher brings forth 
a work, whereas the ascetic priest works only on his own being, he does not save his energy for 
the production of  a work but uses it to shut down the springs out of  which that energy flows.‖125 
Staten thinks that the important part of  this passage for Nietzsche is that the philosopher 
channels his energy and creates a work, and he undermines its importance by suggesting that the 
work is not a ―real‖ expenditure, it is merely another way for the philosopher to eternalise his 
self, to relate his energy back to himself: ―The work that grows from within is only the reflection 
of  the philosopher‘s own being, not a real expenditure of  his being into the outside, into the 
world, into time, but a way of  avoiding such expenditure, of  addressing a postcard to oneself.‖126 
It creates a ―false outside‖ by which he leads his energy back to himself, just as the ascetic priest 
does with ―an object called ―God.‖‖127 But the work or object itself  is not the important part of  the 
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passage. The crucial development that the ascetic philosopher represents is accumulating energy 
rather than shutting ‗down the springs.‘ The ascetic philosopher is the figure that begins to use 
ascetic practices to increase his abundance, rather than to destroy his drives and his passions. He 
is thus different in kind to the priest. Nietzsche ends this section of  the Genealogy wondering 
whether it is yet time for a new species of  philosopher to appear and replace the ascetic 
philosopher; this figure corresponds precisely to the great man as I have been sketching him: ―Is 
there enough pride, daring, boldness, self-assurance, spiritual will, will to assume responsibility, 
freedom of  will available today for ‗the philosopher‘ to be from now on really - possible on earth?...‖ 
(GM III, 10). He returns to his analysis of  the ascetic priest, and the previous passage remains 
the closest he comes to describing the great man in the Genealogy, but it is enough to prove that 
Nietzsche sees the ascetic philosopher as a necessary intermediate stage to the great man, and 
this explains the contradictions and inconsistencies around this figure. Nietzsche‘s great man is 
born at the point where he freely chooses asceticism, in the form of  severity towards his drives, 
out of  a desire to increase all of  their strength. 
Authentic intoxication is a nuanced state that we can contrast with both the modern 
artist‘s indiscriminate intoxication and the ascetic‘s misguided masochism. We should not 
superficially conflate it with either of  these two states, especially since the weaknesses of  each 
extreme can cause a susceptible man to overcompensate by lurching towards the other. For 
instance, the ascetic gives self-control a bad name, because he butchers his drives not from a 
desire to strengthen himself, but because he is too weak for his desires: ―The best things have 
been slandered because the weak or the immoderate swine have cast a bad light on them‖ (WP 
870/KSA 11:25[348]). Since the inability to act is often disingenuously interpreted as self-control 
and power over one's desires, moderation is often conflated with mediocrity. In other words, those 
mediocre in ability preach the value of  moderation, attempting to reinterpret their actions as 
rooted in strength; it does not follow, however, that we must reject moderation, or that we 
should pursue intoxication at any price; rather, we must carefully separate genuine moderation 
from mediocrity, to rediscover the crucial part that both play in an æsthetic condition that 
involves taking ―delight‖ in measure: ―The natural delight of  æsthetic natures in measure, the 
enjoyment of  the beauty of  measure, was overlooked or denied‖ (WP 870/KSA 11:25[348]). 
One finds authentic intoxication not in 'losing oneself,' but precisely in maintaining one‘s 
character and the feeling of  self  against the threat of  its dissolution. The highest conditions 
exemplify a form of  self-control which, unlike that of  the æsthetic, is rooted in strength and 
superior forms of  intoxication: ―those miraculous moments when a great power voluntarily 
halted before the boundless and immeasurable – when a superfluity of  subtle delight in sudden 
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restrain and petrification, in standing firm and fixing oneself, was enjoyed on a ground still 
trembling‖ (BGE 224). Authentic joy does not involve immersing oneself  in Becoming, nor 
feeling 'other' to the everyday self, but in the feeling of  maintaining the self  in conditions that 
apparently threaten its cohesion. Joy is a heightened feeling of  power over oneself  that is not 
produced by removing dangerous elements, but by testing oneself  against them. This suggests a 
nuanced account of  the relationship between Becoming and Being in relation to joy, and the 
need for an account of  joy transcending the pleasure/pain distinction.  
 
Overcoming Pleasure and Pain 
 
It is not the satisfaction of  the will that causes pleasure (I want to fight this superficial 
theory - the absurd psychological counterfeiting of the nearest things-), but rather the 
will‘s forward thrust and again and again becoming master over that which stands in its 
way. The feeling of  pleasure lies precisely in the dissatisfaction of  the will, in the fact that 
the will is never satisfied unless it has opponents and resistance. - ―The happy man‖: a 
herd ideal. (WP 696/KSA 13:11[75]) 
 
 Nietzsche describes two types of  pleasure: ―that of  falling asleep and that of  victory‖ 
(WP 703/KSA 13:14[174]). These two types correspond to the degree of  energy present: ―The 
exhausted want rest, relaxation, peace, calm – the happiness of  the nihilistic religions and 
philosophies; the rich and living want victory, opponents overcome, the overflow of  the feeling 
of  power across wider domains than hitherto‖ (WP 703/KSA 13:14[174]). Only the exhausted 
and impoverished oppose pain and pleasure. The overfull and abundant dissolve the dichotomy, 
recognising pain and pleasure to be ―epiphenomena‖;  they are ―attendant‖ and ―secondary 
phenomena,‖ which anyone who possesses creative powers ―will look down on with derision‖ 
(WP 579/ KSA 12:8[2] & BGE 225). Both are the prerequisites of  experiencing authentic joy, 
because joy depends on the presence of  resistance. Pain, conceived of  as ―unpleasurable stimuli,‖ 
is the precondition of  joy, which is constituted by a rhythmic movement where a constant stream 
of  ―unpleasurable stimuli‖ or ―little hindrances‖ are overcome (WP 697/KSA 13:11[76] & 699). 
This ―game of  resistance and victory‖ produces a feeling of  ―superabundant, excessive power‖: 
this feeling is authentic joy (WP 699/KSA 13:14[173]). 
Nietzsche‘s theory of  authentic joy dissolves the problem of  suffering because the 
presence of  suffering does not constitute an objection at all. Since joy depends on this rhythmic 
movement, it is found in a constant Becoming, or overcoming, and not in the will‘s satisfaction (a 
―superficial theory‖) (WP 696/KSA 13:11[75]). Joy is found not in pain‘s absence, but in: ―The 
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will's constant thrust and again and again becoming master over that which stands in its way‖ 
(WP 696/KSA 13:11[75]). The process of  becoming master requires constantly feeling 
resistance; dissatisfaction is therefore the ―the great stimulus to life‖; it is therefore undesirable to 
aim to eliminate suffering or displeasure, since this makes it impossible to experience authentic 
joy (WP 697/KSA 13:11[76]). Consequently, interpreting the relationship between pleasure and 
pain as a problem to be solved reflects: ―something weary and sick in metaphysicians and religious 
people,‖ and is the ―contemptible sort of  well-being dreamed of  by shopkeepers, Christians, 
cows, women, Englishmen and other democrats‖ (WP 579/KSA 12:8[2] & TI IX, 38). This 
―morbid sensitivity and susceptibility to pain‖ is ―unmanliness‖ which, through religion and 
philosophy, ―would like to deck itself  out as something higher‖ (BGE 293). 
Nietzsche describes the preoccupation with eliminating pain, with soothing and 
anaesthetising, as a ―cult of  suffering,‖ and the latest manifestation of  this ―bad taste‖ is ―pity‖ 
(BGE 293). The irony is that the type of  man who employs these strategies is the type that 
suffers the most from suffering; since he goes to any length to deny his deficiencies, and projects 
the blame for his suffering onto external or uncontrollable forces, he fails to cultivate strength of  
Will, and is thereby unable to partake in the feeling of  growth that overcoming resistance 
produces, and experience the harmonising effect that abundant energy has on drives and 
perception. Not only is it inadvisable to seek to avoid all suffering, but these assertions suggest a 
new ethos, whereby we should actively seek out certain forms of  suffering (unpleasant stimuli) 
because they provide the opportunity for venting strength. Zarathustra tells himself  a narrative 
whereby he constantly defers happiness, understood as a resting state and repose, in favour of  
unhappiness, in the form of  tests of  strength and of  will; ―I must complete myself; therefore I 
now avoid my happiness and offer myself  to all unhappiness - for my ultimate testing and 
knowledge‖ (Z, III, 3). This rhetorical sleight of  hand is a means to induce himself  to overcome 
resistance constantly, and thus to achieve authentic happiness. For it is counterproductive to seek 
a kind of  happiness that depends on constantly overcoming unpleasant stimuli. Indeed, it 
becomes increasingly obviously throughout Thus Spoke Zarathustra that the final moment of  bliss 
that Zarathustra claims to await is not a restful state that he will enjoy, but actually death, which 
will provide the final seal to his perfection.128 Meanwhile, he strives to posit greater and greater 
challenges in the pursuit of  the feeling of  triumph: ―When I have overcome that challenge, then I 
want to overcome one still greater; and a triumph shall be the seal of  my completion!-‖ (Z, III, 3). 
He suspiciously eyes the arrival of  apparent bliss as a ―treacherous beauty‖ seeking to lull him 
into repose. A key aspect of  producing a coherent account of  the great man is determining 
                                                                 
128 I will discuss this idea, such as it is, when I discuss the eternal return. 
 83 
 
 
under what conditions he should seek out suffering, and under what conditions he should guard 
against it and minimise its presence. 
It has been a constant theme that rejecting Becoming is rooted in associating it with 
suffering, and that this rejection only serves to multiply and intensify suffering. My focus has 
been on the way that this rejection demonstrates an inability or unwillingness to take 
responsibility for suffering, and that this only serves to produce inappropriate or relevant 
responses to the problem of  suffering. I have therefore criticised denying Becoming, because it 
often reflects denying the necessity of  changing habits and attitude; the sufferer substitutes 
spiritual and psychological illusions for meaningful change. Having established a theory of  
authentic joy as the overcoming of  resistance we can deepen our understanding of  how the great 
man relates to Becoming. The feeling of  growth requires waves of  unpleasant stimulus to 
overcome, because this is how the self  feels itself  to be master. Elements of  Becoming are 
perfect examples of  this kind of  stimulus, because assimilating change, mutation, and flux 
requires that the spirit exerts itself  to master new conditions. Just as fleeing elements of  Becoming 
is interpreted as demonstrating a lack of  strength, and a weak will, lack of  energy and plastic 
power, the great man seeks out these elements precisely because they offer an opportunity to test 
his will and to expend his energy against opposition; this produces the feeling of  growth and the 
abundance that he desires.  
Abundant energy is plastic power, ―creative and rejuvenating power,‖ which conditions 
both one‘s defensive and offensive capabilities (NCW ‗We Antipodes‘). In both cases its presence 
ensures that the great man can assimilate and overcome unpleasant stimulus, ensuring that time 
does not intensify his suffering. Energy‘s presence is the prerequisite for affirming the most 
contingent aspects of  existence: ―A creature overloaded and playing with force would call 
precisely the affects, irrationality, and change good in a eudaemonistic sense, together with their 
consequences: danger, contrast, perishing, etc‖ (WP 576/KSA 13:18[16]). Nietzsche therefore 
establishes a strict relationship between strength of  will and the ability to confront elements of 
Becoming without needing to nullify them, deny them, or rationalise them: ―It is a sign of  one‘s 
feeling of  power and well-being how far one can acknowledge the terrifying and questionable 
character of  things; and whether one needs some sort of  ―solution‖ at the end‖ (WP 852/KSA 
12:10[168]). 
Staten argues that Zarathustra‘s project of  affirmation is the attempt to ―experience 
becoming not as a violation of  the self  but as its essential act.‖129 It is the experience of  
confronting and overcoming the experience of  the ―fearsome and questionable‖ that is captured 
                                                                 
129 Staten, p. 142. 
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by the genuine ―tragic artist,‖ whose art communicates his ―fearlessness‖ in the face of  these 
aspects of  existence, and thus reflects the highest form of  joy, which seeks out suffering: 
 
Bravery and composure is in the fact of  a powerful enemy, great hardship, a problem 
that arouses aversion - it is this victorious condition which the tragic artist singles out, 
which he glorifies. In the face of  tragedy the warlike in our soul celebrates its Saturnalias; 
whoever is accustomed to suffering, whoever seeks out suffering, the heroic man extols 
his existence by means of  tragedy - for him alone does the tragic poet pour this draught 
of  sweetest cruelty. (TI IX, 24) 
 
It is thus clear the extent to which the highest form of  intoxication, which is also the experience 
that the highest art captures, links intrinsically with a certain approach to suffering, which affirms 
it because of  the resistance it provides. 
Experiencing displeasure deepens the capacity for joy; when those who suffer the most 
attempt to deny Becoming, and instead prioritise ―mildness, peacefulness and goodness,‖ they 
decrease their capacity for joy by destroying their capacity to overcome resistance (GS 370). 
Nietzsche develops this theme as early as The Gay Science, where he interprets the pursuit of 
―painlessness‖ as a barrier to more ―subtle pleasures and joy,‖ and establishes a link between pain 
and growth: ―If  you decide for the former (painlessness) and desire to diminish and lower the 
level of  human pain, you also have to diminish and lower the level of  their capacity for joy‖ (GS 
12). At this stage he still conceives of  displeasure negatively, as the ―price‖ for ―growth‖ (GS 12). 
He later drops this negative connotation entirely, as he further breaks down the distinction 
between pleasure and pain. This link will again be paramount when the issue of  the appropriate 
response and attitude towards sickness arises. Rather than diminish suffering, the great man 
disciplines it, and it is this disciplining of  suffering that has ―created every elevation of  man 
hitherto‖ (BGE 225). When the great man adopts the proper attitude towards suffering, when he 
exploits his suffering, this gives him the opportunity to cultivate strength, ―inventiveness,‖ 
―bravery,‖ ―cunning,‖ and, above all, ―greatness‖ (BGE 225). Suffering creates interiority, but to 
take this advantage from it, one must cultivate the ability to know when it is desirable and 
undesirable.  
 
A Theory of  Authentic Joy 
 
Nietzsche creates a series of  terms to express the highest experiences, but these are all aspects of 
one theory of  authentic joy. His writings on the strong Will, on authentic intoxication, and on 
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energy expenditure all come together to form a criterion to assess values. I have discussed several 
forms of  inauthentic intoxication, which tend to overlap in a rather complex manner. For 
example, the idea of  the weak will stands in an ambiguous relationship with intoxication: the 
hysteric is constantly induced to intoxication, and while the ascetic tends to be disciplined, inert, 
and incapable of  exhilaration, he can, paradoxically, end up so exhausted that he opens himself 
up to the nervous intoxication of  the hysteric – though he calls it ‗mysticism.‘ The modern artist 
complicates the relationship further, because in some cases he possesses an abundance of 
energy, but he deliberately expends this, pursuing extreme experiences, and once again, routinely 
exhausting himself. Inauthentic intoxication can thus refer to both the passive theatre experience 
of  the tired businessman, the frenzy of  the hysteric, or the drunken revelry of  the artist. What 
links all of  these states though, and truly defines inauthentic intoxication, is that the experiences 
of  being intoxicated are like those Nietzsche describes in The Birth of  Tragedy: they involve losing 
oneself, losing the feeling of  self, a drunkenness, an otherness to the everyday self, a desire to 
obliterate reality, a will to forget oneself, to close oneself  off  from reality, and so on. In contrast, 
those that possess a strong Will cultivate the ability to produce energy and direct it so as to 
achieve a feeling of  abundance. Thus their intoxication is one that arises from a feeling of  
increasing energy, a feeling of  growth and power. Everything Nietzsche praises converge on this 
state: the strong Will is indistinguishable from abundant energy, and this is in turn synonymous 
with authentic intoxication, authentic beauty, authentic art, and, finally, authentic joy. States of 
energy condition perception to a high degree, and the defining characteristic of  the values 
Nietzsche praises is that they are rooted in abundance, an overflowing plenitude of  energy. This 
harmonises and coordinates drives, enhances perception and enriches the world.  Its highest state 
is found in the experience of  the self  that feels itself  to be perfect and transforms the world into 
a mirror of  this perfection: ―from a powerful soul to which the high body belongs, the beautiful, 
triumphant, invigorating body, around which every manner of  thing becomes mirror‖ (Z, III, 2). 
This is not being passively immersed in the world, losing oneself, plunging into nothingness, or 
accessing a true world or reality; it is actively transforming the world according to one's will. As 
such, it is creating beauty, not uncovering it.  
Authentic intoxication and joy are inaccessible to those who are exhausted.  Thus, 
Nietzsche ultimately settles on the criterion of  ‗want‘ versus ‗abundance‘ as the means to assess 
values. Although he uses a series of  terms that express both the act of  creating oneself  as the 
great man, and the states which reflect his particular type of  abundance, the decisive factor 
remains the presence of  energy. Once he draws this link between increasing energy and 
increasing joy and affirming the world, then we can see why Nietzsche‘s concrete agenda for the 
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self  is cultivating energy. Whilst it is clear to see that he consistently emphasises exhaustion when 
he criticises past and present values, Nietzsche‘s ‗positive‘ writings on determining values fail to 
converge in an obvious way on the issue of  abundance. This is, however, as much to do with the 
unsystematic way that he presents this ‗positive‘ philosophy, than because he prioritises any other 
value or criterion. For example, Thus Spoke Zarathustra‘s style proves rather prohibitive in making 
strong or definitive claims about exactly how self-creation should take place, and on what 
grounds. I have suggested here that the idea of  ‗abundance‘ is central to grounding a 
reassessment of  values, and by extension the process of  self-creation. This occurs in two ways: 
we evaluate values first according to whether they reflect abundance, and second, whether they 
produce abundance. This yields a new criterion for evaluating values: whether they arise from: 
want or abundance; weak or strong will; desire to weaken or strengthen the feeling of  self. 
Revaluating values is henceforth underpinned by whether a value represents, on the one side: 
exhaustion, want, and lack; or, on the other: abundance, superfluity, and excess; a philosophy of  
energy: ―Regarding all æsthetic values, I now avail myself  of  this main distinction: I ask in every 
instance, ―is it hunger or superabundance that has here become creative?‖‖ (GS 370). Greatness 
is rendered possible by creating oneself  as the 'monster of  energy.' With this determined, we 
have a new task: to assemble the set of  narratives of  the self  that best actualise this idea. 
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Part II 
 
Creating Greatness 
 
 
 
 
How do men attain great strength and a great task? All the virtues and efficiencies of  body and soul are acquired 
laboriously and little by little, through much industry, self -constraint, limitation, through much obstinate, faithful 
repetition of  the same labours, the same renunciations. (WP 995/KSA 11:26[409]) 
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I 
 
 
The Will to Self-Determination 
 
 
 
 Interpreting oneself  through a set of  narratives means imposing accounts of  simple 
cause and effect onto the complex cause and effect of  the body.  I have already criticised many 
such ideas of  simple cause and effect while establishing criteria for assessing narratives of  self-
understanding. With this established, we can turn to the main narratives that Nietzsche 
constructs. The overarching aim of  these narratives is cultivating a superabundance of  energy, 
and thus creating oneself  as a ‗monster of  energy.‘  
The aim of  these narratives is, then, predominantly physiological. It is here, in the second 
part, that I will fuse these ideas with narratives of  the mind. For the process of  creating oneself 
is about the attitude one takes towards oneself; believing oneself  to be certain things, to possess 
certain attributes and capabilities, so as to achieve certain effects. Nietzsche emphasises not the 
necessity of  understanding oneself  in any one particular way, but the types of  narrative of  self-
understanding that are most conducive to avoiding the problems I have been detailing and 
instead creating oneself  as the monster of  energy. Thus Spoke Zarathustra is pivotal in this project, 
because in it Nietzsche attempts to embody an account of  greatness and how it relates to self-
understanding. Zarathustra‘s account of  the narratives that structure his inner life reflect his 
evolving solution to his self-diagnosed problems. This is the key to the idea of  self-creation: 
constructing a set of  narratives about one's inner life (and existence generally), to coordinate and 
shape the interaction of  one‘s drives and passions. Self-creation‘s overarching goal is achieving 
the strong Will, the idea in which all of  Nietzsche‘s most prized narratives coincide: abundant 
energy, a feeling of  growth and power, assuming responsibility, and an active and spontaneous 
joy corresponding to a feeling of  æsthetic intoxication.  
There are three main types of  narratives of  self-interpretation that run throughout 
Nietzsche‘s work, all of  which combine to form an overarching narrative, that of  the strong Will. 
While they may be emphasised in varying quantities in different individuals, they all contribute 
valuably towards developing the great man. First, there is a strong emphasis on the importance 
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of  self-determination; that one must will rather than be willed. This involves cultivating a 
resistance to stimulus to develop character. Second, a narrative of  freedom runs throughout 
Nietzsche‘s work, which focuses on the importance of  thinking of  oneself  as commanding 
oneself, and extends the common idea of  being responsible for one‘s action to encompass all 
that one is and that one becomes. The great man learns to think of  himself  as indistinguishable 
from his entire will, conceived of  not as a faculty, but as the totality of  all that he is. Third, in 
Nietzsche‘s most obscure narratives, he proposes cultivating a new relationship whereby one can 
redeem the events of  the past. Finally, I test Nietzsche‘s criterion for evaluating values against the 
idea of  the eternal return, arguing that it has a detrimental effect on the process of  becoming the 
great man. 
When we create ourselves we should be aiming to achieve the experience of  authentic joy 
- the feeling of  abundance, and of  overcoming resistance. Therefore, when we evaluate different 
narratives for thinking about ourselves it should be according to whether or not they contribute 
towards this. It has been coming increasingly clear that Nietzsche encapsulates the art of  
achieving authentic joy in the idea of  a strong Will. Nietzsche‘s apparent ambiguity towards the 
concept of  willing itself  might make it appear complicated to pin down what he means by the 
strong Will. However, as Reginster argues, ―he only repudiates certain conceptions, such as the 
conception of  the will as an efficient (and uncaused) cause in its own right.‖130 Understanding 
the difference between the idea of  will as a faculty and Nietzsche‘s idea of  the Will is therefore 
central to understanding the authentic self. The Will is an overarching narrative that expresses 
the sum of  all of  the narratives of  the self  that Nietzsche desires most. It is the central narrative 
that Zarathustra uses to interpret himself: ―Yes, there is something invulnerable, unbearable in 
me, something that explodes boulders: it is called my will. Silently and unchanged it strides 
throughout the years‖ (Z, II, 11). It is an idiosyncratic account of  willing, which Nietzsche sets 
up in such a way that authentic joy is the product of  the strong Will expressing itself.  
In order to understand properly what is at stake in this idea of  the strong Will, I will 
discuss the most important narratives, the indispensable elements that form it. Since it is the 
narrative that expresses the highest Nietzschean state, my development of  a criterion to assess 
values has set up several expectations of  what it should look like. We know that it is imperative 
that thinking of  oneself  as cultivating a strong Will must encourage one to take responsibility for 
one‘s suffering, to correct all the errors that come from failing to do this. To do so it must 
involve correcting all the unhelpful errors which the will to faculty tends to produce; hating 
Becoming, elevating reason to the point of  denying the senses, ignoring physiology, etc. We know 
                                                                 
130
 Bernard Reginster, Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism, Harvard University Press, London 2006, p. 56. 
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that it will involve structuring one‘s drives in such a way that incorporates elements of  asceticism, 
but in the service of  producing an abundance of  energy, not of  closing off  its sources. 
Possessing a strong Will means possessing an abundance of  energy, and this abundance is 
nothing other than the strong Will expressing itself. We know that the strong Will must be 
something that we give to ourselves, rather than something already given. We know that it will 
have to be an account of  willing that produces a feeling of  growth and mastery. And, finally, we 
know that it must be creative, since I have been rejecting the idea of  creation as losing the self, as 
closeness to Becoming, and emphasising an account which only arises once we have achieved a 
strong Will. 
This, then, is a basic sketch of  Nietzsche‘s idea of  the strong Will, or at least some of  the 
elements that comprise it. These elements are all indispensable in some form, because they are 
key components of  the way in which I have set up the idea of  authentic joy. We still need to 
accomplish several things, however. We must understand the specific strategies and narratives 
that Nietzsche recommends to the great man to give himself  a strong Will. We must also get a 
sense of  what it means to think about oneself  as possessing a strong Will. We already understand 
why we must create a strong Will, and have some idea of  what it involves, but we do not yet have 
a sense of  what it is to imagine oneself  as, firstly, creating, and secondly, possessing a strong Will. 
This normative element is crucial in making sense of  Nietzsche‘s project, and in actually 
achieving the feeling of  authentic joy that underscores his entire project. Since Nietzsche does 
intend his work to act as a stimulus to great men, it is not sufficient to imagine what they might 
look like, but imperative also to understand how they come to be what they are. In truth, the 
process is more important than trying to specify the result in advance, since we have already seen 
Nehamas note that the great man is, by definition, unique, since he creates himself.  
 
Solitude 
 
 As early as Human all Too Human Nietzsche offers an account of  the stages through 
which the great man develops from herd animal to self-legislating and sovereign being. This 
account corresponds accurately to Thus Spoke Zarathustra‘s structure, and Nietzsche does not 
meaningfully contradict this account. The first stage in the process is the free spirit‘s ―great 
separation‖ from ―obligations‖: a ―rebellious, despotic, volcanically jolting desire to roam abroad, 
to become alienated, cool, sober, icy‖ (HH 3). On the surface this stage involves that he rejects 
the herd and retreat into solitude: 
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To wait and to prepare oneself; to await the emergence of  new sources; to prepare 
oneself  in solitude for strange faces and voices; to wash one‘s soul ever cleaner from the 
marketplace, dust and noise of  this age; to overcome everything Christian through 
something supra-Christian, and not merely to put it aside… to reconquer southern 
healthy and hidden powerfulness of  soul… (WP 1051/ KSA 11:41[6]) 
 
Nietzsche places significant emphasis on this initial idea to detach and distance oneself. 
Zarathustra advises would-be creators to flee the ―poisonous flies‖ and ―invisible revenge‖ into 
solitude, since all ―greatness takes place... Away from the market place‖ (Z, I, 12). He establishes 
the flight into solitude as the initial prerequisite for achieving authentic joy: ―Truly, into the 
highest regions I had to fly in order to rediscover the wellspring of  joy! Oh I found it, my 
brothers! Here in the highest regions the wellspring of  joy gushes for me! And there is a life 
from which no rabble drinks!‖ (Z, II. 6). In Zarathustra‘s call for solitude there is a clear element 
of  disgust at the vulgar activity of  the many-too-many; one of  the crucial aspects of  his self-
overcoming is overcoming his disgust at the present and present-day man. Zarathustra warns 
―the fool‖ against staying in one place and becoming increasingly resentful, advising instead that 
he flee into solitude: 
 
At this point, however, Zarathustra interrupted the foaming fool and clapped his hand 
over the fool's mouth.  
―Stop at last!‖ cried Zarathustra. ―Your speech and your ways have nauseated me for a 
long time already!  
Why have you lived so long near the swamp, that you yourself  had to turn into a frog 
and a toad?  
Doesn‘t tainted and frothy, decrepit swamp blood flow in your own veins now, since you 
have learned to croak and lambast this way? 
Why didn‘t you go into the woods? Or plow the earth? Isn‘t the sea full of  green islands? 
I despise your despising; and if  you warned me - why didn‘t you warn yourself ? (Z, III, 
7) 
 
More is at work here, however, than the many-too-many simply repulsing one. Physical solitude 
is only one aspect of  the desire for freedom, and only a superficial kind. Zarathustra does flee 
into absolute solitude, but finds this condition clearly insufficient, and as he creates himself  it 
becomes obvious that this flight was necessary because of  his own inabilities, especially his 
inability to maintain his character whilst among the populous (Z, II, 21). Initial solitude is one 
aspect of  a broader movement away from the herd‘s mechanical routines and habits, and towards 
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determining oneself. It is the Will‘s desire to grow and expand, and this first takes the form of  
mastering oneself. The Will‘s desire for freedom is a desire to determine itself, to will rather than 
be willed. Zarathustra declares that ―servility‖ before ―human beings and stupid human opinions 
is on a parallel with being servile to ―gods and god‘s kinds,‖ and proclaims a ―blessed 
selfishness‖ that rejects both of  these equally (Z, III, 10). He sharply distinguishes between those 
who command themselves and those that obey, and emphasises that few learn to fulfil this 
capacity to command: ―Whoever cannot command himself  should obey. And though many a 
person can command himself, much is still missing before he also obeys himself!‖ (Z, III, 12). 
Being willed not only includes being subject to the will of  others, but also subordinating oneself 
to impersonal forces and value systems. It is in this rejection of  external wills that we find the 
meaning of  Nietzsche‘s phrase ‗the innocence of  becoming,‘ so often misused (TI VI, 8).131 We 
make Becoming innocent again when we refuse to project our responsibility outside of  
ourselves, either into nature or God; man ―is not the result of  a special design, a will, a 
purpose… it is absurd to want to hand over his nature to some purpose or another (TI VI, 8). 
While the weak believe that crude anthropomorphisms can play a consolatory role, Nietzsche 
suggests that, for the strong, it is a relief  to destroy these representations, and reclaim 
responsibility for themselves: ―One should not invent unreal persons, e.g., one should not say 
―nature is cruel.‖ Precisely this insight that no such central responsible being exists is a relief!‖ 
(WP 403/KSA 12:5[62]). Once one reclaims one‘s power ―over nature,‖ ―one can employ this 
power in the further free development of  oneself,‖ ―for self-elevation and strengthening‖ (WP 
403/KSA 12:5[62]). Believing that there is meaning inherent in things, and that a will runs 
through them, reflects an inability to put one‘s will into things: ―He who does not know how to 
put his will into things at least puts a meaning into them: that is, he believes there is a will in them 
already (principle of  belief)‖ (TI I, 18). Thus we restore the innocence of  Becoming by 
cultivating our own Will, not projecting will into nature: ―strong and domineering natures enjoy 
their finest gaiety in such constraint and perfection under a law of  their own‖ (GS 290). The 
will‘s desire to determine itself  is the essential attribute of  greatness: ―Every superior human 
being will instinctively aspire after a secret citadel where he is set free from the crowd, the many, 
the majority‖ (BGE 26). It is also potentially a disease, because it opens man up to the possibility 
of  destruction. Independence is the ―privilege of  the strong,‖ and he who aspires to self-
determination ―ventures into a labyrinth, he multiplies by a thousand the dangers which life  as 
such already brings with it‖ (BGE 29). Moreover, one must continually ―test oneself  to see 
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we dissolve our individuality back into an inherently innocent and creative Becoming.  
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whether one is destined for independence and command,‖ even though these tests, which must 
be judged by one‘s own standards, are ―perhaps the most dangerous game one could play‖ (BGE 
41). Thus Spoke Zarathustra in particular is full of  warnings about the ways that attempting to live 
according to one‘s own values and standards multiples the dangers that one is exposed to:  
 
Can you give yourself  your own evil and good and hang your will above yourself  like a 
law? Can you be the own judge and the avenger of  your own law?  
It is terrible to be alone with the judge and avenger of one's own law. Thus does a star 
get thrown out into desolate space and into the icy breath of  solitary being. (Z, I, 17) 
 
While the initial retreat into solitude certainly constitutes such a ―test,‖ during a prolonged 
solitude it is relatively simple for the Will to determine itself, since it has little to compete with 
for mastery; thus Emerson suggests that just as ―it is easy in the world to live after the world‘s 
opinion; it is easy in solitude to live after our own.‖132 A better test for the great man is whether 
he can maintain the ―independence of  solitude‖ in ―the midst of  the crowd.‖133 Re-joining the 
many-too-many is thus as dangerous for the great man as his initial flight into solitude, but these 
tests are crucial for him to develop into a sovereign individual. This is evident in Zarathustra‘s 
development, where he always ultimately experiences solitude as insufficient. He initially 
experiences solitude as rejuvenating, but also as creating a tension and desire to bestow. He 
couches this feeling in various language - for example: sometimes he speaks of  this tension as 
love that desires to overflow: ―My impatient love floods over in torrents, downward, towards 
sunrise and sunset. From silent mountains and thunderheads of  pain my soul roars into the 
valleys... And may my torrent of  love plunge into impasses! How could a torrent not finally make 
its way to the sea!‖; and sometimes as wisdom that demands to be imparted: ―My wild wisdom 
wound up pregnant on lonely mountains; on naked stones she bore her young, her youngest‖ (Z, 
II, 1). In these cases, however, the root of  the issue appears to be the presence of  abundant 
energy demanding release. In solitude Zarathustra is not constantly forced to expend defensive 
energy, and he experiences accumulating energy as ―over-fullness‖ that demands release (Z, III, 
14). His problem at this point is that he has little to test his strength against, little to overcome, 
and thus yearns for ―enemies‖ to exert himself  against:  
 
                                                                 
132 Ralph Waldo Emerson, ‗Self-Reliance‘, Essays; First and Second Series, Oxford University Press, London, 
1901, p. 37. 
133 Ibid., p. 37. 
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How I love everyone now, with whom I may simply speak! Even my enemies belong to 
my bliss...  
The spear I hurl against my enemies! How I thank my enemies that at last I may hurl it!  
Too great was the tension of  my cloud: between lightning peals of  laughter I shall throw 
hail showers into the depth. (Z, II, 1) 
 
When Nietzsche chronicles the violent outburst towards freedom, he is concerned that this 
desire for freedom often requires some form of  external tyranny. Again he returns to the theme 
that even the ―superior artists‖ are ―perishing from a lack of  discipline‖; here adding that: ―They 
are no longer tyrannized over from without by a church‘s tables of  absolute values or those of  a 
court; thus they also no longer learn to develop their ―inner tyrants,‖ their will‖ (WP 464/KSA 
11:37[14]). However, even if  the resoluteness that self-determining requires has often been 
provoked by tyranny from without, although there is no reason to think that this necessarily has 
to be the case. Zarathustra certainly does not seem to suffer any tyranny from externally imposed 
‗absolute values,‘ and his struggle is with himself, to take his will to self-determination to its 
conclusion. Whatever provokes a man‘s ―will to self-determination,‖ the important thing is that 
pursuing this path is the only way he can authentically oppose himself  to the mechanical life of 
the herd; his initial outburst of  strength is, therefore, the ―will to free will‖ (HH 3). 
 
Constructing Character or How not to React 
 
Whether out of  stored-up energy, ―spontaneously,‖ or merely stimulated reactively, and provoked? (WP 
1009/KSA 12:10[145]) 
 
Solitude is only one manifestation of  the Will‘s desire to determine itself  and to self-legislate. It 
is one aspect of  a wider strategy aimed at becoming a sovereign man: constructing character. I have 
already argued that Nietzsche is ambiguous towards assimilating new experience, because the 
ability to assimilate characterises the strong Will, but assimilating experience also tends to arrest 
Becoming, in the sense that it reduces the new to the old, the different to the similar, etc. The 
question of  developing character delves further into the nature of  assimilating, and in doing so it 
offers a fresh perspective on the issue of  when assimilating experience becomes a problem. 
Hitherto I have made two points about the great man‘s activity that appear to run in 
contradictory directions. The first point is that the greater his spirit‘s ‗digestive‘ power, the more 
experience he can assimilate. His digestive power corresponds to the degree of  plastic, defensive, 
recuperative power that he possesses, and this relates closely to an abundance of  energy. The 
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more energy a man possesses, the stronger his ‗stomach‘; this means that he can assimilate 
greater quantities of  experience without provoking harmful and debilitating suffering in himself. 
The great man‘s strength to assimilate culminates in his ability to assimilate the ‗terrifying‘ and 
‗questionable‘ aspects of  existence, and so he does not need to deny their existence or validity, or 
blame them as causes of  suffering. He actively seeks out elements of  Becoming because they are 
suitable in providing resistance, interpreting these as opportunities for overcoming, and for 
producing a feeling of  growth.  
There is, however, a second point that appears to conflict with this idea of  assimilating: I 
have established that it is crucial that the great man cultivates the ability to resist new stimulus. It 
is his ability not to react involuntarily that both signals his character and allows him to strengthen 
it (and by extension his strong Will and energy). The question of  character is one of  reacting or 
not reacting. Nietzsche diagnoses the modern artist as similar to the hysteric, in that he lacks the 
ability not to react to stimulus; his heightened artistic state produces sensitivity to stimulus that is 
instrumental in losing his character. Just as this ‗artistic‘ state (diagnosed as an inauthentic state) 
represents losing the feeling of  self, cultivating character is akin to enhancing the feeling of  self. 
To be forced to react is to be subject to the whim of  external forces; it is to lose oneself  
constantly, lose the feeling of  self, and dissolve into Becoming. When this happens to a man 
involuntarily it negates his whole project of  self-mastery, or self-determination, and thus he loses 
the possibility of  authentic joy, which depends on him feeling his Will to be master. 
These two capacities seem to contradict one another. The first implies that cultivating 
abundant energy and a strong Will produces the capacity to assimilate greater quantities of  new 
experience, while the second suggests that possessing energy and a strong Will hinges precisely 
on cultivating the ability to resist stimulus. We can collapse this paradox by emphasising two 
things. Firstly, it is important to note that both cases, assimilating and resisting, should not be 
necessary relations with experience, but capacities that one can exercise. Possessing the capacity to 
assimilate does not mean that it is always desirable to exercise it. Thus striating and bending the 
indeterminate (Becoming) into the determined (Being), which involves relating new experience 
back to oneself, is neither a necessarily positive or negative movement, but depends upon the 
quality of  the one who filters experience and who uses it to reconstruct himself. Secondly, 
Nietzsche distinguishes - albeit not always clearly - between digesting experience and reacting to it. 
The latter is always bad, displaying a lack of  character. Digesting, on the other, is related to 
strength; it is the ability to assimilate experience by forcing it to conform to oneself. One masters 
the experience, and chooses the extent to which it is allowed to affect one. Nietzsche suggests 
that modern man tends to lack this ability to digest experience, and therefore he merely reacts. A 
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note from The Will to Power discusses this power to digest as relating strongly to the capacity to 
be able to act spontaneously. 
 
Sensibility immensely more irritable (-dressed up moralistically: the increase in pity-); the 
abundance of  disparate impressions greater than ever: cosmopolitan in foods, literatures, 
newspapers, forms, tastes, even landscapes. The tempo of  this influx prestissimo; the 
impression erase each other; one instinctively resists in anything, taking anything deeply, 
to ―digest‖ anything; a weakening of the power to digest results from this. A kind of 
adaptation to this flood of  impressions takes place: men unlearn spontaneous action, 
they merely react to stimuli from outside. They spend their strength partly in assimilating 
things, partly in defense, partly in opposition. Profound weakening of  spontaneity. (WP 
71/KSA 12:10[18]) 
 
Nietzsche sketches an image of  a superficial multitude, who unlearn the ability to digest deeply, 
and therefore merely mirror the multiple and varied impressions that they receive. Since they mix 
little of  themselves with these impressions, there is a mass conformity of  reactivity. The multitude 
merely conforms to what they experience, whereas assimilating experience means making it 
conform to oneself. Nietzsche makes it clear elsewhere that it is the wealth of  disparate 
impressions that modern man receives that make him so interesting, but it is equally clear that he 
worries that this ‗wealth‘ often turns him into a mere conduit of  experience. In contrast to this, 
the great man cultivates the ability not to react involuntarily to stimulus: ―A strong nature 
manifests itself  by waiting and postponing any reaction: it is as much characterised by a certain 
adiaphoria as weakness by an involuntary countermovement and the suddenness and inevitability 
of  ―action‖‖ (WP 45/KSA 13:14[102]). It is vital that he is able to adopt a defensive attitude 
towards existence when he judges that not to do so would be harmful towards his character, 
goals, and desires. Judging in this way is the art of  taste - the art of  divining what is good for 
oneself. In particular, it is an intuition he carefully cultivates to be able to avoid situations that 
would force him to react. There is something of  a paradox here: to be able not to react we must 
possess character, and yet we cultivate character precisely by refusing to let ourselves react. 
Knowing what is good for oneself  relates closely to energy expenditure. Taste is ―an instinct for 
self-defence‖ that accomplishes several things (EH II, 8). To be forced to react, to negate, to 
despise, is to expend energy constantly, and as such this pettiness puts one at the risk of  becoming 
exhausted. As I have established, exhaustion links closely with losing oneself  and with being 
unable to determine oneself. 
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Exhaustion increases susceptibility to suffering, and this increases the likelihood that the 
sufferer will interpret all resistance as unpleasant. The sufferer finds temporary release in not 
resisting anything, reaching a state where, temporarily, he experiences no displeasure, but is also 
incapable of  ―all feelings for limitation and distancing,‖ and with it, cuts himself  off  from all 
feelings of  growth and power: 
 
Instinctive exclusion of  all aversion, all enmity, all feeling for limitation and distancing : consequence 
of  an extreme capacity for suffering and irritation which already feels all resisting, all 
need for resistance, as an unbearable displeasure (that is to say as harmful, as deprecated by 
the instinct of  self-preservation) and knows blessedness (pleasure) only in no longer 
resisting anyone or anything, neither the evil nor the evil-doer - love as the sole, as the 
last possibility of  life... (AC 30) 
 
This passage links up the desire for universal love with the desire to immerse oneself  in 
Becoming, because both involve a feeling of  pleasure that comes from no longer resisting 
anything. This type of  pleasure is low and self-defeating because when a man no longer resists, 
he also gives up the possibility of  creating character and the strong Will. He replaces the subtle 
pleasure he could discover in commanding himself, and the joy in overcoming resistance, with 
blessedness, love, and a feeling of  ‗oneness.‘ More than simply knowing what might exhaust one, 
it is an art of  selecting: of  filtering one‘s experience to select that most relevant to one‘s overall 
goals and aims: ―He grows stronger through the accidents that threaten to destroy him; he 
instinctively gathers from all that he sees, hears, experiences, what advances his main concern – 
he follows a principle of  selection – he allows much to fall through,‖ and: ―He reacts with the 
slowness bred by a long caution and a deliberate pride - he tests a stimulus for its origin and its 
intention, he does not submit‖ (WP 1003/KSA 13:15[39]). This is a multifaceted strategy of  self-
defence; the great man sometimes avoids certain situations and places entirely, while at other 
times he applies a principle of  selection over the various aspects of  what he allows to approach 
him. His expedients are united by the fact that they are strategies he designs to conserve his 
energy, and protect his self ‘s cohesiveness. This is a careful process of  cultivating character; as 
his Will becomes stronger, as he learns to legislate to himself, character hardens, abundance 
increases, and he is less susceptible to external forces overwhelming him; ―Supreme rule of 
conduct: even when alone one must not ‗let oneself go.‘ - Good things are costly beyond 
measure‖ (TI 112). 
 
The Sickness unto Life 
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Health and sickliness: one should be careful! The standard remains the efflorescence of  the body, the agility, 
courage, and cheerfulness of  the spirit – but also, of  course, how much of  the sickly it can take and overcome – 
how much it can make healthy. That of  which more delicate men would perish belongs to the stimulant of  great 
health. (WP 1013/KSA 12:2[97]) 
 
The great health - that one does not merely have but also acquires continually, and must acquire because one 
gives it up again and again, and must give it up.‖ (GS 382) 
 
 Nietzsche frequently comments on the relation between sickness and health, and he does 
not merely describe the relation, but prescribes one: we need a "new health, stronger, more 
seasoned, tougher, more audacious, and gayer than any previous health‖ (GS 382). The problem 
of  sickness relates closely to the problem of  exhaustion, and Nietzsche often discusses them 
interchangeably. The reason that his writings on sickness are so useful is that, while I have been 
addressing long-term strategies to prevent oneself  becoming exhausted, in these sections 
Nietzsche deals with how one should deal with suffering when it does appear. This is important 
because exhaustion is not just an extreme state that we can avoid entirely; fluctuations in energy 
expenditure mean that at least some degree of  exhaustion is likely, if  not inevitable.  
Nietzsche states that the exhausted man‘s priority should be choosing the ―right means‖ 
to make himself  healthy: ―In combating my sick conditions I always instinctively chose the right 
means: while the decadent as such always chooses the means most harmful to him… A being who 
is typically morbid cannot become healthy, still less can he make himself  healthy‖ (EH I, 2). The 
goal of  becoming healthy encompasses two priorities: firstly, to ensure that exhaustion is not 
prolonged any more than it need be; secondly, to make sure that the exhausted state does not 
manifest itself  in values and/or important actions or decisions. The key to both priorities is 
ensuring that one does not submit to ressentiment, and, at the last resort, that ressentiment is not 
allowed to become creative. The lack of  defensive energy available in conditions of  sickness and 
exhaustion means that the ―curative instinct‖ becomes weak; becoming healthy again becomes a 
question of  whether this instinct can endure, or whether it submits to ressentiment. Solutions to 
exhaustion are not as clear-cut as simply being aware of  the danger of  resentment and refusing it; 
because of  the effect that physiological states have on the way that we think, there are limitations 
on our ability to gauge the quality of  our thoughts at any given moment. There is no pure 
vantage point from which to judge the quality of  thoughts; thoughts produced in conditions of 
weakness are not felt to be weak thoughts, but instead appear ―reasonable‖ (GS 317). Nietzsche 
 99 
 
 
develops this idea by distinguishing between ethos and pathos: ―Looking back – the true pathos of  
every period of  our life rarely becomes clear to us as long as we live in this period; then we 
always assume that it is the only state possible and reasonable to us… an ethos and not a pathos‖ 
(GS 317). Feelings and thoughts that seem to us at the time to be permanent or enduring, rooted 
in our character and disposition (ethos), later appear to be fleeting and even incomprehensible 
experiences (merely pathos). This process never ceases, since there is no fixed or unchanging 
standpoint from which to judge the ‗reasonableness‘ of  one‘s own thoughts. The worst attitude 
that we can take in conditions of  exhaustion and suffering is to submit to the resentment of 
conditions. As I have established, we maintain strength by conserving energy, and this involves 
preventing ourselves from expending energy superfluously. The problem of  superfluous 
expenditure becomes more acute in the exhausted individual:  ―Vexation, morbid susceptibility, 
incapacity for revenge, the desire, the thirst for revenge, poison-brewing in any sense – for one 
who is exhausted this is certainly the most disadvantageous kind of  reaction: it causes a rapid 
expenditure of  nervous energy, a morbid accretion of  excretions‖ (EH I, 6). The convalescent‘s 
paramount concern should be restoring energy, and all petty expenditure hinders this. Nietzsche 
suggests a strategy he terms ―Russian Fatalism,‖ which logically concludes the refusal to react that I 
have been highlighting: ―That fatalism without rebellion with which a Russian soldier for whom 
the campaign has become too much at last lies down in the snow.  No longer to take anything at 
all, to receive anything, to take anything into oneself  – no longer to react at all‖ (EH I, 6). The 
man who adopts this attitude understands that every time he reacts, he expends energy. When he 
is sick he is most at risk from ―men and things,‖ but it is precisely this time when it is most 
important that he not react to painful stimuli. Since he lacks the strength to react authentically, he 
must refuse to react at all. ―Because one would use oneself  up too quickly if  one reacted at all, 
one no longer reacts: this is the logic‖ (EH I, 6). This ability not to react is the most difficult 
thing for the weak, because it requires the strength and abundance of  energy that they lack. It is 
therefore clear that exhaustion tends to perpetuate itself, lending a sense of  fatality to exhaustion; 
Nietzsche clearly implies this in the following note in The Will to Power: ―On the hygiene of  the 
―weak,‖ - Everything done in weakness fails. Moral: do nothing. Only there is the hitch that 
precisely the strength to suspend activity, not to react, is sickest of  all under the influence of  
weakness: one never reacts more quickly and blindly than when one should not react at all. -‖ 
(WP 45/KSA 13:14[102]). Thus the weak man tends to harm himself, because the one thing that 
he needs is the one thing that he lacks: ―The will is weak - and the prescription to avoid 
stupidities would be to have a strong will and do nothing – Contradictio. - A kind of  self-
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destruction; the instinct of  preservation is compromised. - The weak harm themselves. - That is 
the type of  decadence.-‖ (WP 45/KSA 13:14[102]). 
Nietzsche‘s writings on sickness are instead a particularly acute example of  the complex 
relationship between physiology and agency in his thought, which might, at times, seem to 
downplay responsibility for one‘s thoughts and actions. Since the drives‘ relation affects thought, 
at times he appears to reduce the quality of  thought to the quality of  physiology: ―A thought 
comes when ‗it‘ wants, not when ‗I‘ want‖ (BGE 17). But all this does is provide some limitations 
on the conscious will‘s ability to determine itself, not deny that it has the ability at all. The great 
man carefully cultivates an approach to exhaustion that allows him to revaluate his condition 
consciously. Only the weak-willed man interprets his exhausted actions and thoughts as 
inevitable or imposed upon him; the great man, in contrast, cultivates as much control as he can 
possibly obtain over such conditions. This is the crucial point: he distinguishes his greatness not 
by being entirely unaffected by his physiology, but by the fact that he constantly emphasises 
everything that he can control, seeking greater and greater mastery of  himself, rather than 
searching out anywhere he is constrained. He does not seek a total mastery, such as the desire we 
might find in the violent willing of  the ascetic, but he extends the realm of  his own mastery, 
whilst not only accepting, but welcoming contingent and fluctuating conditions that he must, in 
turn, master once more.  
  The great man retains as much ability to intervene in the process of  translating physiology 
into value and actions as possible. He intervenes in two primary ways. The first is his ability to 
close himself  off  from what might harm him, to look away, to negate. This simply involves being 
able to recognise one‘s own weak state, and limit exposure to that which is likely to produce 
ressentiment: a: ―determined self-limitation to what was bitter, harsh, and hurtful to know‖ (GS 
preface 1).134 The crux of  this is being able to diagnose one‘s own condition, to be aware of  
one‘s body, energy levels, and the extent to which one‘s ―curative powers‖ are still strong. This 
intervention, then, is preventive: ―We must learn to live with diminished energies, too; As soon as 
pain gives its safety signal the time has come to diminish them; some great danger or other, a 
storm is approaching, and we are well advised to ―inflate‖ ourselves as little as possible‖ (GS 
318). The second way he intervenes is limiting the extent that he allows the harm that is inflicted 
to produce values and actions:  
 
Just as a traveller may resolve, before he calmly abandons himself  to sleep, to wake up at 
a certain time, we philosophers, if we should become sick, surrender for a while to 
                                                                 
134 All references to GS preface are to the second edition of  The Gay Science.  
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sickness, body, and soul – and, as it were, shut our eyes to ourselves… something will 
leap forward then and catch the spirit in the act: I mean, in its weakness, or repentance 
or resignation or hardening or gloom. (GS preface 2)) 
 
The philosopher surprises his own body in the process of  translating physiology into thought 
and action. This act is the ability to diagnose the roots of  values and actions, and to prevent those 
rooted in weakness from being actualised, carried out, and/or endured. These two aspects of 
intervention help us to understand more fully why Nietzsche endorses this idea of  ‗Russian 
Fatalism.‘ The convalescent limits nonessential expenditure, both in a preventive way to limit 
ressentiment, and in the sense of  preventing any residual ressentiment from manifesting itself  in his 
values and actions.  
In the state of  weakness it is vital to break the affinity between sickness and ressentiment. 
In times of  weakness conscious thought thus becomes an imperative: a way of  conditioning 
oneself  to be more than a conduit for one‘s physiology. Conscious thought must perform a 
double operation. The great man diagnoses weakness in his thoughts and actions and prevents 
them from coming to fruition, but at the same time he ensures that while he feels weak he makes 
as few meaningful decisions as possible. Nietzsche describes the extent that he tries not to change 
his circumstances amidst sickness, for fear that this desire for change is itself  rooted in ressentiment; 
―clinging tenaciously‖ to ―almost intolerable situations, places, residences, company‖ because ―to 
accept oneself  as a fate, not to desire oneself  ‗different‘ – in such conditions this is great rationality 
itself‖ (EH I, 6). The intellect‘s task in exhausted conditions is therefore predominantly the 
negative one of  refusing to react.    
All of  this presupposes an attitude towards oneself  by which one is confident of  one‘s 
strength and of  one‘s imminent recovery. When Nietzsche writes: ―The noble soul has reverence for 
itself,‖ he means that the central characteristic that distinguishes the noble soul is that it possesses 
a ―fundamental certainty‖ in ―regard to itself ‖ (BGE 287). This certainty is a type of  ―faith,‖ but 
it involves redeploying a religious formula in a ―deeper sense‖ (BGE 287). The importance of 
possessing this faith is that it allows the noble soul to be relatively unaffected by events and 
circumstances. This fundamental certainty is therefore what I have been describing as character. 
It is important to note that this idea of  a fundamental certainty cannot be taken to be absolute or 
it risks becoming an obstacle to meaningful change. Zarathustra offers an example of  this when 
he analyses ―the poets‖: they tend to take reverence for themselves in an inappropriate direction, 
by believing that they have access to ―a special, secret portal to knowledge‖ (Z, II, 17). They 
believe themselves to be exceptional, in the sense that ―they always think that nature is in love 
with them,‖ and that ―she creeps up to their ears to tell them secrets and enamoured flatteries‖ 
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(Z, II, 17). The effect of  this belief  is that it tends to make the poets ―boastful and bloated 
before all mortals!‖ (Z, II, 17). This boastfulness alludes to a wider problem. Believing oneself  to 
be a unique recipient of  revelation can become a substitute for the self-creation that Nietzsche 
wants to promote. The reverence that the noble soul possesses must relate to his pride as a self-
created being, rather than as having received anything. His faith in himself  is therefore only 
useful to the extent that it refers to faith in the strength of  his character, which gives him the 
ability to overcome changing events and circumstance. If  instead of  this he believes that he has 
been chosen to convey nature‘s secrets then he deludes himself, and the result of  this may well 
be that he eschews the habitual training and hard work that effective self-creation requires. The 
poets want ―spectators‖ and their spirit is characterised by ―vanity,‖ but they are only 
transformed when they turn ―their gaze against themselves‖ (Z, II, 17). The great man‘s essential 
attribute is revering himself, but he must also be aware that he creates himself, and is thus 
responsible for his works. He must avoid thinking of  himself  as the intermediary of  higher 
forces, and forgo the temptation to believe that nature whispers secrets to him. 
The final element of  the great man‘s attitude towards exhaustion is cultivating gratitude 
towards his weakest periods. This goes beyond merely accepting such periods, to affirming their 
value in his self-development as a whole: ―You see that I do not want to take leave ungratefully 
from that time of  severe sickness whose profits I have not yet exhausted even today. I am very 
conscious of  the advantages that my fickle health gives me over all robust squares‖ (GS preface 
3). He loosely divides this ‗gratitude‘ into two guises: sickness‘ effect on his attitude towards life, 
and the assertion that his investigations into his own sickness provide valuable insight into his 
project of  revaluating values. Nietzsche interprets his sickness as stimulating new life: it provides 
(and requires) a constant rebirth: ―From such abysses, from such severe sickness... one returns 
newborn, having shed one‘s skin, more ticklish and malicious, with a more delicate taste for joy, 
with a tenderer tongue for all good things, with merrier senses‖ (GS preface 4). Experiencing 
sickness, then, provides for a new taste for joy - sensitivity towards pleasure. At its simplest level, it 
is the experience of  great contrast that ensures that the convalescent appreciates his health in a new 
way. Nietzsche argues that experiencing sickness demonstrates that life itself  is a problem, and 
this changes attitudes towards life. It is therefore a stimulus to investigate the conditions under 
which we undertake life: ―One emerges as a different person, with a few more question marks – 
above all with the will henceforth to question further, more deeply, severely, harshly, evilly and 
quietly than one had questioned heretofore‖ (GS preface 3). It is a mistake to think that such a 
change makes one "gloomy." Rather, "one loves (life) differently" (GS preface 3). This love is 
antithetical to equilibrium, representing affirming change and Becoming. Above all, by 
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problematising life, sickness makes one more profound. Cultivating the ability to question and 
interrogate oneself, to undertake a genealogy of  one‘s own values, is projected outwards as 
Nietzsche‘s self-diagnosis becomes a psychology: ―After such self-questioning, self-temptation, one 
acquires a subtler eye for all philosophizing to date... for now one knows whether the sick body 
and its needs unconsciously urge, push and lure the spirit – towards the sun, stillness, mildness, 
patience, medicine, balm in some sense (GS preface 2). Nietzsche believes that his philosophical 
method is underpinned by his ability to diagnose the force that values express. Furthermore, he 
believes that the relation between health and values is philosophy‘s great unexplored question: 
―All those bold insanities of  metaphysics, especially answers to the question about the value of 
existence, may always be considered first of  all as the symptoms of  certain bodies‖ (GS preface 
2). It is the extent of  Nietzsche's experience with sickness, coupled with his extreme distaste for 
values which codify and institutionalise weakness, that provide him with what he considers a 
privileged standpoint from which to diagnose the forces that values express, and to judge their 
value. By calling into question the narratives of  cause and effect that men use to interpret 
themselves, those ―phantoms and false lights‖ of  the inner life, Nietzsche confronts his own 
pathos, that his consciousness invariably tends to present as the only one reasonable (TI 60). By 
dissecting himself, experimenting with different ways of  understanding himself, creating himself, 
he acquires the ability to judge and the perspective he requires to undertake a genealogy of 
values: 
 
Every philosophy that ranks peace above war, every ethic with a negative definition of  
happiness, every metaphysics and physics that knows some finale, some final state of  
some sort, every predominantly æsthetic or religious craving for some Apart, Beyond, 
Outside, Above, permits the question whether it was not sickness that inspired the 
philosopher. (GS preface 2) 
 
Nietzsche is careful to distinguish between immediately disciplining one‘s thoughts and making a 
certain approach and way of  acting habitual The former is necessary but not sufficient to 
produce character: ―For one must not mistake the method involved here : a mere disciplining of 
thoughts and feelings is virtually nothing: one must first convince the body (AC 47). This 
accurately represents Nietzsche‘s writings on the relationship between body and mind in general: 
one should not overlook the importance of  the body, but it is up to one to ―convince‖ the body 
of  what one wants. Again he emphasises training and habit, in this case to ―internalise‖ the 
ability to maintain a ―significant and select demeanour‖ (AC 47). 
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This accounts for Nietzsche‘s emphasis on the importance of  an initial period of 
solitude. Abundant energy does not, however, negate the need to cultivate a strong sense of  
taste; he warns against ―rich and noble souls‖ who ―expend themselves prodigally, a lmost 
indifferently.‖ While Zarathustra praises expenditure as the essence of  bestowing, of  an abundance 
that overflows, it is crucial not to take this to the ―point where it becomes a vice‖; independence 
demands that one retains the ability ―to conserve oneself‖ (BGE 41). This is in line with my earlier 
assertion that the great man‘s æsthetic intoxication occurs along different lines than the modern 
artist‘s violent oscillation, between creative frenzy and nihilistic exhaustion. The power reflected 
here is ―slow to answer,‖ is ―conscious of  no witness around it,‖ and lives ―oblivious of  the 
existence of  any opposition‖: it ―reposes‖ only in itself  (TI IX, 11). It is therefore an æsthetic 
intoxication that is both spontaneous and active but nonetheless controlled. The importance of 
conserving energy is that one is then able to employ it spontaneously and offensively, rather than 
merely defensively. Wyndham Lewis argues that: ―The average, worldly man does not... Get 
beyond the conception of  ‗the struggle for existence.‖‖135 Unlike the great man, ―he has no 
creative surplus at all.‖ His ―war,‖ his manifestation of  the will to power, is: ―a defensive war; and 
he is only aggressively cunning, not in the heroic ‗dangerous‘ fashion suggested by Nietzsche. He 
disposes his forces very prudently and strategically. He is by nature what is called ―pessimistic‖; 
he sees nothing but defeat, in the sense of  horror and struggle.‖136 Lewis goes on to argue that 
both Nietzsche and the average man employ ―falsification theory‖ and ―will to illusion‖ for their 
various struggles, but the former engages in an offensive war, while the latter‘s war is defensive. 
However, Nietzsche lacks the success of  the average man, testifying to the difficulty of  the 
offensive war, and the need to appreciate the limits of  one‘s capabilities. 137  
That is, if one lacks the energy for the offensive war, then attempting to live as a 
sovereign individual risks completely discharging one‘s energy, exhausting one entirely. Given that 
even the defensive war requires a constant series of  small expenditure, this is a risk that threatens 
cohesion. We have already seen such a violent oscillation between extreme states at work in 
Bataille and Miller‘s work, among others. Nietzsche, on the other hand, becomes preoccupied 
with the idea of  maintaining character by refusing to put himself in situations where one will be 
forced to react. He draws a ―horizon‖ around himself, so to, first, retain ―cheerfulness‖ and 
―confidence in the future‖ and second, so that his self-determination (freedom) cannot be 
overwhelmed (UM II, 1). One aspect of  this horizon is wholly physical; preventing himself  from 
being anywhere which would unduly exhaust his defensive powers: ―Suppose I were to step out 
                                                                 
135 Wyndham Lewis, The Art of  Being Ruled, Black Sparrow Press, Santa Rosa, 1989, p. 118. 
136 Ibid., p. 118. 
137 Ibid., p. 118. 
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of  my house and discover, instead of  calm and aristocratic Turin, the German provincial town: 
my instinct would have to blockade itself  so as to push back all that pressed upon it from this 
flat and cowardly world‖ (EH II, 8). More than just this physical removal, the horizon governs 
elements necessary to life in society. We must prioritise energy according to one‘s task, and so 
good taste, when developed, governs when stimulus is allowed to approach one and when one 
should assimilate it: ―I do not want to wage war against what is ugly... Looking away shall be my 
only negation‖ (GS 276).  Emerson similarly argues that being affected by the trifling aspects of 
the world should always be interpreted as something that one chooses: 
 
But your isolation must not be mechanical, but spiritual, that is, must be elevation. At 
times the whole world seems to be in conspiracy to importune you with emphatic trifles. 
Friend, client, child, sickness, fear, want, charity, all knock at once at thy closet door, and 
say, ‗‗Come out unto us.‘ But keep thy state; come not into their confusion. The power 
men possess to annoy me, I give them by a weak curiosity. No man can come near me 
but through my act.138 
 
We can contrast both Nietzsche‘s active restraint and the ―average man‘s‖ defensive war with the 
modern artist‘s war, which involves exhausting his surplus energy by deliberately exposing 
himself  to stimulus. Compare Nietzsche‘s unwillingness to suspend his self-determination with 
Henry Miller‘s account in Black Spring: ―The slightest stir and the whole fabric falls apart. In the 
street I expose myself  to the destructive, disintegrating elements that surround me. I let 
everything wreak its own havoc with me. I bend over to spy on the secret processes, to obey rather 
than to command.‖139 Miller embraces the temporary dissolving of  his character to ‗spy on the 
secret processes‘; actively consenting to a situation where he will have to obey, in the sense of 
responding to a host of  stimulus. Nietzsche‘s preoccupation, in contrast, is the danger that 
suspending his freedom would  involve, even if  it only temporarily; this constantlyleads him to 
prioritises strong character and exercising volition over Miller‘s form of  creative interpretation: 
―sagacity and self-defence consists in reacting as seldom as possible and withdrawing from situations 
and relationships in which one would be condemned as it were to suspend one‘s ‗freedom,‘ one‘s 
initiative, and becomes a mere reagent‖ (EH II, 8). 
 
Positing a Goal 
 
                                                                 
138 Emerson, ‗Self-Reliance‘, Essays, p. 50. 
139 Henry Miller, Black Spring, Panther Books, St Albans, 1974, p. 28-9. 
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‗I know not which way to turn; I am everything that knows not which way to turn‘ - sighs modern man. (AC 1) 
 
We became gloomy, we were called fatalists. Our fatality - was the plenitude, the tension, the blocking-up of  our 
forces. We thirsted for lighting and action, of  all things we kept ourselves furthest from the happiness of  the 
weaklings, from ‗resignation…‘ (AC 1) 
 
 Nietzsche argues that a philosophy based on energy expenditure must take seriously the 
need to posit a goal. The passage immediately above describes the adoption of  a certain attitude 
towards the problem of  the lack of  release for abundance. Nietzsche extols the virtue of  a 
patience that we must be careful to distinguish from ‗resignation.‘ Resignation is a technique the 
weak employ to attempt to transform their inactivity into an (inert and submissive) idea of 
happiness. In contrast, patience is necessary because forces, if  we are not to squander them 
recklessly, require a means and a direction so that we can discharge them. The great man requires 
a goal, and he must give this goal to himself. His ‗tension‘ indicates strength and a ‗thirst‘ for 
action. A note from The Will to Power again references a ―tension of  forces‖ that corresponds to 
the coupling of  increasing force and a present lack of  outlet for its discharge (WP 1022/KSA 
13:11[38]). This passage crucially provides a new insight into the way that Nietzsche employs the 
idea of  ―commanding‖; this idea occupies a central place in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, although it 
differs from what is commonly understood by commanding. The increasing tension of  forces 
creates a condition which appears similar to ―pessimism‖; a ―dark‖ condition (WP 1022/KSA 
13:11[38]): 
 
A doctrine that puts an end to such a condition by commanding something or other – a 
revaluation of values by virtue of which the accumulated forces are shown a way, a 
whither, so they explode into lightning flashes and deeds – certainly does not need to be 
a doctrine of happiness: by releasing force that had been compressed and dammed to 
the point of  torment it brings happiness. (WP 1022/KSA 13:11[38]) 
 
Several things are particularly notable: first, Nietzsche again identifies authentic happiness, the 
happiness of  strength, as synonymous with discharging pent-up force; second, he associates 
commanding with the act of  giving forces a direction. This direction is provided by the act of  
revaluating, which creates the possibility of  transforming accumulated forces into a deed. 
Zarathustra preoccupies himself  with the question of  whether his failure to command stems 
from cowardice and ‗unripeness,‘ and this self-reflection, conveyed in the form of  a discourse 
with his ―stillest hour,‖ who chastises him: ―you are not ripe for your fruits!‖, provokes his return 
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to solitude (Z, III, 22). Although he leaves the meaning of  commanding vague, he intimates in 
the passage above that commanding refers not merely to the act of  imparting orders to others, 
but more generally to the process of  revaluating values in such a way as to give direction to pent -
up forces. Therefore, commanding oneself  towards a goal or aim is as much an act of  command 
as commanding others is. When Zarathustra scolds himself  for not being ripe enough for his 
thoughts, for lacking the ―lion‘s voice‖ for commanding, this signifies that he is aware that he is 
failing to transform his revaluation of  values into the release of  his abundance (Z, II, 22). 
In part four of  Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche introduces the figure of  ‗the shadow,‘ 
that represents an extreme example of  a so-called free spirit who entirely lacks a goal. The 
shadow persuades himself  that ―Nothing is true, all is permitted,‖ unlearns ―faith in words and 
values and great names,‖ and overthrows all ―boundary stones.‖ (Z, IV, 9). But without a goal he 
is directionless and aimless, has ―smashed anything‖ he ever honoured, and lost all sense of  his 
identity - when he ―shed his skin‖ his name fell off  too (Z, IV, 9). The result of  his lack of  a goal 
is that he has ―plunged into the coldest waters‖ without any sense of  purpose or self, been 
―whirled by every wind, unsteady‖ and been left ―thin, blackish, hollow and outdated‖ (Z, IV, 9). 
He finds it impossible to experience any pleasure, since he lacks any conception of  the good life: 
―A good wind? Indeed, only the one who know where he‘s sailing knows also which wind is good 
and which is his favourable wind. What did I have left? A heart weary and insolent; a restless will; 
fluttering wings; a broken backbone‖ (Z, IV, 9). The shadow is thus a free spirit in the sense of 
releasing himself  from all of  the chains of  society, morality and obligations but he suffers from a 
nihilistic lack of  meaning. Thus having a goal is important in pursuing freedom. Zarathustra 
warns him that he must be on the guard against an inevitable urge to enslave himself  to the first 
―narrow belief‖ and ―severe delusion,‖ because to the exhausted and restless ―even a jails ends 
up looking like bliss‖ and captured criminals often ―enjoy their new security‖ (Z, IV, 9). 
Nietzsche‘s emphasis on revaluation ensures that the act of  positing a goal I am 
discussing here is not merely a question of  choosing one direction over another, but is a 
genuinely creative act. Revaluation involves reinterpreting oneself  and realigning perception, 
yielding a new goal and new priorities. This entire process restructures the drives‘ relation. There 
is a complex relation between revaluating values, positing a goal, and expending energy. Although 
I have suggested that the former is the essential precondition of  the latter, I have also suggested 
that expending energy is the essential precondition for precisely the transformation of  the world 
that makes creation possible. There is, however, no necessary contradiction here; rather, there is 
a complex relation where expending abundant energy means that an initial creative act – a 
momentary revaluation, a realignment of  forces - provides the release of  the tension induced by 
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the build-up of  forces. This release in turn produces a progressive intoxication whereby the 
world is transformed æsthetically. The genuine state of  creation - transforming the world into 
perfection - therefore presupposes expenditure, but precisely this expenditure is nonetheless 
predicated upon the creative spark of  revaluation and the act/art of  commanding.  
All of  these interrelated elements – the creative spark, intoxication, and the ability to 
command – depend upon a prior cultivation of  character. That is, they depend upon the long 
process of  training and forming habits that we require to give ourselves character and become 
sovereign. That is, cultivating the ability not to react, and mastering oneself, is necessary to 
acquire the capacity to determine goals for oneself. While we can conceivably use any goal as a 
pretext to discharge energy, accumulating abundant energy presupposes defending against small 
expenditure, and therefore, again, possessing character. Since possessing abundance presupposes 
character, which entails creating oneself  as self-legislating, positing a goal requires unleashing 
energy, ensuring that the goal must be one that we choose, rather than one imposed on us from 
without. What truly distinguishes creating a goal from merely deciding between pre-existing 
alternatives is therefore, ultimately, possessing character.  
Positing a goal plays a role in shaping the strong Will by imposing uniformity and 
direction upon one‘s drives. The goal posited is, however, in a meaningful sense shaped by the 
drives‘ activity, since the Will determines it, and this is inseparable from the drives‘ activitie s 
(even if  we cannot reduce it to them). The central aspect of  positing a goal is the way in which it 
leads to a new interpretation of  existence that shapes and controls drives and forces.  The art of 
positing a goal depends on volition, in two senses: first, volition is responsible for cultivating a 
strong Will and abundant energy initially; second, it is responsible for imposing a direction on 
this produced energy.  
A goal must reflect the drives‘ activity. It does not reveal interiority though, since we 
form it by interpreting this activity, not by discovering an essential relation. It is therefore subject 
to alteration by the continual strengthening of  the Will, which subsequently reinterprets itself. 
This process is undoubtedly circular. A goal that succeeds in marshalling forces reflects the Will‘s 
activity, but is desirable precisely because it is instrumental in imposing uniformity and regularity 
upon the drives. In some sense, it is accurate to say that: on the one hand, being able to posit an 
individual goal for oneself  presupposes that one has a strong Will, in that it requires a man 
capable of  Willing, that is, of  self-legislating; and on the other, the act of  positing a goal is central 
to creating a strong Will. This is no objection however, since the strong Will always desires to 
increase its strength. A certain degree of  strength is needed for the creative positing of  a goal, 
and this goal is the means to increase strength. 
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II 
 
 
Free Will and Responsibility  
 
 
 
 In developing the idea of  character, I have suggested that the great man‘s development is 
characterised by an ever greater increase in his feeling of  the unity of  his self. We have seen that 
he learns not to react to stimulus, to develop the capacity to determine his own Will, and to 
master and integrate his drives and affects into a coherent and unified centre. This stands at odds 
with accounts of  Nietzsche that emphasise a disorganised and/or decentred self, being close to 
Becoming, and so on. This process of  increasing mastery is how one goes about giving oneself  a 
strong Will. I am now going to delve deeper into the question of  how the great man should 
think about the Will that he is creating, in particular, I am going to suggest that he must think of  
his Will as free, and assume responsibility for all that he is. Firstly, I want to consider an argument 
that Graham Parkes makes in Composing the Soul; Reaches of  Nietzsche‘s Psychology, where he tries to 
complicate the idea of  a linear movement towards a greater unity of  the self. If  we are to 
understand Nietzsche‘s ideas about the freedom of  the will, we must be sure of  the extent to 
which we think of  ourselves as unified. Parkes suggests that there are two crucial stages in the 
way that the great man acts with regards to his drives. The first stage involves developing control 
over oneself  by not reacting to stimulus. Parkes argues that this is the ―same as in the Platonic -
Socratic program‖; where it differs is in the second stage, which justifies the first, which is 
―simply a preliminary strategy for the sake of  an eventually greater freedom.‖140 For Parkes, while 
the first stage aims at ―self-control,‖ this is a means and not an end in itself; it is in the second 
stage that the great man truly becomes great.141 Parkes‘ account of  this second stage is an 
interesting close-reading of  Nietzsche‘s texts, and is worth recounting and considering at length, 
as it touches closely on the issues of  self-mastery, the unity of  the self, and the amount of 
control that rests with a central, organising force: 
 
                                                                 
140 Parkes, p. 357. 
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The will‘s ―power of  mastery‖ becomes such that it is now safe to ―give back to the 
drives their freedom,‖ in the confidence that they will now ―go where our best inclines.‖ 
By the end of  this second phase, in which ―the entire affective system is stimulated and 
intensified,‖ one is able to react with total spontaneity - strangely but knowingly ―unable 
not to react‖ - moved now by the mysterious power of  Dionysus (TI 9.10)... 
 
At some point in the practice of  self-discipline it is possible to relax control of  the 
―magnificent monsters‖ that are the drives, affects, and passions, and trust them to move 
us spontaneously in the appropriate ways... 
 
The ideal state would be one in which as much power as possible is ultimately returned 
to the greatest variety of  energetic drives, affects, and passions, in the expectation that all 
parties will spontaneously organize themselves to the optimal benefit of the 
―psychopolis‖ as a whole.142 
 
Parkes thus identifies an initial movement towards self-mastery, the unity of  the self, and 
conscious control over one‘s affects, but this is only a preliminary stage to a second movement, 
where one gives autonomy back to one‘s drives. This involves relinquishing central power, or at 
least temporarily delegating this power: 
 
The will that would then hold gentle sway over the monstrously powerful drives no 
longer operates only through the conscious ego, but rather works and plays as ―will to 
power‖ - a configuration of  the interpretive energies that constitute life in the widest 
sense...143 
 
One‘s openness to the drives that flow in from the archaic (and more recent) past has to 
respond to the capacity to assimilate - yet without the help of  an independent regulatory 
agency. If  such an agency is retained, in the form of  a separate unitary I, the consequent 
restriction of  flow will inhibit the attainment of  greatness.144 
 
His key claim here is that it is necessary to relax control of  a ‗separate unity I‘ in order to take 
advantage of  the maximum quantity of  power and energy from the drives, and thus to attain 
greatness, or at least the possibility of  greatness. It is certainly true that the great man must strike 
a balance between self-mastery, and allowing his drives and desires to express himself. In 
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discussing the figure of  the ascetic I have already made clear the limits involved in ‗mastering‘ 
oneself  at the expense of  the drives‘ energy; this kind of  ‗violent willing‘ precludes the 
possibility of  greatness. What worries me about Parkes‘ account is that he separates the great 
man‘s development into two separate stages. I think it makes more sense to think of  it as one 
fluid process, whereby one seeks to master one‘s drives but is constantly aware that one must 
harness their power, rather than destroy them. If  one mutilates one‘s drives in the pursuit of  self-
control then one is left not with a strong Will, but merely exhausted; it seems difficult to imagine 
that one is then in a position to be able to give power back to one‘s drives and take advantage of  
them. With respect to becoming a great man, self-mastery is therefore conditional upon 
maintaining the power of  one‘s drives, and thus there is no need to divide this into two stages at 
all. This is not just a semantic distinction, since it has repercussions for how one interprets 
oneself. From the point of  view of  the most expedient way to think about oneself  so as to 
increase one‘s abundance, I think it unhelpful to think of  one‘s will as holding only a ‗gentle 
sway‘ and as deliberately not retaining a ‗separate unitary I,‘ for several reasons. It seems to open 
up the possibility of  abdicating responsibility for one‘s actions and thoughts. If  we think of 
ourselves as delegating power and control to a particular drive or set of  drives, even if  only 
temporarily, then we open up the possibility of  blaming this particular drive for our thoughts or 
behaviour, which masks the extent to which we both could be and are responsible for it. In fact, 
I think the whole idea of  allowing a drive to control or direct us is problematic. A complex and 
hierarchical relation of  various drives affects all self-perception; whether or not we want to say 
that we are in control of  one‘s drives, in a Socratic-type ‗top-heavy‘ formation, or that we are 
temporarily delegating one‘s power of  decision/direction to a particular drive, is unimportant 
compared to the crucial point that we must feel that we are commanding ourselves. The result of 
the hierarchy of  drives, when one undertakes the process of  self-creation fully, is that one is 
one‘s will, and feels oneself  to be in affinity with one‘s drives. When Parkes suggests that there is 
a second stage of  the process, where one imagines that one is delegating power and authority to 
this drive or that, he reproduces the same sort of  distinction between what I imagine ‗myself ‘ to 
be and the drives, at the same time as he wants to point out that Nietzsche collapses this 
distinction. In other words, he suggests that the ‗separate unitary I‘ grows more powerful in the 
first stage, then deliberately lessens its power in the second, while also suggesting that for 
Nietzsche there is no unitary I at all.  
Contra Parkes, I do not think that we have to relax or relinquish central  control of  the 
unified ‗I‘ to maximise the power of  the monstrous drives fully; we ‗just‘ need to integrate and 
control them properly in the first place, so that there is never a stage when we lose their power 
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and energy. When we properly appreciate the effect that increasing energy expenditure and 
abundance has on perception, we see that the effect of  this increasing energy is an æsthetic state, 
where one feels oneself  identical with the hierarchy of  drives that one creates. This is not losing 
the feeling of  self, losing the feeling of  control, or being subservient to one or more of  one‘s 
drives, but a state of  harmonization where one integrates one‘s drives and passions into a feeling 
of  unity and coherence. This is a state of  the highest autonomy and sovereignty, where one‘s 
power to act reaches its highest point.  
Having established that the movement of  determining oneself  is one of  gaining mastery 
over oneself, and of  lessening the extent to which one allows circumstances, and the external 
world in general, to influence one, we are in a good position to revisit the debate over free will in 
Nietzsche‘s thought, an area of  scholarship characterised by wild divergence. Most worryingly, 
commentators often interpret Nietzsche as a critic of  the idea of  free will. I will argue that this 
attitude is a significant obstacle to constructing a coherent account of  the great man. Given that 
I have emphasised that he criticises the idea that willing is the product of  faculty - a position often 
taken to underpin the idea of  free will - it is important to disentangle the ideas I am presenting 
here from the interpretation of  him as an enemy of  free will. Given the emphasis I am placing 
on the idea of  responsibility, it is also crucial to clarify the relationship this idea has with free 
will, since the two are often taken to be complimentary ideas.  
One common argument is that Nietzsche‘s theory of  competing drives undermines the 
idea of  free will; i.e., since consciousness is not autonomous from the drives, this undermines the 
traditional domain of  free will, and therefore refutes the idea. This is often taken to be rather a 
self-evident feature of  Nietzsche‘s thought; in Nietzsche and Machiavelli Diego A. Von Vacano 
argues that ―Nietzsche‘s idea of  multiplicity negates the notion of  the free will,‖ since the will is 
not autonomous, but is merely ―the strongest drive in each person.‖145 Man‘s ―capacity to alter 
the world is severely limited,‖ as a man is neither autonomous nor sovereign, but ―subject to the 
effect of  his own competing drives.‖146 Such arguments always rest on the idea that Nietzsche‘s 
theory of  drives completely undermines the stable unity required to ―order the person.‖ 147 
Instead, shifting arrangements of  the multiplicity of  drives ensure constant change and 
uncertainty: ―The uncertain boundaries of  the self, for Nietzsche, exist ultimately because there 
is no unifying, fixed entity that one could ascertain to always order the person. The process of  
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146 ―The forces of  nature also circumscribe him.‖ Ibid., p. 91. 
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self-development and change is never-ending.‖148 In this sort of  account, introducing any sort of  
contingency into the ‗boundaries of  the self ‘ is associated with completely undermining the 
possibility of  free will. One‘s consciousness merely expresses the relation between drives at any 
given moment, this arrangement is constantly shifting, and we apparently have little to no control 
over what our drives are expressing through us.  
We find a similar move elsewhere. As I began to address earlier, in Sovereignty of  Joy 
McIntyre characterises Nietzsche‘s project as one of  demolishing responsibility. He underpins 
this by suggesting that Nietzsche rejects the idea of  free will, because it is intrinsically tied to an 
unhelpful metaphysical view of  the self; separating the doer and deed is a device the priest uses 
to make free will inseparable from responsibility, with the aim of  inflicting guilt.  
 
For Nietzsche, to believe in free will is to accept a metaphysical conception of  the self  as 
an entity, as a faculty, and an unconditioned substance. Its very unconditioned nature 
makes it free, responsible, and self-knowing; it makes of humanity a cause sui... Hence, 
morality and the metaphysics of  substance coincide; responsibility, guilt, and free will 
become synonymous though the separation of  doer and deed.149 
 
McIntyre extends this critique and suggests that Nietzsche rejects the idea of  ―will‖ entirely.150 It 
must be difficult to believe sincerely in such a suggestion, given that it requires ignoring 
innumerable sections of  Nietzsche‘s writings - in particular, Thus Spoke Zarathustra in its entirety. 
McIntyre‘s idea, which is far from unusual, is that once Nietzsche undermines the traditional 
‗metaphysical conception of  the self ‘ as a faculty, then this means we must give up on the idea of 
free will entirely. However, given the ambiguity that Nietzsche often exhibits towards concepts, 
criticising one form and reviving another, it hardly seems sensible to take a few passages as 
indicating the definitive truth of  his thought. I want to tell a very different tale about the role of  
freedom in Nietzsche‘s thought, one which is rooted in the overall spirit of  his texts, the question 
of  how the great man should think about himself.  
If  Nietzsche is ambivalent to the idea of  free will, in the sense that its value depends on 
the reasons it is taken up and the uses to which it is put, then he is entirely clear when he 
characterises the type of  man who imagines his will is unfree. Believing and feeling that one‘s will 
is not free, but determined, is one of  the key narratives of  the malaise created by refusing to accept 
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responsibility. Attempting to identify aspects where one feels oneself  to be unfree, controlled, or 
conditioned, reflects insufficient strength: 
 
‗Unfree will‘ is mythology: in real life it is only a question of  strong and weak wills. - It is 
almost always a symptom of  what is lacking in himself  when a thinker detects in every 
‗causal connection‘ and ‗psychological necessity‘ something of  compulsion, exigency, 
constraint, pressure, unfreedom: such feelings are traitors, the person who has them 
gives himself  away. (BGE 21) 
 
Searching for constraint within oneself, for any evidence of  compulsion, is a symptom of  self-
hatred and reflects a desire to avoid responsibility for what one is, and what one does. The man 
who refuses to be responsible betrays an ―inner self-contempt,‖ blaming others for his suffering, 
and/or attributing it substantially to misfortune (BGE 21). This is the ―fatalism of  the weak-
willed,‖ who imagine themselves to be at the mercy of  both external forces and aspects of 
themselves that they claim they have no control over (BGE 21). Unfree will manifests a 
―weariness‖ that ―no longer wants to will,‖ and instead desires to be willed; therefore it creates 
―gods and hinterworlds‖ (Z, I, 3). It is a desire to obey rather than to command.  
 We have seen from the emphasis Nietzsche places on cultivating character that the great 
man learns to determine himself, rather than merely react to stimulus. In a passage in Nietzsche 
Contra Wagner, he suggests that Wagner lacked free will, and thus merely translated his physiology 
into his work. This suggests that the weaker a man is, the less he is likely to have learnt to 
cultivate free will: 
 
He was not the ―defective,‖ ―ill-fated,‖ ―contradictory‖ genius that people have declared 
him to be. Wagner was something complete, he was a typical décadent, in whom every sign 
of  ―free will‖ was lacking, in whom every feature was necessary. If  there is anything at all 
of  interest in Wagner, it is the consistency with which a critical physiological condition 
may convert itself, step by step, conclusion after conclusion, into a method, a form of 
procedure, a reform of  all principles, a crisis in taste. (CW 7) 
 
In On the Twilight of  the Idols Nietzsche associates unfreedom with ugliness, and this in turn 
signifies ―degeneration‖: ―Every token of  exhaustion, of  heaviness, of  age, of  weariness, every 
kind of  unfreedom, whether convulsive or paralytic, above all  the smell, colour and shape of 
dissolution, of  decomposition, though it be attenuated to the point of  being no more than a 
symbol - all this calls forth the same reaction, the value judgement ‗ugly‘‖ (TI IX, 20). He closely 
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associates the appearance of  unfreedom here with exhaustion since both are bound up with the 
inability to will and a lack of  unity, reflecting ‗dissolution‘ and ‗decomposition.‘ Downplaying 
one‘s freedom by emphasising ―constraint,‖ ―compulsion‖ etc, manifests the desire to project 
blame onto external persons or forces (BGE 21). It matters little whether he situates the blame in 
aspects of  himself  that he apparently cannot control ( i.e., genes or chemical processes) or in 
elements of  himself  that are ‗conditioned‘ by circumstance. It is a question of  what we choose 
to emphasise, and we should determine this by the effect it is likely to have on us. Submitting to 
external forces is the worst attitude to suffering and one‘s insufficiencies possible, since it closes 
off  the possibility of  improving oneself. It is the willing victim‘s bad faith, and he is likely to pay 
for the momentary anaesthetizing of  his displeasure with future increase of  his suffering. This 
increase is due to a number of  related factors, all of  which stem from him deceiving himself  and 
refusing to admit his complicity in suffering: First, he does not address and deal with any 
problem as it appears; second, he does not develop any of  the capacities central to achieving 
Nietzsche‘s idea of  joy, because of  his failure to develop an authentic relation with his suffering; 
third, he tends to project an unbalanced relation between his character and event (especially since 
he possesses little character), whereby he comes to see himself  defined, often negatively, by 
events that have simply ‗happened to him.‘ He therefore suffers from the past in a way that the 
man of  character does not - I will take up this theme of  suffering from the past later. 
To make sense of  the ideal Nietzschean self, we must recognise the ambiguity in his texts 
that stems from his desire to criticise the traditional idea of  the self, while nonetheless 
maintaining the aspects of  this self  which are still useful to his aims. We can resolve this 
ambiguity through our aim to highlight the normative aspect of  his writings on the self. Several 
of  the best Nietzsche commentators note and discuss this ambiguity, and criticise those who 
ignore one side of  it. In discussing the status of  the self, Henry Staten argues that Nietzsche 
attempts to engage in a radical project of  undermining the unified self, while at the same time he 
recognises that the feeling of  growth requires something akin to this self. On the one hand: ―he 
wants utterly to undo the substantial or essential presence of  a subject of  any kind, wants there 
to be left only waves of  will to power perpetually overflowing themselves,‖ and insists that the 
will to power is ―an affect, a feeling, pleasure, a pathos‖; this appears to undermine completely 
the ―notion of  an Einheit, the unified self-identical singularity of  the individual, (that) is the core 
of  the substantialist metaphysics he criticizes.‖151 On the other, ―he adds his ―nonetheless‖‖: 
opposition and overcoming require ―relatively, encroaching Einheiten.‖‖152 Staten points out that 
                                                                 
151 Staten, p. 124-6. 
152 Ibid., p 125. Staten is quoting WP 693. 
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the use of  ―relatively‖ here is a ―conceptual obscurity,‖ since even a ―purely relative Einheit can 
be thought only in terms of  some boundary of  identity,‖ and ―if  there is to be a sensation of  
growth, there must be a substratum of  change.‖153 Staten‘s discussion is extremely relevant to 
modern Nietzsche scholarship, because he correctly identifies that: ―Nietzsche scholarship 
constantly repeats as a self-evident item of  doctrine that there is no unified subject of  will to 
power, that will to power has to do with the play of  forces, that there is no relation between 
Nietzsche‘s ―will‖ and Schopenhauer‘s, and so on.‖ 154  In particular, he singles out 
―poststructuralist writers... Who commonly take for granted that Nietzsche utterly shatters the 
unity of  the self.‖155 We might also add that there is also a tendency that runs in the opposite 
direction, towards completely ignoring Nietzsche‘s apparent criticisms of  the unified self. Staten 
closes his illuminating discussion by concluding that he is not primarily interested in debating the 
cogency of  Nietzsche‘s doctrines,‖ and leaves it at that.156 Staten is certainly correct to argue that: 
―Nietzsche wants to have it both ways‖;157 the idea of  the Will is his attempt to construct a 
narrative for thinking about oneself that avoids the problems that he identifies with the 
traditional unity of  the self, whilst retaining, and maximising, the feeling of  self.  
As we have already seen Staten point out, there are clear ambiguities in Nietzsche‘s texts 
surrounding the unity or disunity of  the self, and he echoes these in comments he makes about 
the Will‘s freedom. He was surely aware of  these ambiguities, but does little to reconcile them 
explicitly. In an excellent recent essay, Christopher Janaway clearly captures this ambiguity, by 
describing the tension that exists between what he calls Nietzsche‘s ―official position‖ - 
proclaiming that the unified subject is a fiction - and the assumptions that lie beneath many of  
Nietzsche‘s positive appraisals of  ideas.158 For Janaway, Nietzsche claims an official position, that 
a multiplicity of  drives and affects compose the self, and seize control of  a consciousness that 
has little autonomy over them. However, as I have already noted, Nietzsche entirely undermines 
this when he discusses the creative man, who is able to work creatively on the structure of  his 
drives. Janaway is right to suggest that when Nietzsche positively describes great men this 
completely fail to fit with his apparent criticisms of  the unified self:  
 
But I have to be, in my own self-conception, a sufficiently unified self  that I can ‗take 
sides‘ between the various drives that (though I did not originally will them) I find within 
                                                                 
153 Ibid., p. 125. 
154 Ibid., p. 125. 
155 Ibid., p. 127. 
156 Ibid., p. 129. 
157 Ibid., p. 127. 
158 Janaway, p. 55. 
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myself. Likewise, it is not just that each of the affects I find within myself  has a goal of 
its own, but rather that I have a goal in pursuit of  which I can flexibly use the affects I 
feel. When Nietzsche is thinking of  his ideal, creatively evaluating, perspectivally 
knowing individual, he freely imbues this individual with the status of  a unified, self-
conscious, autonomous subject, in a way that fails to mesh comfortably with his 
eliminativist description of  what the individual amounts to ‗in reality‘.159 
 
Janaway‘s clear account of  the apparent discrepancies between these two positions  is a useful 
one, which should have an extremely positive effect on Nietzsche scholarship, which has so often 
failed to account for both of  these elements of  his thought. It has significant implications for the 
debate over Nietzsche and freedom. Nietzsche designs his ‗official position,‘ that a struggle 
between a multiplicity of  drives and their affects comprises the self, to introduce contingency 
into the structure of  the self, and to shatter what he interprets as the illusion of  a mind detached 
from the body‘s operations, ignorant of  physiology. Yet rather than weakening a man‘s freedom, 
he actually intends to increase his freedom, in that he now becomes responsible for the kind of 
narratives (simple cause and effect) that he imposes onto the complex cause and effect of  his 
inner life. In Janaway‘s detailed analysis of  the figure of  the ‗sovereign individual‘ of  On the 
Genealogy of  Morals, it is clear that the great man imagines himself  as free, as possessing a 
powerful will, and as master of  himself. It is worth quoting this passage at length, as it 
summarises concisely many of  the aspects of  the man to whom Nietzsche wants us to aspire:  
 
Civilization begins with the proposition ‗any custom is better than no custom‘, and 
tradition is a ‗higher authority that one obeys [ . . . ] because it commands‘ (D 16, 9). Yet 
the end-product or ‗fruit‘ of  this whole constraining process is an individual ‗resembling 
only himself ‘, having the capacity to be ‗free again from the morality of custom‘, to have 
an ‗independent [ . . . ] will‘ and be ‗autonomous‘. Nietzsche says much in a short space 
here, perhaps grasping for a vocabulary that will capture his insights. The sovereign 
individual's will is ‗free‘, ‗his own‘, ‗independent‘, ‗long‘, and ‗unbreakable‘; and in virtue 
of  this will the sovereign individual is permitted to promise, has ‗mastery over himself ‘, 
has his own standard of value, is permitted to say ‗yes‘ to himself, and has a 
consciousness of  his ‗superiority‘ and ‗completion‘. To be permitted to make promises, 
one must not only be minimally capable of promising but have the power to fulfil one's 
promises and the integrity to promise only what one genuinely has the will to do. This 
suggests a kind of self-knowledge in which one is properly conscious of  what it is that 
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one wills, and confident of the consistency with which one's will is going to maintain 
itself  intact until the moment at which it can be delivered upon.160 
 
Janaway suggest that Nietzsche offers a complex account that reflects his constant ambiguity, 
which eschews both the absolutey free will of  the metaphysical subject and the notion of  a 
completely unfree will. He concludes that, contra many commentators, Nietzsche‘s writings 
cannot make sense without at least some notion of  creative agency:  
 
The latter step of becoming free from the inherited values of  morality requires, I argue, 
the conception of  oneself  as deciding, choosing, and trying as a genuine agent. Such 
genuine agency does not require that one be a neutral subject of  free will that has 
unlimited possibility of  action unconstrained by character and the causal order. In that 
sense there is no free will. But it does require, as Nietzsche says, that we rid ourselves of 
the other myth, that of  the total unfreedom of the will. So it is wrong to think that 
Nietzsche wishes to exclude creative agency from his picture of  humanity, because 
without it his proposed critique of  moral values and his project of  learning to think and 
feel in healthier ways would make little sense.161 
 
This is a limited conclusion, since I think it should be clear to anyone who reads Nietzsche 
clearly that he subscribes to something in between the neutral subject of  free will and total 
unfreedom of  the will. I want to go further than this and claim that we can distinguish between 
the roles played by the official position and Nietzsche‘s writings on how the great man thinks 
about himself, and submit the former to the latter. This relieves the tension between these 
positions. Firstly, we can explain Nietzsche‘s ‗official position‘ as an attempt to illustrate that the 
inner life is comprised of  a complex cause and effect which we lack the means (and should lack 
the desire) to designate accurately. Secondly, all of  Nietzsche‘s writings that address how we 
should think about ourselves consistently emphasise the importance of  the coherent, unified self 
that is encapsulated in the idea of  the strong Will. I think it is implicit in Nietzsche‘s overall 
project that the idea of  how one should think about oneself  is far more important than truth 
claims about how free or unfree the will is. There is therefore no necessary tension between the 
official position and the assumed position, because the former is a way of  bringing all established 
positions into question, whereas the latter concerns how the great man should interpret himself.  
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Once we put this normative element at the centre of  our analysis we must establish an 
idea of  free will that can accomplish what Nietzsche desires, in terms of  self-interpretation, 
while avoiding the negative repercussions of  the will as faculty.  Nietzsche comes up with an idea 
of  the Will which he thinks expresses the most beneficial ways of  thinking about oneself. The 
fundamental point is that the idea of  the Will should include all aspects of  the process of 
thinking and acting, not just the end result:  ―The old word ‗will‘ only serves to designate a 
resultant, a kind of  individual reaction which necessarily follows a host of  partly contradictory, 
partly congruous stimuli - the will no longer ‗effects‘ anything, no longer ‗moves anything...‖ (AC 
14). He intends his idea of  the Will to be a more comprehensive account of  the body‘s relations, 
which goes further than the over-simplistic idea of  the will as a faculty: ―in all willing there is, 
first of  all, a plurality of  sensations, namely the sensation of  the condition we leave, the sensation 
of  the condition towards which we go, the sensation of  the ‗leaving‘ and ‗going‘ itself, and then 
also an accompanying muscular sensation‖ (BGE 19). He collapses distinctions between mental 
acts into the manifestation of  one grand will: the will to power is: ―one will that is inherent in all 
events‖ (WP 675/KSA 13:11[96]). He reinterprets ―Purposes, ―aims,‖ and ―meanings‖ as 
―modes of  expression‖ and ―metamorphoses‖ of  this underlying will (WP 675/KSA 13:11[96]). 
This does not devalue purposes, aims and meanings; on the contrary, the ability to form and 
possess them – to create them – signals the presence of  a powerful will. Their importance 
derives from their role as symbols of  the force that they express.  Nietzsche‘s indicates his 
attitude towards the idea of  a unity of  the self  when he discusses the ‗soul hypothesis‘; he 
confides, ―Between ourselves, it is not at all necessary... To get rid of  ‗the soul‘ itself  and thus 
forgo one of  the oldest and most venerable of  hypotheses‖ (BGE 12). Rather than destroy a 
useful idea, he suggests experimenting with ―new forms and refinements‖ (BGE 12). I think that 
exactly the same is true for the hypothesis of  the unified self; just as he transfigures the formerly 
intact soul into ―mortal soul,‖ ―soul as multiplicity of  the subject,‖ or ―soul as social structure of  
the drives and emotions,‖ he makes the same kind of  conceptual transformation on the unity of  
the self  (BGE 12). 
 Sometimes he describes this Will as producing a unity of  the self, and sometimes in 
opposition to the type of  unity involved in the idea of  will as a faculty; he is most content, 
however, to describe this multiplicity as a regency:  
 
It all depends on the proper characterization of  the unity that comprises thinking, 
willing, feeling and all the affects: clearly the intellect is only a tool, but in whose hands? 
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In the hands of  the affects certainly: and these are a multiplicity behind which is not 
necessary to posit a unity: it suffices to conceive the multiplicity as a regency.162 
 
In conceiving of  the self  thus, Nietzsche attempts to rid self-image of  the worst excesses that he 
associates with the idea of  the unity of  the self, viz., rejecting and ignoring the body, projecting 
pseudo-psychological and spiritual accounts of  suffering, and overemphasising rationality. This is 
what at stake when he denies the traditional notion of  unity. In complicating the idea of  unity of  
the self  Nietzsche certainly emphasises that willing is complex, but this does not mean that he 
praises the disorganised self, a non-unified self, or chaos; it is, instead, his way of  restating the 
image of  the self  in such a way that enhances the feeling of  self, and the feeling of  growth (since 
he believes that these two ideas are identical).  
 He links the feeling of  growth to the feeling of  commanding. Conceiving of  the self  as a 
‗regency‘ does not detract from this pathos of  commanding, because interpreting the body as a 
―structure composed of  many souls‖ enables the agent to add the ―under-wills‖ of  ―under-
souls‖ to the sensation of  pleasure he feels as ―commander.‖ ―What happens here is what 
happens in every well-constructed and happy commonwealth: the ruling class identifies itself 
with the success of  the commonwealth‖ (BGE 19). The important aspect is not determining 
exact relations between affects, but the belief  that ―a man who wills - commands something in 
himself  which obeys or which he believes obeys‖ (BGE 19). Whether it obeys or whether he 
believes it obeys is immaterial; the sensation is all. A man believing in the Will as multiplicity believes 
that he commands himself  in all aspects. Nietzsche prescribes this to express the complex 
interplay between drives and thoughts, where we cannot separate the two or oppose them to one 
another. If  the traditional idea of  the unity of  the self  involves feeling that one commands one‘s 
actions, then Nietzsche‘s idea of  the self  goes further so that one commands one‘s Will, and thus 
identifies oneself  with the success of  all the body‘s processes.  
In The Will to Power, Nietzsche identifies free will as a fundamentally antireligious idea, 
prior to religious forces misappropriating it: ―The theory of  ―free will‖ is antireligious. It seeks to 
create the right for man to think of  himself  as cause of  his exalted state and actions: it is a form 
of  the growing feeling of  pride‖ (WP 288/KSA 13:14[126]).) At the outset of  this theory, a man 
―feels his power,‖ and assumes that: ―there must be ―will‖ behind this state - otherwise it would 
not be his‖ (WP 288/KSA 13:14[126]). At the outset, he links believing in the freedom of  his 
will to having pride over his actions, and a feeling of  power over oneself  as  cause. Nietzschean 
scholarship consistently tends to underestimate the importance of  this feeling of  pride, which 
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relates closely to the feeling of  growth, since they are both underscored by the idea that one is 
responsible for one‘s action or thought. Nietzsche‘s criticisms of  the idea begin when the weak, 
and their moral leader, the priest, co-opt the idea and place it on the side of  the will to punish 
and the desire to make men feel guilty. We can contrast this with the particular idea of  the 
freedom of  will he caricatures in On the Genealogy of  Morals, where he discusses it as a tool the 
weak use to justify their weakness as freely chosen; this also conceals their urge to punish the ―birds 
of  prey‖ who fail to suffer from this inability to act. Nietzsche argues similarly when he 
apparently denounces the idea of  free will in Twilight of  the Idols titled ―The error of  free will.‖ He 
unveils ‗free will‘ as ―the most infamous of  all the arts of  the theologian for making mankind 
‗accountable in his sense of  the word, that is to say for making mankind dependent on him‖ (TI VI, 
7). He invents free will for the purpose of  ―finding guilty‖ and of  thereby inflicting 
―punishment.‖ ―Men were thought of  as ‗free‘ so that they could become guilty: consequently, 
every action had to be thought of  as willed, the origin of  every action as lying in the 
consciousness‖ (TI VI, 7). While commentators frequently use these sections to try to 
demonstrate that Nietzsche objects to the idea of  free will, the point of  these passages  is to 
criticise some of  the uses that idea has been put to; in particular, its role in concealing the desire 
to punish and in transforming ressentiment into punishment. Given that he emphasises the role that 
free will plays in helping the priest and the herd achieve their goals, this does not constitute a 
criticism of  free will per se. On the contrary, he suggests that believing in the freedom of  one‘s 
will, at least in a certain form, is a crucial aspect of  greatness. Addressing the ―normative 
dimension‖ of  Nietzsche‘s account of  free will, Gemes argues that Nietzsche, like Kant,  sees 
―something valuable‖ in the ―actual imperative to exercise agency free will, to be an agent rather 
than a mere cog in the causal network.‖163 
Nietzsche expresses the Will‘s most important aspects in the following passage:  
 
Enough, he who wills believes with a tolerable degree of  certainty that will and action 
are somehow one - he attributes the success, the carrying out of the willing, to the will 
itself, and thereby enjoys an increase of  that sensation of  power which all success brings 
with it. ‗Freedom of  will‘ - is the expression for that complex condition of  pleasure of 
the person who wills, who commands and at the same time identifies himself  with the 
executor of the command - who as such also enjoys the triumph over resistances 
involved but who thinks it was his will itself  which overcame these resistances. (BGE 19) 
                                                                 
163 Ken Gemes, ‗Nietzsche on Free Will, Autonomy, and the Sovereign Individual‘, Nietzsche on Freedom and 
Autonomy, edited by Ken Gemes and Simon May 2010, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009, p. 46-7. 
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Nietzsche here credits belief  in the Will with enjoying the triumph over resistances that he 
identifies as the basis for experiencing authentic joy. As I have already discussed, the ascetic‘s 
‗top-heavy‘ structure strangles this resistance because he tyrannises over his drives, reinforcing a 
conflict between his mind and his body, between Being and Becoming, between reason and his 
drives, that destroys all hope of  harmony. In contrast, the great man maintains nuanced layers of  
resistance, and identifies himself  with mastery over a whole host of  subtle tensions. He 
constantly harmonises powerful drives into a successful whole: 
 
The free man is a warrior. - How is freedom measured, in individuals as in nations? By 
the resistance which has to be overcome, by the effort it costs to stay aloft. One would 
have to seek the highest type of free man where the great resistance is constantly being 
overcome: five steps away from tyranny, near the threshold of  the danger of  servitude. 
(TI IX, 38) 
 
The idea of  ‗freedom of  will‘ in its most positive manifestation is identifying oneself  as the 
commander of  oneself. The will to power expresses itself  most highly in the one who interprets his 
body as a hierarchical structure of  commanding and obeying, which he cannot reduce to the idea 
of  will as merely a faculty, but which includes the sensation of  power accompanied by 
conceiving of  himself  as the ruler of  his whole body. In some of  Nietzsche‘s highest praise he 
suggests that Goethe cultivate the ability to conceive of  himself  as totality; his foremost strength 
is that he strives to overcome the separation of  aspects of  himself: ―What he aspired to was 
totality; he strove against the separation of  reason, sensuality, feeling, will... He disciplined himself 
to a whole, he created himself‖ (TI IX, 49). The other most striking part of  his description of 
Goethe is that, while Nietzsche conceives of  him as refusing to be severed from life - ―he placed 
himself  within it; nothing could discourage him and he took as much as possible upon himself, 
above himself, within himself‖ - this has nothing in common with the loss of  self  that the 
plunge into Becoming involves, but is predicated upon the fact that he ―surrounded himself  with 
nothing but closed horizons‖ (TI IX, 49). It is the strength of  his self-created character, his 
―keeping himself  in check and having reverence for himself,‖ that enables him to dare ―to allow 
himself  the whole compass and wealth of  naturalness‖ (TI IX, 49). It is his power over himself 
that increases his scope to assimilate more experience without being overwhelmed and allowing 
himself  to be willed. It is the strong and powerful Will that permits one access to the strange and 
terrifying aspects of  existence.  
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Apart from the issue of  placing the idea of  free will in the service of  the will to punish, 
it is not clear that we can easily distinguish between the free will of  the slave of  the Genealogy and 
the free will of  the great man. The slave‘s adoption of  the idea of  free will is not necessarily 
disingenuous (i.e., concealing a desire to punish), since it can also be a strategy to engineer pride 
in himself. Accordingly, the arguments in favour of  assuming the freedom of  one‘s will - joy in 
commanding, pride in one‘s successes, ability to cultivate one‘s will and self-create - can very well 
apply equally to the slave‘s adoption of  free will; in assuming the mantle (and rhetoric) of  
freedom of  the will, the slave assumes the central narrative that underpins self-creation and 
overcoming. This is but one of  the many nuances that destroy any attempt to bestow unreserved 
praise on the noble of  the Genealogy, and unreserved condemnation on the slave.164 Assuming 
free will is a pivotal moment in enhancing the feeling of  self, and ultimately to achieving æsthetic 
enjoyment of  oneself as perfection, a more refined and cultivated joy than that the noble of  the 
Genealogy enjoys, whose will to power not only lacks subtlety, but is, as Nietzsche is keen to point 
out, rendered completely impossible by societal life. Nietzsche identifies a link between greatness 
and believing that one‘s Will is free, arguing that this link is consistently underestimated by those 
who desire to believe that greatness relates to ―faith‖:  
 
Systematic falsification of  great human beings, the great creators, the great epochs; one 
desires that faith should be the distinguishing mark of  the great: but slackness, 
scepticism, ―immorality,‖ the right to throw off a faith, belong to greatness (Caesar, also 
Homer, Aristophanes, Leonardo, Goethe). One always suppresses the main thing, their 
―freedom of  will.‖ (WP 380/KSA 12:9[157]) 
 
Now that we have an account of  a fuller and more comprehensive account of  the Will, 
we can better understand the specific notion of  responsibility that Nietzsche employs. As with 
the idea of  free will, Nietzsche‘s criticisms of  the traditional idea of  the self  are often said to 
undermine the idea of  responsibility. McIntyre, for example, makes denying responsibility central 
to his analysis of  the Nietzschean self. In fact, in analysing Nietzsche‘s critique of  morality, 
which he understands as the ―denaturalisation of  morality,‖ or morality as a tool for revenging 
oneself  on nature, criticising the subject derives from the need to deny responsibility: ―first, the 
critique of  morality as anti-nature is fundamentally the critique of  the idea of  responsibility; 
                                                                 
164 While we cannot criticise the slave‘s adoption of  the idea of  free will out of  hand, there are many 
other factors which separate him from the great man. Not least, he creates his values reactively, which 
clearly implies a lack of  character and an inability to resist stimulus (GM 22).  
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second, it entails the critique of  the subject presupposed by the idea of  responsibility.‖165 For 
McIntyre, responsibility is Nietzsche‘s real enemy, and since it ―presupposes free will,‖ and this in 
turn presupposes ―the transformation of  every action into a deed and a doer who is the free 
author of  the deed,‖ we can only criticise it by attacking this idea of  the subject that it 
(apparently) depends on.166 Instead of  the traditional subject, McIntyre insists that we must have 
―the unconditional unfreedom of  the will,‖ replacing morality with ―necessity‖ by taking ―the 
doer back into the deed.‖167 He picks up on Nietzsche‘s phrase ―the innocence of  becoming,‖ 
and argues that we achieve this innocence through a ―newly redeemed, wholly decentred, 
absolute difference‖ (which is apparently also the meaning of  the will to power).168 McIntyre 
often appeals to concepts in this way, using them in a vague way and leaving it entirely unclear 
what it actually means to think about oneself  in this way. What can it possibly mean to imagine 
oneself  as ‗absolute difference‘ or ‗wholly decentred‘? Arguments of  this kind consistently fail to 
realise the extent that Nietzsche both criticises one use of  an idea, but nonetheless recognises that 
this idea can be valuable for interpreting oneself. McIntyre completely misses the possibility that 
Nietzsche could be critical of  some of  the uses to which the idea of  responsibility is put, and 
nonetheless retain it in another form. In fact, Nietzsche proposes a greater sphere of 
responsibility as one of  the most important narratives for thinking about oneself.  
Experiencing the feeling of  growth and overcoming resistance depends upon identifying 
with one‘s successes, and for this to be true, we must believe ourselves to be responsible for what 
we are and what we do. I have already suggested that responsibility is the correct approach to 
suffering: since a man‘s suffering intensifies and multiples when he fails to take responsibility for 
his suffering, he can best correct this by assuming responsibility wherever possible. The idea is 
that the best attitude to adopt towards oneself  is to refuse to project the blame onto either 
external forces, or onto aspects of  the self  that one believes that one cannot control. It is 
becoming clear how this functions through the idea of  the Will: I identify with my Will, which 
includes the multiplicity of  affects that make up thinking, feeling, etc.; I assume the role of  a 
commander, a regent, who commands and assumes responsibility for the individual aspects of 
the body, wherever this is possible - Nietzsche thus summarises freedom as ―the will to self-
responsibility‖ (TI IX, 38). 
The Will‘s desire to determine itself  is bound up with an ethos of  assuming 
responsibility for what one is. The very idea of  self-creation presupposes that one is responsible 
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for what one does, but also that what one thinks and does meaningfully affects and shapes what 
one is. Establishing this point is crucial, because while commentators often take Nietzsche‘s 
apparent denial of  the unity of  the self  to diminish the importance of  responsibility, I have been 
arguing that taking responsibility by recognising one‘s complicity in suffering is the foremost 
remedy for the problems of  exhaustion, resentment, and a host of  others problems, both 
physiological and psychological. When we deny responsibility for our suffering, we strip 
ourselves of  the means to combat it. Coherence, then, depends on reconciling the assumption 
of  responsibility with the idea of  the Will, the self ‘s central narrative.  
Nietzsche goes further than the idea that one is responsible for one‘s immediate actions, 
and interprets this as only one aspect of  a wider project of  becoming responsible. One assumes 
responsibility for the state and conditions of  one‘s Will as a whole. In suggesting this Nietzsche 
radically extends the use of  the idea of  responsibility, rather than diminishing it. The problem 
with the way in which the concept of  responsibility is used, when tied to the idea of  the will as 
the product of  a faculty, is that it is restricted by the ―naive‖ belief  that one only causes what one 
has intentionally willed: ―The entire theory of  responsibility depends upon the naive psychology 
that the only cause is will and that one must be aware of  having willed in order to believe in 
oneself as cause‖ (WP 288/KSA 13:14[126]). Such a theory opens up the possibility that wherever 
one can claim one is not aware of  having willed, then one cannot clearly identify oneself  as the 
cause. Nietzsche‘s suspects that, perhaps counter-intuitively, the weak can transform the will as a 
faculty into an excuse for blaming what they do on unconscious acts, or other forces that are 
expressed through one, and so on. Such a man only claims responsibility for that which he can 
clearly recall consciously willing (if  even that). Nietzsche‘s move is to suggest that one should 
make oneself  into one‘s will, becoming inseparable from it, by identifying oneself  with it. This 
elides the problem of  which actions and thoughts one is responsible for, since one takes 
responsibility for the whole process. On this point, as in many other places, Nietzsche is clearly 
influenced by Emerson, who wrote: ―There can be no driving force except through the 
conversion of  the man into his will, making him the will, and the will him... The one serious and 
formidable thing in nature is a will. Society is servile from want of  will, and therefore the world 
wants saviours and religions.‖169  Our Will is not given; we establish its relative strength or 
weakness through our habits, and thus we are responsible for cultivating it. Nietzsche interprets 
actions and thoughts as manifestations of  the underlying Will. Both the act of  taking 
responsibility and the feeling that it produces are central to the highest forms of  self-development. 
It is a ―sign of  nobility: never to think of  degrading our duties into duties for everybody; not to 
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want to relinquish or share our own responsibilities; to count our privileges and the exercising of  
them among our duties‖ (BGE 272).  
 Responsibility constitutes a narrative in itself  ( i.e., a specific way of  conceptualising one‘s 
relation to oneself), but it is also the narrative that underpins all other narratives, since a man 
cannot enter into self-creation without first assuming that the idea of  the process itself  is viable. 
Thus it is not only an act of  self-creation, but the belief  that makes the very process of  self-
creation possible. This is a more complex notion of  responsibility, which eludes simple 
characterisation. For instance, I will establish that Nietzsche attempts to downplay the degree of  
power that any individual event is allowed to exert over a man, instead shifting his emphasis away 
from individual events and onto overall character.  
We must understand all of  this through Nietzsche‘s fundamental contention that 
thought‘s quality connects intrinsically with physiological states. When responsibility depends 
upon a strict idea of  will as faculty, then every effect physiology has on thoughts seems to 
undermine the possibility of  this responsibility. In other words, if  we conceive of  will as a faculty 
this makes it impossible to allow for physiological states to affect our perception, whilst still 
believing that we are responsible. It should be clear, however, that once a man believes in his Will 
in the all-encompassing Nietzschean sense, it is possible for him both to account for physiology‘s 
effects while still believing that he is responsible. He is no longer merely responsible for what he 
does, but also for what he is, including the fluctuating physiological states themselves . For example, if  we 
conceive of  responsibility narrowly, then it might be objected that Nietzsche‘s emphasis on 
exhaustion‘s effects on thought undermines a man‘s ability to be responsible for his actions; 
however once we accept that he is responsible for creating himself  and developing as a whole, 
then it is obvious that he is always responsible for his exhaustion, and thus, once more, for each 
individual action. The great man takes responsibility for ensuring that he does not become 
exhausted, and, when this is unavoidable, he takes responsibility for making sure that he does not 
allow this exhaustion to manifest itself  in values and actions.  
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III 
 
 
Conquering the Past and Rejecting the Eternal Return 
 
 
 
A full and powerful soul not only copes with painful, even terrible losses, deprivations, robberies, insults; it emerges 
from such hells with a greater fullness and powerfulness. (WP 1030/KSA 12:7[39]) 
 
 A central narrative of  Nietzsche‘s great man concerns the attitude he adopts to the/his 
past. I noted in establishing the Will‘s primacy that the chapter ―On Redemption‖ establishes that it 
is crucial to become the kind of  being that can will. The rest of  the chapter discusses the 
problem of  the relationship between the Will and the past. The fundamental problem he 
identifies with will-theory generally is that the will is apparently powerless to alter the past. ―‗It 
was‘: thus is called the will‘s gnashing of  teeth and loneliest misery. Impotent against that which 
has been - it is an angry spectator of  everything past. The will cannot will backward; that it 
cannot break time and time‘s greed - that is the will‘s loneliest misery‖ (Z, II, 20). The Will‘s 
antipathy towards time and the past, derived from its fixity, is the essence of  ―the spirit of 
revenge,‖ which is the guise ressentiment appears in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: ―Thus the will, the 
liberator, became a doer of  harm; and on everything that is capable of  suffering it avenges itself 
for not being able to go back‖ (Z, II, 20). We solve this formulation of  the problem of  the spirit 
of  revenge by transforming the ―It was‖ into ―thus I willed it!‖ (Z, II, 20).  
In discussing responsibility I made it clear that Nietzsche‘s focus is less on any individual 
thought or action‘s worth, and more on cultivating a feeling of  responsibility for all that one is; in 
particular, creating oneself  in such a way as to develop character. We do not define character by 
any one particular deed, but by the grand sum of  all that one is; ―that is to say... The order of  
rank the innermost drives of  his nature stand in relative to one another‖ (BGE 6). In identifying 
nobility, individual actions are unreliable indicators of  possessing character: ―It is not his actions 
which reveal him - actions are always ambiguous, always unfathomable -; neither is it his ‗works‘‖ 
(BGE 287). Nietzsche is again influenced by Emerson on the relationship between character and 
the event. The presence of  character makes for ―an overpowering present,‖ which ―dulls the 
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impression of  particular events."170 This occurs both from the outsider‘s perspective: ―When we 
see the conqueror we do not think much of  any one battle or success. We see that we had 
exaggerated the difficulty it was easy to him,‖ and extends to the effects that events have on the 
self: ―The great man is not convulsible or tormentable: events pass  over to him without much 
impression.‖171 This is entirely congruent with the idea that character develops by cultivating the 
ability not to react. No single event is allowed to overwhelm this kind of  strength of  character, 
because of  the Will‘s supreme confidence in itself.  
The great man holds himself  responsible for all of  his thoughts, for all of  his deeds, and 
for his suffering. Yet he does not take any one particular event too seriously. Both of  these aspects are 
vital: the former is essential to enable him to identify the causes of  his suffering accurately and 
thus guard against it multiplying and intensifying; the latter is crucial so that he does not suffer 
from the past, or be paralyzed by former events, and in doing so avoids debilitating self-loathing. 
With the two aspects in place, he strikes a balance which makes a productive introspection 
possible, enhancing his future possibilities rather than limiting them. A man‘s character 
contextualises any deed that he performs. Zarathustra criticises the ―pale criminal‖ for entering 
into a relationship with his deed whereby he allows the deed to define him ―He was equal to his 
deed when he committed it, but he could not bear its image once he had done it. From then on 
he always saw himself  as the doer of  one deed. I call this madness: the exception reversed itself 
to the essence‖ (Z, I, 6). Nietzsche offers one explanation for this over-concentration on one 
deed when he argues that introspection tends to focus on the consequences of  a particular 
action rather than its cause, because every deed with unusual consequences tends to produce a 
―spiritual disturbance,‖ which gives the individual deed a significance to the doer which it should 
not actually possess: ―the iniquitous interest that society may have in treating our entire existence 
from a single point of  view, as if  its meaning lay in bringing forth one single deed, should not 
infect the doer himself  - unfortunately this happens almost all the time. This stems from the fact 
that spiritual disturbance follows every deed with unusual consequence, whether these 
consequences are good or ill‖ (WP 225/KSA 13:11[365]). The mistake, as always, is emphasising 
the consequences over the cause: exceptional consequences do not necessarily tell the doer 
anything about the causes of  the deed, and thus very little about himself  that he could not 
determine from other deeds with less dramatic consequences. When cowardice produces a man‘s 
everyday deeds, routines and habits, this should be far more of  a problem than when one of  his 
deeds produces novel consequences.  
                                                                 
170 Emerson, ‗Circles‘, Essays, p. 225. 
171 Ibid., p. 225. 
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Nietzsche identifies suffering from any particular aspect of  the past as an ―illness‖: ―This 
reopening of  old wounds, this wallowing in self-contempt and contrition, is one more illness‖ 
(WP 233/KSA 13:14[155]). The spirit of  revenge‘s emergence is, however, rooted in assuming 
the stability of  the deed and the past event. The limit that Nietzsche imposes on the possibility 
of  self-knowledge – centred on recognising that the workings of  the inner life are subject 
to complex cause and effect – effectively undermines precisely this stability. The great man 
forges a new relationship with his deed, empowering his Will to confront the inviolability of  the 
past, and killing the spirit of  revenge. Imposing Nietzsche‘s idea of  the Will onto complex cause 
and effect functions as a creative synthesis: a shaping, plastic, generative force. The meaning of  
the past is not given, but exists as ―fragment‖: ―All ‗it was‘ is a fragment, a riddle, a grisly accident 
- until the creating will says to it: ‗But I will it thus! I shall will it thus!‘‖ (Z, II, 20). Recognising 
the complex cause and effect involved in every deed and thought means giving up on the idea of  
accurately reconstructing or remembering their causes. If  we must  interpret the details of  the past 
then this means giving up on the idea of  consistency. Nietzsche‘s thought here again exhibits a 
striking parallel with Emerson‘s, who wrote: ―A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of  little 
minds... With consistency a great soul has simply nothing to do.‖172 Reinterpreting the past is not 
only necessary but also desirable: ―It seems to be a rule of  wisdom never to rely on your 
memory along, scarcely even in acts of  pure memory, but to bring the past for judgement into 
the thousand-eyed present, and live ever in a new day.‖173 Zarathustra rejects consistency in 
exactly the same way when a disciple asks his reasons for an opinion he (apparently) held: 
 
―Why?‖ said Zarathustra. ―You ask why? I do not belong to those whose Why may be 
questioned.  
Is my experience of  yesterday? It has been a long time since I experienced the reasons 
of  my opinions.  
Would I not have to be a keg of  memory if  I were also to have my reasons with me? 
It is already too much for me to keep my own opinions, and many a bird flies away. (Z, 
II, 17) 
 
True overcoming and health does not consist in being able to feel well despite the past, but occurs 
when the great man subsumes individual events into the personal narrative that constitutes his 
history; Emerson writes: ―True conquest is the causing the calamity to fade and disappear as an 
                                                                 
172 Emerson, ‗Self-Reliance‘, p. 39. 
173 Ibid., p. 39. 
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early cloud of  insignificant result in a history so large and advancing.‖ 174 Nietzsche echoes these 
thoughts precisely: the stronger a man‘s character and history, the less significant he tends to 
interpret any particular deed or event to be; ―The stronger the innermost roots of  a man‘s nature, 
the more readily will he be able to assimilate and appropriate the things of  the past‖ (UM II, 1). 
He concerns himself  less with the outcome of  a particular action and more with the process, 
because his interest lies in ensuring the strength of  his character, and guarding against becoming 
a ―mere reagent‖ (EH II, 8). His character is not defined by events, but they become aspects of  his 
character. The great man‘s priority is subjecting much to his own volition, rather than 
emphasising any aspect where he might be dependent on circumstance. When the decadent loses 
his power to resist stimuli, he ―comes to be at the mercy of  accidents‖ (WP 44/KSA 13:17[6]), 
but the great man, in contrast, cultivates his character so that he depends less and less on 
circumstances; Emerson argues: ―The man must be so much, that he must make all 
circumstances indifferent.‖175 Nietzsche advocates a selective approach to events, where one still 
feels full pride over actions that succeed, but where one refuses to let oneself  be defined by 
events and actions deemed less successful. Part of  the story Nietzsche wants to tell about the 
attitude we should adopt to the past, then, follows logically from the process of  developing 
character. The stronger our character, the more we become immune to individual events. Once 
we loosen the grip we allow specific events to hold over us, we are freer to shape the past into a 
narrative that spurs us on to greatness.  
The second element, that completes this process of  being redeemed from the past, is 
inscribed into the process of  increasing energy itself, because Nietzsche interprets a plenitude of  
energy with a creative, healing power that allows one to overcome the insignificant, rather than 
suffer from it. In On the Uses and Disadvantages of  History for Life Nietzsche describes this as a 
―plastic power,‖ the absence of  which is directly related to suffering from the past: 
 
I mean by plastic power the capacity to develop out of  oneself  in one‘s own way, to 
transform and incorporate into one self  what is past and foreign, to heal wounds, to 
replace what has been lost, to recreate broken moulds. There are people who possess so 
little of  this power that they can perish from a single experience, from a single painful 
event, often and especially from a subtle piece of injustice, like a man bleeding to death 
from a scratch. (UM II, 1) 
 
                                                                 
174 Emerson, ‗Circles‘, Essays, p. 225. 
175 Emerson, ‗Self-Reliance‘, p. 42. 
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Because this power is synonymous with possessing surplus energy, Nietzsche is able to claim 
that: ―The entire practice of  psychological healing must be put back onto a physiological basis‖ 
(WP 233/KSA 13:14[155]). Taking individual past events too seriously is a symptom of  
weakness and exhaustion because it betrays a lack of  the creative, plastic power vital to 
overcoming misfortune. The ability to redeem the events of  the past is correspondingly a sign of  
health: ―One is healthy when one can laugh at the earnestness and zeal with which one has been 
hypnotized by any single detail of  our life, when one feels that the ‗bite‘ of  conscience is like a 
dog biting on a stone – when one is ashamed of  one‘s remorse‖ (WP 233/KSA 13:14[155]).  
Thus the stronger we make our character, the better an approach we can take to the 
problems of  the past, both because we turn our focus to character, rather than specific events, 
but also because our increasing energy enables us to heal more, rather than to dwell and fixate on 
minor painful memories. This process is slightly complicated by the argument I have already 
developed, that we must take responsibility for our suffering. This ensures that we must adopt at 
least a measure of  truthfulness towards our past, we cannot simply forget it, ignore it, because 
we must honestly appraise the extent to which we were complicit in our suffering. But this does 
not contradict the process I have been describing. The great man appraises his suffering, 
recognises and even emphasises where he is complicit in it, and then, drawing upon his resources, 
his depth of  character and his wealth of  energy, of  plastic healing power, he moves forward into 
the present.  
Contra to most Nietzschean scholarship, I have not discussed the eternal return in an 
attempt to resolve the problem of  the relationship between the will and the past.  This commonly 
drawn link is undoubtedly because of  the final lines of  ‗On Redemption,‘ where Zarathustra muses 
on the possibility of  something higher than ―reconciliation‖ with the past: ―and who taught it 
(the will) reconciliation with time, and what is higher than any reconciliation? That will which is 
the will to power must will something higher than any reconciliation (Z, II, 20). Laurence 
Lampert, for instance, writes: ―The conclusion implied, but not named, in Zarathustra‘s 
formulation of  the problem of  redemption is that the will to power that wills the past, and hence 
wills what is higher than all reconciliation, wills eternal return.‖176 I am satisfied with the idea that 
Zarathustra is in fact alluding to the eternal return. The problem is that commentators tend to 
get so caught up with this (likely) allusion that they neglect the aspects I have been discussing. 
Lampert, for example, argues that it is the eternal return that cures a man of  the desire to take 
revenge on the past: ―The teaching of  eternal return thus first comes to light as the teaching 
                                                                 
176 Laurence Lampert, Nietzsche‘s Teaching; An Interpretation of  Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Yale University Press, 
London, 1986, p. 147. 
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which solves the problem of  revenge against the unwillable past.‖177 The importance of  energy, 
of  cultivating character, of  strength of  will even, all tend to get ignored because of  the focus on 
the eternal return. My account has appealed to a long process of cultivating a strong Will, not a 
sudden transformation of our attitude to the past through the eternal return. Of course, if the 
idea of eternal return actually does solve problems such as the attitude of the will to the past, 
then this would at least be a consolation for all of Nietzsche‘s valuable arguments that 
commentators tend to ignore. Unfortunately, the whole idea of the eternal return is inadequate, 
and it is to this that we now turn.  
 
The Eternal Return of  the Same 
 
 Little to no consensus has been reached about the idea of  the eternal return. One of  the 
main reasons for this is that the idea is not only hugely underdeveloped in Nietzsche‘s writings, 
but, when he did attempt to write about it, he suggested a number of  different uses to which the 
idea could be put, without developing any of  them substantially. Several of  the best works on 
Nietzsche have chosen to ignore the eternal return almost entirely (Bataille‘s On Nietzsche) or at 
least ‗slight‘ it (Staten‘s Nietzsche‘s Voice).178 Hardly anyone disputes that it is an important idea in 
Nietzsche‘s thought.179 David Owen for example claims that: ―There seems to be little doubt that 
Nietzsche regarded the thought of  the eternal recurrence as the linchpin of  his mature thinking; 
however, there is considerable disagreement among Nietzsche‘s scholars as to the form and 
function of  this thought,‖ and that because of  this ―the need to situate the concept of  eternal 
recurrence with respect to the concepts of  will to power and the Overman becomes an 
important concern for any attempt to do justice to Nietzsche‘s thought.‖180 Likewise Lampert‘s 
Nietzsche‘s Teaching, one of  the few, and probably the most well-known, commentaries on Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, argues that Zarathustra is a ―guide to the interpretation of  eternal return,‖ that 
the concept supersedes the Übermensch, and that it is the ―most spiritual expression of  the will to 
power.‖181 Deleuze likewise argues that the will to power finds its highest form in the eternal 
return: ―The eternal return is the highest power, the synthesis of  affirmation which finds its 
                                                                 
177 Ibid., p. 147. 
178 Despite explicitly slighting the eternal return, Staten does discuss it briefly in his final chapter, and, 
characteristically, provides one of  the most meaningful contributions to be found in Nietzsche 
scholarship. 
179 I think we can probably put Bataille in this bracket (although he mentions it occasionally), but very few 
other authors. 
180 Owen, p. 111-2. 
181 Lampert, p. 260. 
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principle in the will.‖182 These are significant mistakes that impair many discussions. My main 
point will be that it is not such an important idea in Nietzsche‘s thought as almost everybody 
seems to think: it is not a cosmological or ontological truth, it is not the key to his thought, it 
should not be central to his legacy, and we should not try to explain the whole of  Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra as a book designed to explicate the idea - this myth is particularly damaging. Why 
discuss it then? Establishing why it is not as important as prevailing wisdom seems to think takes 
us right to the centre of  Nietzsche‘s thought, and means I must bring together all the claims I 
have made about his project and its goals. I will show that, as a narrative, it runs counter to a lot 
of  Nietzsche‘s most important claims, fails to fit in with the underlying spirit of  his thought, and 
that its true significance to him was as a personal thought that he never managed to elucidate 
properly or find a use for. I start by establishing the nature of  the thought of  the eternal return, 
following Klossowksi‘s arguments in Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle that its significance is primarily 
as a unique lived experience, characterised by its intensity. I then move to evaluate Nietzsche‘s 
attempts to explicate the thought and transform it into doctrine, concentrating in particular on 
the uses he puts it to in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, his only real attempt to elucidate it. I contrast this 
attempt negatively with the other narratives I have discussed, using the criterion I have 
established to reject its usefulness as a narrative for achieving greatness. 
Of all of  Nietzsche‘s thought, the eternal return is the idea that is still subject to the 
most wide-ranging interpretation. Many essays have been written that speculate on the meaning 
of  a few pages in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, and still no one seems to agree on very much. 183 
Nowhere is this more evident than in the recent collection of  essays on Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
edited by James Luchte. In The Gateway-Augenblick, Paul S. Loeb compares the ―doctrine of  
recurrence‖ with ―Plato‘s doctrine of  reincarnation in the Phaedo,‖ concluding that we can 
recollect aspects of  our identical past lives, ―Like Plato, Nietzsche argues for personal 
immortality, thinks that we may recollect our souls‘ knowledge of  our past lives, and emphasizes 
the significance of  dreams and courageous philosophical encounters with the facts of  our 
death.‖184 In contrast, Friedrich Ulfers and Mark Daniel Cohen develop an interpretation of  the 
eternal return which has absolutely nothing in common with Loeb‘s. In Zarathustra, the Moment, 
and Eternal Recurrence of  the Same: Nietzsche‘s Ontology of  Time, they argue ―that Nietzsche 
committed himself  to the development of  a coherent theory of  ontology, one which finds much 
                                                                 
182
 Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche & Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson, Columbia University Press, New 
York, 1983, p. 197. 
183 As I will establish, part of  the problem is authors often focus almost exclusively in part three of  
Zarathustra, rather than on the important revelations at the close of  part four. 
184 Paul S. Loeb, ‗The Gateway-Augenblick‘, in Nietzsche‘s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, edited by James Luchte, 
Continuum, London, 2008, p. 108 
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of  its inspiration in the mid-nineteenth century ideas of  natural science and in 
Naturphilosophie.‖185 Such is the divergence of  interpretations, which hardly seem to be discussing 
the same idea. 
Both of  these authors agree, however, over its centrality and importance in Nietzsche‘s 
work. While nobody disputes that the idea of  the eternal return rarely occurs outside of  Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, the argument generally runs along the lines that Nietzsche‘s considers this his 
central work, explicating his most significant ideas, and that is one of  the most significant, or the 
most significant idea in this work. I agree with the first claim, and disagree strongly with the 
second. It certainly seems to occupy a privileged place in the text: Zarathustra alludes to its 
importance in several important sections, most notably On Redemption before discussing it (in a 
fashion) in two sections in part three, On the Vision and the Riddle and The Convalescent. He appears 
noticeably transformed after the latter section, apparently having resolved his problem of  disgust 
at the small men of  the present. Yet Nietzsche‘s accounts of  the eternal return are incredibly 
problematic. These two explicit discussions are among Nietzsche‘s most obscure sections, and in 
every attempted explication he distances Zarathustra from the account given; Alan White argues 
that this distancing is the most ―striking: aspect of  Zarathustra:  
 
Yet what is most striking about Zarathustra, in light of  Nietzsche‘s retrospective 
description, is the extraordinarily problematic status of  the thought of  the eternal return 
within it... although it is the work‘s ―fundamental conception,‖ Zarathustra, rarely short 
of  words, expresses it only in recounting a dream, and then only in a preliminary fashion, 
before he has directly confronted it. Following his confrontation with the thought, he 
seems to discuss it not at all; what we hear of it we hear not from him, but from his 
animals.186 
 
 If  the eternal return is as central to his thought as many people think, then it is unclear 
why Nietzsche, apparent master of  different literary and rhetorical styles, did not make more of  
an effort at least to try to make its meaning clear. Klossowski at least partially explains this in 
Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, the most compelling, multifaceted, and complex interpretation of  
Nietzsche‘s relation to the eternal return. I do not imagine anyone is able to summarise this 
fascinating book satisfactorily, but there are several points, often overlooked (as the whole book 
seems to be in general), that help us understand the eternal return‘s role in Nietzsche‘s thought. 
                                                                 
185 Friedrich Ulfers & Mark Daniel Cohen, ‗Zarathustra, the Moment, and Eternal Recurrence of  the 
Same: Nietzsche‘s Ontology of  Time‘, in Nietzsche‘s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 75 
186 Alan White, Within Nietzsche‘s Labyrinth, Routledge, London, 1990, p. 71. 
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Klossowski uses Nietzsche‘s correspondence and published works to demonstrate that the 
eternal return struck Nietzsche as a moment of  personal revelation, rather than a clearly defined 
concept: ―The thought of  the Eternal Return of  the Same came to Nietzsche as an abrupt 
awakening in the midst of  a Stimmung, a certain tonality of  the soul. Initially confused with this 
Stimmung it gradually emerged as a thought; nonetheless, it preserved the character of  a revelation 
- as a sudden unveiling.‖187 The thought of  the eternal return was thus just a ―lived fact,‖ not a 
concept or ―representation,‖ and was marked out by it singular intensity: ―in Nietzsche‘s mind, it 
had not yet achieved a doctrinal form - the secret experience remained an experience whose only 
evidence lay in its intensity.‖188 
Klossowski details, using Nietzsche‘s private correspondence with Lou Salome, his desire 
to give the thought of  the Eternal Return a scientific basis, transforming it into a doctrine:  
 
At that time, the recurrence idea had not as yet become a conviction in Nietzsche‘s mind, 
but only a suspicion. He had the intention of  heralding it when and if it could be 
founded scientifically. We exchanged a series of letters about this matter, and Nietzsche 
constantly expressed the mistaken opinion that it would be possible to win for it an 
indisputable basis through physics experiments. It was he who decided at that to devote 
ten years of  exclusive study to the natural sciences at the University of  Vienna or Paris. 
Then, after ten years of  absolute silence, he would - in the event that his own surmise 
were to be substantiated, as he feared - step among people again as the teacher of  the 
doctrine of  eternal recurrence.189 
 
 Klossowski speculates that not only would a scientific basis for the idea have the 
advantage of  presenting the eternal return in a form compelling to others, but, also, ―the 
verification of  the lived fact by science would reassure him of  his own lucidity.‖190 The project 
of  scientific verification was doomed to failure, even irrespective of  the actual scientific aspect, 
because the real significance of  the doctrine, its ―revelatory ecstasy,‖ was ―undemonstrable.‖191 For 
Klossowski, the personal significance of  the thought of  the eternal return for Nietzsche is that it 
revealed the fortuitous nature of  his existence. 192  Before thoughts of  proving it scientifically, 
before interpreting it as a selective doctrine, and before thoughts of  it as a conspiracy of  the 
―vicious circle,‖ as a founding principle for a new elite, the thought of  the eternal return called 
                                                                 
187 Klossowski, p. 56. 
188 Ibid., p. 72 & 94. 
189 Ibid., p. 96 (Klossowski quoting Lou Salome). 
190 Ibid., p. 93. 
191 Ibid., p. 94. 
192 Ibid., p. 94. 
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into question the ―once-and-for-all‖ of  the subject, revealing ―innumerable times‖: the eternal 
return is a ―mode‖ in which a certain feeling is ―deployed‖:  
 
The Eternal Return is merely the mode of  its deployment. The feeling of  vertigo results 
from the once and for all in which the subject is surprised by the dance of innumerable times: 
the once-and-for-all disappears. The intensity emits a series of  infinite vibrations of  being, 
and it is these vibrations that project the individual self  outside of  itself as so many 
dissonances. Everything resounds until the consonance of  this single moment is re-
established, where the dissonances are once again resolved.193 
 
 Klossowski makes it clear that the thought of  the eternal return calls into question the 
identity of  the subject, revealing that it is contingent. The logic behind this move is not self-
evident, since the idea of  the same self  occurring infinite times does not in itself  seem to 
undermine the identity of  this self  that I now am at all. But we must remember that the idea is 
merely the mode by which the ‗feeling of  vertigo‘ is ‗deployed‘; the feeling is more important 
than the idea itself. And yet the image of  the circle does play an important role, although it could 
perhaps be substituted for another: at the moment of  the highest intensity, provoked by the 
thought, an image of  the circle was formed, which seemed to preclude the very self  that was 
thinking of  it. This image rent asunder the coherence of  the one that thought it, but nonetheless 
contained its own internal coherence. Klossowski‘s account of  this experience is worth quoting 
at length: 
 
Now in a Stimmung, in a tonality that I will designate as the highest feeling, and that I will 
aspire to maintain as the highest thought - what has happened? Have I not surpassed my 
own limits, and thereby depreciated the everyday code of signs - either because thought 
abandons me, or else because I can no longer discern the difference between 
fluctuations from without and those from within? 
Up to now, in the everyday context, thought was always referred back to me in the 
designation ‗myself.‘ But what becomes of  my own coherence at that degree of  intensity 
where thought ceases to refer back to me in the designation ‗myself,‘ and instead invents 
a sign by which it would designate its own coherence with itself ? If  this sign is no longer 
my own thought, does it not signify my exclusion from all possible coherence? If  it is 
still mine, how could it conceivably designate an absence of intensity at the highest 
degree of  intensity?  
                                                                 
193 Ibid., p. 72. 
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Let us now suppose that, during such a high tonality of the soul, an image of the Circle 
is formed. Something happens to my thought in this sign, it regards itself  as dead, as no 
longer my own: it enters into such a strict coherence with it that the invention of  this 
sign, this circle, takes on the power of all thought. Does this mean that the thinking 
subject would lose its own identity in a coherent thought that would itself  exclude 
identity? There is nothing here to distinguish the designating intensity from the 
designated intensity, to re-establish the coherence between the self  and the world, as 
constituted by everyday designations.194 
 
The high tonality of  the soul in which Nietzsche experienced the vertigo of  Eternal 
Return created the sign of  the Vicious Circle. What was instantaneously actualized in this 
sign was both the highest intensity of  thought, self-enclosed in its own coherence, and 
the absence of  any corresponding intensity in the everyday designations; by the same 
token, the designation of the self, to which everything had heretofore led, was itself  
emptied.195 
 
 This feeling of  ‗vertigo‘ and ‗highest intensity,‘ should sound familiar, since it describes 
exactly the same type of  experience I have been criticising throughout: an idea of  intoxication 
that involves losing the coherence of  the everyday subject. But Klossowski‘s strength is  that, 
unlike so many others, he recognises not only the allure that this feeling exerted on Nietzsche, 
but also his fear of  the threat it posed to the coherence of  his identity. Nietzsche‘s experience of  
the thought of  the eternal return, whatever its actual content and whatever meanings he would 
later put into the concept, was one of  an intense delirium, the total intoxication of  losing his self 
and his identity. The brilliance of  Klossowski‘s passage (above) is that he draws a tangible link 
between the idea of  the eternal return and the experience of  desubjectification which has so 
often been touted as the meaning of  Nietzsche‘s work. Nietzsche‘s experience of  the eternal 
return problematises the coherence and identity of  the everyday self, but nonetheless reveals a 
monstrous and ecstatic vision of  the character of  the world beyond human existence:  
 
This world: a monster of  energy, without beginning, without end... Force throughout, as 
a play of  forces and waves of  forces, at the same time one and many, increasing here and 
at the same time decreasing there; a sea of  forces flowing and rushing together, eternally 
changing, eternally flooding, with tremendous years of  recurrence, with an ebb and 
flood of  its forms... blessing itself  as that that which must return eternally, as a 
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becoming that knows no satiety, no disgust, no weariness: this, my Dionysian world of  the 
eternally self-creating, the eternally self-destroying, this mystery of  the twofold 
voluptuous delight, my ―beyond good and evil,‖ without goal, unless the joy of  the circle 
is itself  a goal. (WP 550/KSA 12:2[83]) 
 
 Klossowski‘s charting of  the ambiguity of  the experience of  the eternal return, its 
attraction and its repulsion, provides a richness and charm to his text, so often lacking in 
Nietzsche scholarship, finally concluding at the dramatic point whence Nietzsche breaks down in 
Turin and the ambiguity is resolved by the complete collapse of  his everyday coherence. In 
calling into question the absoluteness of  identity and coherence, the eternal return does not 
make these ideas obsolete, but, as Nietzsche would also write about sickness, it makes existence a 
problem. In undermining coherence, it makes consciously acquiring and maintaining coherence an 
important issue. While the thought of  the eternal return may have seemed ecstatic, it was also 
the experience of  ―Chaos,‖ and of  the emptying of  the self.196 Nietzsche, who increasingly 
feared losing his strength and coherence, now had an image, a particular thought that  came to 
personify these fears. But what it did reiterate was the importance of  re-establishing his identity 
and coherence, and creating himself  in such a way as to maintain these in the face of  the 
thought. It reinforced his belief  in creating his own identity, in assuming responsibility for 
maintaining his coherence, and thus for adopting a role as master of  chaos. By constructing 
character he could retain the ecstasy the thought of  the eternal return involves, whilst guarding 
against its worst excesses. Thus he could strip the ecstasy he found in the eternal return of  its 
ambiguous nature, and locate it in the triumph of  the self  over chaos, as the feeling of  
overcoming and holding firm against forces threatening its dispersal. Thus while the eternal 
return began as a thought ‗throwing Nietzsche outside of  himself,‘ he tried to transform it into a 
thought that one could only bear and affirm by fortifying the strength of  one‘s everyday self. We 
can note, in conclusion, that there is nothing of  unique importance about the thought of  the 
eternal return in this regard, its importance is instead in its role as a transgressive thought that 
shatters the everyday self. 
Nietzsche first put the thought to use in his published writings in The Gay Science, in the 
famous passage ―The greatest weight‖, where he proposes a thought experiment where ―a demon‖ 
proclaims: ―This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will have to live once more and 
innumerable times more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and 
every thought and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in our life will have to return to 
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you, all in the same succession and sequence.‖ (GS 341) Nietzsche then argues that: ―If  this 
thought gained possession of  you, it would change you as you are or perhaps crush you‖ (GS 
341). This first use of  the thought, then, clearly implies that the thought should have some kind 
of  transformative effect on the life of  the one to whom it is presented. The most 
straightforward interpretation of  the idea of  the eternal return is thus as a thought that can be 
taught, and that will affect a man‘s attitude to his life and behaviour. Many interpret it in some 
such way. Danto, for instance, interprets it as an imperative: ―Stated as an imperative: So act (or so 
be) that you would be willing to act exactly the same way (or be exactly the same thing) an 
infinite number of times over. Heeding this, men might stop feeling ressentiment. In existentialist 
terms, it is a plea for authenticity.‖197 Robert Solomon also interprets the eternal return as an 
―existential imperative,‖ which ―is a welcome counter to Christian mythology,‖ and can be used 
to provide an ―existential kick of inspiration.‖198 He discusses, however, a number of problems in 
using it in this way, not least that there are a number of different interpretations of how it can be 
used, none of which seem wholly satisfactorily. He concludes that ―it does seem to me a pretty 
slim and abstract support for such a weighty matter as life-affirmation.‖199 This seems to me to 
be correct. The problem with the eternal return, if we conceive of it primarily as an existential 
imperative, a thought experiment designed to force us to revaluate our lives, is that it just does 
not seem to be a very good one. In general, Nietzsche scholarship tends to be at best lukewarm 
to the idea, and, despite Nietzsche‘s popularity, I am not aware that it has had any significant 
cultural impact.200 While it might be a welcome alternative to a Christian denial of this world, it 
does not seem to have any more intuitive appeal - or deeper appeal - that I can fathom, than a 
popular cliché like ‗You only live once, make the most of it.‘ The problem, which will be a 
recurring one with Nietzsche‘s uses of the idea, is that once it becomes divorced from its nature 
as a lived experience, it feels rather hollow and banal.201 I do not think it is particularly useful as 
an existential imperative, and, in any case, while this idea might be a plausible description of the 
way Nietzsche tries to use the idea in The Gay Science, I do not think it captures the way that he 
tries to use it in Thus Spoke Zarathustra adequately. Furthermore, in a moment, I will argue that 
using the eternal return as an existential imperative also runs into the same problem that befalls 
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any attempt to use it to ‗transform‘ the one who thinks it: it tends to detract from the actual 
processes involved in achieving greatness. 
Thus Spoke Zarathustra is Nietzsche‘s most sustained and, in fact, only real attempt to 
explicate the idea; developing the figure of  Zarathustra was a chance for him to convey the 
intensity that lay at the centre of  the experience – Klossowski suggests that Zarathustra would 
―mime‖ Nietzsche‘s ecstasy: ―The need to provide a ‗systematic‘ commentary to his prophecy 
became even more imperative. The unintelligible evidence of  the Sils-Maria ecstasy, the implicit 
intensity of  the vertigo of  the Return - in a word, the high tonality of  the soul - was no longer 
Nietzsche‘s alone, but would be mimed by Zarathustra‘s bombastic gesticulations.‖202 Was this attempt 
to convey the meaning of  the eternal return successful? Judging by the sheer variety of 
contradictory interpretations of  the eternal return, and the almost total lack of  consensus over 
any aspects of  the idea, it would appear not. While Nietzsche would never cease praising Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra, often declaring it his greatest book (and sometimes the greatest book), 
Klossowski certainly doubts whether Nietzsche considered his enunciation of  the eternal return 
a success: ―Zarathustra‘s miming of  the high tonality seemed to ridicule Nietzsche‘s distress and 
make a mockery of  it.‖203  
Thus Spoke Zarathustra is about the narratives that Zarathustra uses to interpret himself 
and develop into a great man. We must therefore interpret the idea of  the eternal return as just 
such a narrative, i.e., as constructed by Zarathustra to produce certain effects on himself. Its 
importance is the role it plays in Nietzsche/Zarathustra‘s development, and it is important in 
direct proportion to its success in this capacity. Thus only by establishing the role that it plays 
can we evaluate the extent of  its success, and determine to what extent it might be 
interchangeable with other narratives that can fulfil the same purpose(s). To interpret the eternal 
return in this way is to reject the view that its significance is ontological, and that it is intrinsically 
bound up with other Nietzschean ideas, such as the will to power (Lampert) or the Übermensch 
(Kaufmann).204 The difficulties in explicating the idea are clear enough in the text itself. The 
most extended discussion occurs in ‗The Convalescent,‘ but Nietzsche only allows Zarathustra‘s 
animals to try to define the idea and Zarathustra immediately chastises them for trivialising the 
experience by making ―a hurdy-gurdy song of  it,‖ as he does several pages later, when they again 
try to summarise the idea (Z, III, 13). The animals‘ attempt to describe Zarathustra‘s experience 
of  the eternal return entirely fails to capture its ecstatic nature, mirroring the entire book‘s 
attempt to capture Nietzsche‘s experience. Much has been written about how accurate the 
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animals‘ account is supposed to be; White argues that the animals‘ words have often 
problematically been taken to be authoritative, and that even those who stress ―the unreliability 
of  the animals‘ first accounts‖ tend to accept the second: ―The animals‘ final account of  the 
eternal return is generally taken to express Nietzsche‘s own deepest thoughts.‖205  
 The most common type of  interpretation of  the eternal return in Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
– a type of  approach that can incorporate the idea of  it as an existential imperative, is to refer to 
its transformative role in the text. In particular, in ‗The Convalescent‘ thinking the thought of  the 
eternal return apparently ‗cures‘ Zarathustra of  his problem of  disgust. I want to suggest that 
this account is entirely misleading. The ‗transformation‘ is actually merely the end of  a long 
process of  self-development. Firstly, after initially conceiving of  the idea of  the eternal return, 
Zarathustra finds it impossible to speak about the idea or even think through its repercussions. 
The main reason appears to be that it exacerbates his constant problem of  disgust at mankind, a 
problem which preoccupies him from the outset. In ‗On the Rabble‘ he identifies the presence of 
‗the rabble‘ as the fundamental obstacle to his joy, which he could only ‗solve‘ by taking refuge in 
solitude: ―And the bite I gagged on most was not the knowledge that life itself  requires hostility 
and dying and torture crosses -. Instead I once asked, and almost choked on my question: What? 
Does life also require the rabble?‖ (Z, II, 6). The most pronounced immediate effect that the 
thought of  the eternal return has on him is that it intensifies his suffering at the thought of  the 
small man; it was already almost unbearable that he should exist, but the idea that he might 
return eternally nauseates Zarathustra to the point of  nihilism: 
 
The cross on which I suffered was not that I know human beings are evil - instead, I 
cried as no one yet has cried: 
‗A shame that their most evil is so very small! A shame that their best is so very small!‘ 
My great surfeit of  human beings - that choked me and crawled into my throat; and what 
the soothsayer said: ‗All is the same, nothing is worth it, knowledge chokes.‘ 
A long twilight limped ahead of me, a tired to death and drunk to death sadness that 
spoke with a yawning mouth: 
‗Eternally he returns, the human of  whom you are weary, the small human being‘ - thus 
my sadness yawned and dragged its foot and could not fall asleep.  
For me the human earth transformed into a cave, its chest caved in; everything living 
became human mold and bones and crumbling past. 
My sighing sat upon all human graves and could no longer stand up; my sighing and 
questioning croaked and choked and gnashed and lashed day and night: 
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- ‗alas, human beings recur eternally! The small human beings recur eternally!‘ - (Z, III, 
13) 
 
 Upon conceiving of  the idea of  the eternal return, he cannot bring himself  to speak of  it 
to his disciples: ―Now you have heard everything, and why I must return to my solitude. I 
withheld nothing from you, my friends. But hear this from as well, I who am still the most 
tightlipped of  human beings - and want to be so! Oh my friends! There is still something I could 
tell you, there is still something I could give you! Why do I not give it? Am I stingy?- (Z, II, 22). 
Indeed, the ―hunchback‖ notices that Zarathustra cannot even speak of  it to himself: ―But why 
does Zarathustra speak otherwise to his pupils - than to himself ?‖ (Z, II, 20), and in a bitter 
conversation with his ―stillest hour‖ Zarathustra uncharacteristically complains that affirming the 
eternal return is ―beyond my strength!‖, even hiding behind his projected figure of  the 
Übermensch: ―I am waiting for one more worthy‖ (Z, II, 22). He speaks of  the thought of  the 
eternal return as a ―challenge‖ that must be prepared for and overcome: ―Oh abysmal thought, 
you who are my thought! ... One day I shall yet find the strength and the lion‘s voice to summon 
you up!‖ (Z, III, 3), and then when he eventually confronts the thought it is not an accident, but 
a deliberate act of  will: ―I, Zarathustra, the advocate of  life, the advocate of  suffering, the 
advocate of  the circle - you I summon, my most abysmal thought!‖ (Z, III, 13). Finally, having 
developed in other aspects of  his existence, which have nothing to do with the eternal return, Zarathustra 
feels ready to call up the thought, endures it, is transformed, and awakes, convalescing. Thus 
while the idea does play a pivotal role in the text, it does not play a pivotal role in his development; 
the idea is not itself  transformative, but merely the final moment of  a longer transformation. 
This of  course merely continues Nietzsche‘s thesis, already discussed, that pain and pleasure are 
not opposites, but intrinsically linked: authentic joy is the constant overcoming of  resistance, the 
Will ‗thrusting itself  forward‘ again and again. The eternal return as a selective doctrine really just 
operates as a way of  ascertaining whether this thought and its repercussions have been 
understood properly. We have seen that in the experience of  authentic joy all distinction between 
pleasure and pain breaks down, as the abundant Will seeks out resistance to overcome. Great 
men seek out the ‗questionable and terrifying aspects of  existence‘ as challenges and resistances 
to be overcome. When Nietzsche lists the attributes required to be able to affirm the notion of  
the eternal return, he just restates the principles that define authentic joy: ―To endure the idea of 
the recurrence one needs: freedom from morality; new means against the facts of  pain (pain 
conceived as a tool, as the father of  pleasure; there is no cumulative consciousness of  
displeasure); the enjoyment of  all kinds of  uncertainty, experimentalism‖ (WP 1060/KSA 
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11:26[283]). Anyone experiencing authentic joy, and experiencing the world as perfect, will 
presumably have no difficulty affirming the idea of  the eternal return, rendering it rather 
superfluous for great men. It is only the weak, who still interpret happiness and joy as the 
absence of  pain, that will fail the test of  the eternal return, making a utilitarian judgement that 
the ‗pleasure‘ they experience (which is really nothing other than repose) cannot compensate for 
the pain and suffering they also feel. At times in Nietzsche‘s notes it seems that he cannot find 
any better use for the idea of  the eternal return than to use it to drive a further wedge between 
the weak and strong - as if  one were needed. He apparently believes, probably somewhat 
optimistically, that the weak will be unable to bear, firstly, that the eternal return implies losing 
the consoling idea of  an afterlife, and secondly, that their suffering will return eternally. The 
―philosopher‖ can thus use it as ―mighty pressure and hammer with which he breaks and 
removes degenerate and decaying races to make way for a new order of  life, or to implant into 
that which is degenerate and desires to die a longing for the end‖ and, apparently,  ―the races that 
cannot bear it stand condemned‖ (WP 1055/KSA 11:35[82] & WP 1053/KSA 11:26[376]). 
Nietzsche dreams that a doctrine of  the eternal return, made public, could paralyse the weak, and 
galvanise the strong, marking them out and affirming their superiority.  
Thus it should be obvious that the important thing is not the test of  the eternal return 
itself, but the process by which one creates oneself  in such a way as to be able to pass the test. 
Immediately after apparently transforming, Zarathustra is evidently keen to dismiss his animals‘ 
vulgar summaries, and settles down instead to converse with his soul. In ―On Great Longing he 
enters into a dialogue with his soul where he lists all the gifts that he has given to it. These gifts 
are none other than narratives by which he has redefined and restructured his soul. The result of  
these narratives is the ever-increasing abundance of  his soul: ―Oh my soul, super-rich and heavy 
you stand there now, a grapevine with swelling udders and crowded, brownish gold grapes‖ (Z, 
III, 14). Every time commentators overvalue the eternal return as a concept, positing it as the 
meaning of  Thus Spoke Zarathustra, they tend to lose sight of  all of  the narratives that the great 
man employs to create himself; it is the whole process that is transformative. 
If  Zarathustra‘s actual transformation owes little to the eternal return, then we must look 
deeper for the normative role it plays in his existence. Staten argues that the eternal return‘s 
significance does not become clear until near the end of  part four - and even here only partly 
clear. He singles out the following passage in particular as especially rich in depth and ambiguity.  
 
You grapevine! Why do you praise me! I cut you! I am cruel, you bleed - what does your 
praise want of  my drunken cruelty? 
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―What become perfect, everything ripe – wants to die!‖ so you speak. Blessed, blessed be 
the vintner‘s knife! But everything unripe wants to live, alas! 
Pain says ―Refrain! Away, you pain!‖ But everything that suffers wants to live, to become 
ripe and joyful and longing, 
-longing for what is farther, higher, brighter. ―I wants heirs,‖ thus speaks all that suffers, 
―I want children, I do not want myself‖ – 
But joy does not wants heirs, not children – joy wants itself, wants eternity, wants 
recurrence, wants everything eternally the same. (Z, IV, 19) 
 
 This is a remarkable passage, often neglected, because commentators have tended to 
focus on the use of  the eternal return in part three of  Thus Spoke Zarathustra, no doubt because it 
is here that he is apparently ‗transformed.‘ Stanley Rosen‘s The Mask of  Enlightenment, one of  the 
only commentaries/expositions of  Thus Spoke Zarathustra, does not even mention it, or any of 
the ideas it contains.206 Staten argues that this passage captures the ambiguity of  the meaning of  
the eternal return to Zarathustra: ―The tensions in the language of  this passion, both internal 
and contextual, are extraordinary. There is a straightforward sense here, and also something that 
destabilizes the sense.‖ 207  The ambiguity stems from the fact that these passages invert 
Nietzsche‘s standard formula, where sufferers want to turn away from life and to deny existence, 
whereas the strong can confront its terrible and questionable aspects. Here, rather, ―it is the 
sufferers who want to live and procreate and the joyous ones who want to die.‖208 These sections 
of  Thus Spoke Zarathustra are some of  the most obscure and esoteric passages Nietzsche wrote, 
as he asserts that the man who has become perfect, ‗ripe,‘ who has reached the peak of 
abundance, want to die.  
What is happening in these passages, and what is necessary for Zarathustra to get to the 
idea that abundance eventually means wanting to die, is that Nietzsche is breaching the wall 
between the personal and the impersonal (Staten calls this distinction the ―internal or micro-
economy‖ and the ―grand economy‖). 209  The great man‘s will to power dissolves into the 
universal will to power. The great man has learnt to desire and affirm all of  his suffering, but 
Nietzsche now transforms this into a desire for all things, eternally. In a note from the Will to 
Power Nietzsche attempts to link the eternal return and the Dionysian, and make it appear that 
the Dionysian tendencies conclude in the idea of  the eternal return:  
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The word ―Dionysian‖ means: an urge to unity, a reaching out beyond personality, the 
everyday, society, reality, across the abyss of  transitoriness: a passionate-painful 
overflowing into darker, fuller, more floating states; an ecstatic affirmation of  the total 
character of  life as that which remains the same, just as powerful, just as blissful, through 
all change; the great pantheistic sharing of joy and sorrow that sanctifies and calls good 
even the most terrible and questionable qualities of  life; the eternal will to procreation, 
to fruitfulness, to recurrence; the feeling of  the necessary unity of  creation and 
destruction. (WP 1050/KSA 13:14[14]) 
 
 We might conclude that this passage reinforces Zarathustra‘s apparent contention that 
the state of  ‗ripeness,‘ of  wanting to die, is the final conclusion of  the process of  becoming 
abundant, the highest state, where a man redeems his energy in the whole. The Dionysian desire 
for greater and greater unity eventually leads the great man to reconcile with death through the 
image of  the eternal return, through a desire to redeem his energy in the Universal. Nietzsche, 
who consistently rebukes the consolations of  the weak, who criticises any narcotisation, any 
anaesthesia, any attempt to deny the conditions of  existence, is seeking to be consoled from the fact 
that the highest joy is, in itself, transitory. This is the one questionable aspect of  existence that 
Zarathustra cannot overcome, but must reconcile himself  with. Thus Staten argues that, while 
we might interpret the thought as hard to bear, it is actually: ―the most economical thought, the most 
consoling one, the one that recuperates absolutely all of  the squandering that goes on in the 
grand economy of  the whole.‖210 In a note collected in the Will to Power, and which, I suspect, 
was unlikely ever to be published willingly, Nietzsche reflects on the eternal return‘s consolatory 
role: 
 
A certain emperor always bore in mind the transitoriness of  all things so as to not take 
them too seriously and to live at peace among them. To me, on the contrary, everything 
seems far too valuable to be so fleeting: I seek an eternity for everything; ought one to 
pour the most precious salves and wines into the sea?-  My consolation is that everything 
that has been is eternal: the sea will cast it up again. (WP 1065/KSA 13:11[94]) 
 
Thus it appears Nietzsche has found a use for the idea of  the eternal return, which, Zarathustra 
has us believe, still maintains the depth, drunkenness and lucidity of  the original lived experience. 
There are, however, tremendous problems with this idea, which must be solved if  the eternal 
return is going to play the role that he apparently desires for it. We must fall back on his criteria 
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for evaluating values and narratives. Nietzsche is not immune from his own criticisms, and just as 
he is so keen to diagnose psychological weakness in others, we must probe where his values 
might betray weakness. We must therefore submit Nietzsche to his own criteria, and ask: does 
the idea of  the eternal return reflect want or abundance? Exhaustion or plenitude?   
Klossowski insightfully recognises that the thought of  the eternal return revealed to 
Nietzsche that he might have fallen into the trap he identified in others, of  conflating exhausted 
fervour and nervous mysticism with abundance and joy: ―Another motif  seemed to have 
intervened in Nietzsche‘s hesitation. Did not the very experience of  the Eternal Return bear 
witness, in Nietzsche, to what he himself  had denounced as exhaustion? Was he or was he not a victim 
of  what he called the most dangerous misunderstanding - namely, that the symptoms of  exhaustion 
would be confused with those of  an excess or overabundance of  life?‖211 The thought initially 
designates incoherence, or, at best, a coherence that forms around the idea of  the circle, and 
excludes the one that thinks it. It is certainly reasonable to suppose that it was the result of  
exhaustion, of  irritability, nervousness, of  a desire to be intoxicated by losing himself. We know that 
the exhausted fail to perceive themselves as such. To the extent that thinking the eternal return led to 
Nietzsche losing himself, it seems likely that its origins did lie in exhaustion, not abundance. The 
origins of  the thought thus certainly appear to be, at the very least, suspect.  While the initial 
thought of  the world as eternally recurring energy overwhelms Nietzsche, we have seen that he 
tries to tame this thought in a variety of  ways, to put it to use, to form a doctrine, to use it as a 
teaching, a useful narrative to inspire others to greatness, and finally, to reconcile with death. We 
must determine if  this final manifestation finally liberates the eternal return from the shadow of  
exhaustion. 
We should immediately recall that Nietzsche has consistently criticised using ideas as 
consolations, when they are attempts to anaesthetise and narcotise the terrifying and questionable 
aspects of  existence, and we must consider whether the eternal return escapes these criticisms. 
The reason he criticised consolatory ideas is that they represent an unhelpful and regressive 
attitude to the problem of  suffering. Rather than focus on the physiological causes of  his 
suffering, and the places where he is complicit in his suffering, the sufferer focuses on imaginary 
spiritual and psychological causes, and thus perpetuates his misery. What he should really be 
doing is focusing on strengthening his Will, creating an abundance of  energy, of  plastic power, 
that will enable him to deal with his problems, to affirm his suffering, and so on. Now, it might 
be objected that the problem of  death is different in kind than many other causes of  suffering, 
in that it does not appear to have a readily available solution, i.e., it is not clear that focusing 
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properly on the cause of  suffering will help. This is, however, rather misleading. The idea is not 
to ‗solve‘ all problems, in the sense of  removing the suffering. It is rather to be able to affirm the 
suffering, to discipline the suffering, to use it to elevate oneself. Thus it is easy to imagine that 
the monster of  energy, with his abundance of  plastic, healing power, should be able to affirm, or 
at the very least accept, the idea of  death and the transitory, the once and for all of  his deeds, 
which are, after all, perhaps the most terrifying and questionable aspects of  exi stence as it is. 
There is no reason to suppose, then, that desiring to be consoled about death, about the loss of 
all the most valuable things, about the transitoriness of  existence, is any more helpful than 
desiring to be consoled over any other form of  suffering. In both cases, the proper thing, if  
Nietzsche is to be true to his own writings, is to increase one‘s strength, not to blame existence 
and fictionalise it. It is not at all clear, then, that the eternal return is a desirable response to the 
problem of  death and the transitory, and, as a ‗solution,‘ it suggests inadequate strength and 
energy in the one who desires such a consolation. But there are more problems with the way 
Zarathustra uses this version of  the eternal return, which extend beyond its relationship with 
death. We can assess these problems by contrasting the eternal return with two general principles 
that I have developed about the sorts of  narratives that are conducive to greatness. Whilst these 
are not infallible rules, they are significant patterns in Nietzsche‘s discussions of  how we should 
think about ourselves.  
The eternal return violates Nietzsche‘s general principle that we must emphasise long processes of  
training and self-cultivation over shortcuts or sudden transformations. We have seen Nietzsche argue again 
and again that the narratives we use to structure ourselves and our existence should emphasise 
the necessity of  long processes of  habitualisation, of  rigorous asceticism, of  self-mastery. I have 
criticised a number of  approaches because they propose shortcuts to the highest experiences, but 
only end up aping Nietzsche‘s ideal. Whenever a commentator proposes an account of 
Nietzschean intoxication that does not depend upon possessing abundant energy, or an account 
of  creation that does not depend upon possessing the ability to assimilate experience and make it 
conform to oneself, or an idea of  happiness based on passively receiving all stimulus, we should 
be suspicious about whether there is residual ressentiment in such claims, and an attempt to make 
states available to all, with no regard for effort. Likewise, whenever commentators use the idea of  the 
eternal return to explain a sudden transformation of  Zarathustra in book three, they fall into this 
trap, of  eschewing a long process in favour of  a sudden and easy solution. And is Nietzsche not 
falling into this same trap with the way he uses the eternal return in book four? Nietzsche has 
grappled with the problem of  what to do with the eternal return ever since its first ‗revelation,‘ 
and Zarathustra grapples in ‗On Free Death‘ with the question of  how to know when to die 
 148 
 
 
(―victorious, surrounded by those who hope and promise‖) (Z, I, 21). Then, suddenly, in an 
esoteric revelation, which inverts his normal thesis that sufferers want to turn away from life and 
the strong want to confront it, he reveals that the eternal return, understood properly, makes one 
want to die. The problem of  death, of  when to choose one‘s death, is resolved not through a 
long process of  training and habitualisation, but through a sudden feeling of  ‗over-ripeness,‘ an 
urge to die, to recuperate oneself  in the whole. And finally Nietzsche seems to have found 
something for the eternal return to do, a role for it that matches the privileged place that he 
intuitively feels it deserves. It feels rather too convenient.  
Now, it could be objected that the eternal return, as Zarathustra employs it, does not 
violate the principle of emphasising long term, difficult, and effort-driven processes over 
‗shortcuts‘ as much as I am suggesting, because he suggests that one only reaches the feeling of 
wanting to die when one has already reached the peak of abundance. Thus, if we believe this claim, 
then the whole process of creating oneself, of becoming stronger, giving oneself a strong Will, 
etc., is required so that we can truly appreciate this experience of being overripe, over-abundance, 
wanting to die. Even if we accept this, I nonetheless think that it still violates the principle of 
emphasising long-term processes and self-development over instant solutions. In the midst of 
narratives that emphasise returning our focus to the body, ignoring spiritual and metaphysical 
illusions in favour of physiological solutions, we get a bewildering esoteric narrative which 
Nietzsche cannot make up his mind what to do with, let alone how to convey it to his readers. If 
we take the thought only to apply to the one who is already abundant, even more problems arise. 
If we take this idea seriously it creates a paradox about the thought which makes it wholly 
unsuitable as a narrative of greatness. If the point of constructing narratives is to cultivate 
greatness, what good is one that we can only make sense of once we achieve the highest state? If 
it is a feeling which we will acquire anyway, when we achieve the required level of abundance, 
what good can it do to impart it as a teaching? As a feeling and an idea it is only relevant to those 
who have already acquired the highest states, since the notion that once we achieve a long 
process of self-mastery and cultivation we will feel so overripe that we will want to die hardly 
seems particularly aspirational. But those who access these highest states will not need the feeling 
explained to them. 
The eternal return violates Nietzsche‘s general principle that the narratives of the self should promote 
greater unity and self-mastery. Throughout I have emphasised that the idea of authentic joy hinges 
upon reinforcing the boundaries of the self, increasing the coherence of the mind, increasing the 
feeling of self and the feeling of power, and cultivating the ability to resist stimulus. Can we really 
believe that the whole process of developing character, of self-mastery, of developing 
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abundance, really leads Zarathustra to want to die as he becomes perfect? We can well 
understand that his moment of perfection, where the world is transformed æsthetically into a 
mirror of this perfection, that his joy ―wants itself‖ and ―wants everything eternally the same‖ (Z, 
IV, 19). But the presence of his joy is wholly down to his understanding of the necessity of 
overcoming resistance, and his readiness to confront the fearful and questionable aspects of 
existence. And yet, we are led to believe, all of a sudden he desires the absolute dispersal of his 
self, the destruction of his boundaries and his cohesion, indulging in ―lust for eternity and for the 
nuptial ring of rings – the ring of recurrence!‖ (Z, III, 16). If we accept that this desire is the 
natural conclusion of abundance, as Nietzsche seems to do, it cannot help but undermine the 
emphasis on greater unity and self-mastery through the rest of his work. It is impossible to 
emphasise the importance of unity and strength of will, while simultaneously idolising a narrative 
that destroys them.212 The eternal return thus detracts from the significance of his underlying 
project, becoming the great man. 
Throughout all of Nietzsche‘s attempts to make the importance of the thought of the 
eternal return clear, it never loses its connotations with a form of intoxication that involves loss 
of coherence and the feeling of self. Despite Nietzsche‘s claim that he was a ―psychologist who has 
not his equal,‖ he could not avoid the most dangerous misunderstanding, that of confusing exhausted 
intoxication with abundant intoxication (EH III, 5). Thus the fine line between the two and the 
relentless need to investigate the physiological sources of our values and thoughts. We must 
resist any attempt to breach the personal and the impersonal, because joy belongs to the monster 
of energy, who reposes in his ability to resist and overcome stimulus, and transforms the world 
æsthetically until it mirrors his perfection. While the eternal return might be an interesting insight 
into Nietzsche‘s psychology, it is useless as a narrative for achieving greatness, whatever mould 
he tries to force it into. But where the eternal return fails, his method for evaluating values 
succeeds.  
 
 
                                                                 
212 Nathan Widder, for example, takes Zarathustra‘s final account of  the eternal return seriously, and 
argues that it solves the problem of  what he meant when he claimed that the will needs ―something 
higher than reconciliation‖ to deal with its problems with the past. The eternal return completes the 
process of  ―redemption,‖ which ―culminates with the ego‘s dissolution.‖ Thus, ―the eternal return is 
inseparable from this kind of  death or ―going under.‖‖ When Widder considers the normative 
repercussions of  this, he demonstrates the problem I am describing, where the eternal return leads us to 
devalue the unity of  the self: ―The ethical sensibility required for overcoming is a consciousness of  the 
ego‘s superficiality, of  its being a façade.‖ Nathan Widder, ‗A Semblance of  Identity: Nietzsche on the 
Agency of  Drives and Their Relation to the Ego,‘ 2011, forthcoming, p. 25-6. 
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